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The research contained in this thesis investigates the main determinants of Jordanian bank 
performance and related issues covering liquidity risk, risk-based capital requirements and 
capital regulations using data for 13 Jordanian commercial banks covering the period 2003- 
2015. This period includes measures taken by policy makers, including the Central Bank of 
Jordan (CBJ), to liberalize and reform the Jordanian banking sector to improve bank 
performance. The thesis is structured as follows: chapter one introduces the subject matter of 
the thesis; chapter two provides a select survey of the literature. Chapter three briefly 
discusses developments in the Jordanian banking sector, including the reform measures since 
the 1990s. Chapters four, five, six and seven are the core empirical chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter four examines the impact of competition, liquidity risk and market interest rate 
environment on Jordanian banks’ profitability using Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects 
(RE) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methods. The findings of chapter four  
provide evidence that reform policies   favored the overall profitability and efficiency of the 
Jordanian banking sector. However, the evidence suggests the need for improvements in bank 
competition. Liquidity risk is shown to have a significant positive impact on profitability, 
while the banks’ size, capital adequacy ratio, and equity to assets all reduce profitability 
measures. Chapter five examines the relationship between bank efficiency/productivity, 
capital, and risk using Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) methods. The results show that 
return on assets (ROA), capital, size and stock market development (SMD) are essential for 
Jordanian banks’ efficiency and risk measures. Chapter six measures how competition and 
efficiency of the banking sector influence the cost of credit for borrowing firms using data 
from 118 firms using fixed effect and random effect method. The findings indicate that firm 
size, bank competition, and GDP are the main drivers of firms borrowing costs. Chapter seven 
studies the impact of bank funding liquidity risk on Jordanian commercial banks' risk-taking 
behavior and analyses the impact of the CBJ 2000 imposed deposit insurance scheme on 
Jordanian banks' liquidity creation using a FE, a RE and difference in difference methods 
(DD). In relation to the risk determinants, the results show that large-capitalized banks tend 
to be involved in riskier investment decisions than their less capitalized counterparts. Also, 
an increase in deposit funding increases both liquidity creation and risk-weighted assets. The 
difference in differences results indicates that after the introduction of the deposit insurance 
scheme, banks with excessive deposits have lower rates of liquidity funding risk, and 
consequently reduced probability to default.  
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1.1 Research background and motivation to the study of Commercial          
Banking in Jordan 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 impacted the world economy in many ways, including 
deep financial losses in asset value, bankruptcies, and the rethinking of regulation applied to 
international financial markets and institutions. The global financial crisis that originated in the 
United States of America (USA), because of subprime lending had a global impact and 
spillover into Jordan. This indicates that the USA's financial sector problems can significantly 
impact the real economy of a developing country such as Jordan. In the immediate onset of  the 
2008 crisis, the central banks have immediately affected the governments and regulators 
devised by measures designed to stabilize their financial systems and in particularly the 
banking sector. Central bankers aimed to protect the financial institutions and, in particular, the 
banks, against potential risks and economic shocks , to safeguard the economies and provide 
signal to international financial markets and the global economy. Those careful and thoughtful 
measures were being taken to safeguard the international financial system and to ensure the 
continued growth and development of the global economy. It is recognized that the 
performance of financial sector is very sensitive to changes the business cycle (Smirlock, 1985, 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997b), inflation (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2000), as well as the interest rate environment (Bourke, 1989).  
Particularly the banking sectors are driven by internal and external factors. Internal 
factors are those related to bank-specific characteristics such as size, capital, liquidity, risk, and 
capital requirements. In contrast, external factors are associated with the extrinsic legal and 
economic environments governing the banking industry. As a developing country exposed to 
global shocks, Jordan's economy was not protected from the severity of economic and financial 
shocks. Jordan has been confronting several shocks, including the global financial crisis and 
the Arab Spring since 2007. It also had a severe dampening effect on the domestic economy. 
The imposition of a tight fiscal policy that followed these crises is accompanied by prudent 
monetary policy (which was accompanied by several cuts in interest rates in 2007-2010) from 
10 
 
the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ). It helped in some ways to maintain the economic and 
monetary stability to sustain growth rates, high levels of reserves and price stability. While 
financial stability was maintained by the CBJ via the application of prudent supervisory and 
legislative policy. It may be argued to consistent with the policy measures imposed by the G7 
countries central banks. Besides the imposition of these measures, the management of the 
banking system in the aftermath of global banking crisis contributed towards protecting the 
financial system against the recurrence of a crisis, given that the banking system is relatively 
conservative in its approach to banking, with high levels of capital and low exposure to 
sovereign euro denominated debt.  
Since 1948 Jordan’s banking sector has been one of the strongest performing sectors of 
the Jordanian economy. Therefore, it’s given a special role in Jordan’s financial system, the 
banking sector has played an active role in terms of development and growth of the economy, 
in the provision of credit facilities for the household and business sectors which enabled the 
economy to continue on an upward trajectory growth trend. Currently, the number of banks in 
Jordan stands at 25 banks are engaged in the conventional banking business. In 1934 only 2 
banks were operating in Jordan, but increased to five by 1955.  During the 1990s, 25 banks 
operated in Jordan’s banking sector, thirteen engaged in commercial banking activities, three 
in Islamic banking activity, and nine are foreign commercial banks. Commercial banks provide 
customers with various services (modern and traditional) such as accepting deposits and 
granting credit to households, businesses and other outlets. Other income-generating activities 
include the provision of credit card, economic and financial consulting, bill collection, and 
financing government development and economic plans. Deposits are the most important 
sources of funds for these banks who are Islamic banks aside. They generate the majority of 
their earnings (or profits) from the spread rate, which is the difference between the debt interest 
and credit interest.  
In 2003, Jordanian banks conducted their banking operations through a network of 581 
branches and 158 representative offices, compared to 786 branches and 83 representative 
offices in 2015. The banking sector is a key sector of the Jordanian economy which is 
accounted in 2015 for 18.82 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) compared to 3.85 
percent of GDP in 2003. It its widely considered a profitable sector for local and foreign 
investors with a return on assets (ROA) of 1.3 per cent in 2015 compared to 0.07 per cent in 
2003, and return on equity (ROE) of 10.3 percent in 2015 compared to 9.9 percent in 2003. 
11 
 
The primary source of income for Jordanian banks is the Interest yield from loans with interest 
margins accounting for around 77.4 per cent of total banks income in 2015 compared to 63.7 
percent in 2003. 
Despite the political and economic risks in the Middle East and North Africa region 
(MENA), the banking system in Jordan provided stability due to resilience and the soundness 
of its financial position that continued to improve and demonstrated the robust nature of the 
banking sector. As a result, the banking sector has been an integral source of support to the 
economy during periods of economic uncertainty. Furthermore, aided by the CBJ pro-growth 
monetary stance, which followed from the growth in deposits and profits at commercial banks 
during the period represented by the data used in the present study, the banking sector continued 
to post healthy performance. 
 Historically, monetary policy in Jordan has evolved over two stages. The first stage in 
1964-1990, is characterized by the use of direct and traditional monetary instruments such as  
setting of interest rates to control banks operations, while the second stage from 1991-to the 
present was largely influenced by the banking crisis of 1989 which as a result of its impact on 
the Jordanian economy compelled the government to co-operate with the World Bank and the 
IMF to develop a structural reform program so as to enable to restructure and rebuild the 
economy in the aftermath of the crisis. One of the main goals of the structural reform program 
was to improve the structure and efficiency of Jordanian banks which was enabled because of 
measures designed to liberalize the banking system.  
Prior to the 1980s banking in Jordan was dominated by domestic banks as foreign banks 
found it extremely difficult to penetrate the domestic banking market and it is a large degree 
helped to insulate the local banking market from foreign competition. Thus, Jordanian 
commercial banks operated in an oligopolistic environment which meant that interest rates on 
both credits and deposits were determined monopolistically. Over the period of 1988–1991 
following the devaluation of Jordanian Dinar (JD) the CBJ increased interest rates as a way of 
incentivizing Jordanian citizens to save. But as a result of the financial difficulties, combined 
with the collapse of Petra Bank and six other financial institutions linked to it. The banking 
system suffered by crisis which came from climaxed in August 1989 as a result of inadequate 
banking regulations which ignored widespread fraud in the banking sector. Moreover, since 
the level of market abuse had reached a level such that it could no longer go unnoticed.  The 
CBJ was forced to implement measures which one are compelled the Jordanian banks to 
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comply with operating ratios while imposing credit limits also. It would force the banks to 
carryout proper risk credit analysis on all loan advances. The second reason is the high level of 
Non-performing loans (NPL) resulting from the overexposure of the banks to the real estate 
market. And finally, the speculative activity of banks in the foreign exchange market was 
exposed by many banks to excessive foreign exchange exposure. 
From the early 1990s to onward the CBJ implemented a series of measures designed to 
facilitate the deregulation of the Jordanian financial system. One of the key policy measures 
was the removal of restrictions on interest rates to help promote a diversified, efficient, and 
competitive banking system, as it was thought that the operational flexibility of the banks was 
one way of increasing their competitiveness. Following these measures, the interest rate 
margins increased at Jordanian banks and the CBJ adopted a floating policy for both debit and 
credit markets interest rate. Another crucial policy change was the decision to allow market 
forces to set market interest rates. While the decision to remove restrictions on investment 
activities had favourable effect on all the important indicators of bank performance.  
During the period of 2003-2015, most of these indicators are reflected by a significant 
improvement in assets quality, profitability and efficiency of the Jordanian banking sector. 
However, it is worth noting that the financial crises had temporary and mitigating effect on the 
development of these indicators, especially during the period represented by the global banking 
and financial crisis of 2008 to 2010.  Table 1.1 shows the development of selected bank 
indicators over the period 2003 to 2015.  
Table 1 1 Selected bank indicators 2003-2015. 
Year Return on Equity (ROE) Return on Assets (ROA) Interest Margin to Gross Income 
2003 9.9% 0.7% 63.7% 
2004 13.1% 1.1% 58.3% 
2005 20.9% 2.0% 56.4% 
2006 15.0% 1.7% 70.2% 
2007 12.6% 1.6% 66.7% 
2008 11.5% 1.4% 71.3% 
2009 8.8% 1.1% 71.6% 
2010 8.8% 1.1% 74.3% 
2011 8.3% 1.1% 70.1% 
2012 8.6% 1.1% 76.6% 
2013 9.9% 1.2% 77.6% 
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2014 11.1% 1.4% 77.9% 
2015 10.3 1.3% 77.4% 
Source:  CBJ Database 2003-2015 
 
Bank managers usually face difficult choices to secure high returns for their 
shareholders while keeping risks under control. These excessive risk intentions are then 
controlled by the CBJ regulatory measures which are designed to maintain the stability of the 
banking system. Following the CBJ reforms which created a low-interest-rate environment in 
an effort to stimulate lending and the channeling of funds for the development of the economy, 
the Jordanian Deposit Insurance Corporation (JDIC) was established in 2000s as a part of the 
reform programs to protect deposit-taking institutions against potential internal and external 
shocks. In addition, the CBJ also encouraged the integration of risk management policies in 
banking operations to enhance the safety and soundness of banks and to strengthen the financial 
system as a whole. The imposition of stress testing exercises in all banks was seen as a 
necessary requirement following the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
announcement in 2009. A bank’s stress test is one conducted under various hypothetical 
scenarios for example, an economic recession, a crisis in financial markets, or external shocks, 
designed to determine whether a bank is adequately capitalized to withstand the effects of any 
adverse economic development that would ultimately impair a bank’s balance sheet.  
The 2008 global financial crises on the Jordanian economy were largely felt in the real 
sector of the economy. This was due in part to the country's high dependence on imported food 
and oil and the cost of external finance which became more difficult and expensive to access, 
causing shareholders in Jordan to value cash at a premium since the crisis (Ahid and Augustine, 
2012). As a result, the profitability of the banking sector was deeply affected. In a study by 
(Ahid and Augustine, 2012) on Jordanian banking. The authors split the post-financial crisis 
period in Jordan into two stages. The first stage extends from April 2008 to December 2008 
and the second stage runs from the period 2008 – 2011. The findings note that during the first 
period, the impact of the crises was driven by the downturn in the values of grants from 
developed and international donors who were adversely affected by the crises. The response of 
the CBJ was to apply measures to protect the banking sector to ensure its bank stability against 
the crises. One such measure was the imposition of strict loan classification to reduce 
unnecessary exposure, with interest rate set at 10.5 percent for housing loans.  
Despite such measures, many depositors withdrew their savings in large amounts which 
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led to a decline in the number of deposits in foreign currency from 5370.1 million JD in 2007 
to 4754.1 million JD in 2008. However, confidence in the stability of Jordanian banks was 
restored when the government declared that it would fully guarantee all bank deposits. To 
prevent a further run-on Jordanian banks, the CBJ required the banks to increase their capital 
(both in JD and foreign currency) to cover any potential liquidity shortages. The CBJ also 
decreed that the banks should stress test conditions against liquidity levels. And following the 
widespread imposition of Basel III, stress testing became one of the main tools applied by 
banks in their effort to withstand regional and global shocks and thereby hedge against potential 
risky positions. According to the CBJ the results of these tests are not only helped in 
determining the required level of capital and liquidity but also protected the banking system.  
To strengthen the solvency of banks and their ability to face banking risk with some 
degree of confidence. In 2000 the CBJ amended the 2000 law regarding the minimum capital 
of licensed banks.  In this respect the CBJ raised the minimum capital of banks to 100 million 
JDs for Jordanian banks and 50 million JD for branches of foreign banks. In 2011, the CBJ 
amended the 1971 Act with respect to medium-term grants of licensed banks to increase bank 
lending to the real sectors of the economy to boost economic growth and the economy 
following the recession. In 2012 the CBJ updated the operational framework for monetary 
policy to steer the level of bank reserves surplus and interest rate lending between banks. In a 
move that would help to make Jordanian banks more flexible with respect to bank liquidity 
management, the CBJ continued to apply the corridor system within the operational framework 
for monetary policy whereby the CBJ sets the floor and ceiling of policy rate while at the same 
time allowing other money market rates such as the interbank rate to wander within this floor 
and ceiling.  
On the regulatory front in 2013 the CBJ updated many instructions in the field of 
banking supervision and regulation and 2014 issued a number of instructions related to 
corporate governance and the role of audit committee in the branches of foreign banks 
operating in the banking sector of Jordan. Other policy measures that had a calming effect on 
the banking crises were the government’s guarantee of all bank deposits until the end of 
December 2009, which helped to re-establish investors trust as earlier noted. During this period 
the CBJ cut interest rates three times until April 2009, thus bringing the benchmark rate to 5.25 
percent. In an effort to enhance bank liquidity the CBJ reduced banks' reserve requirements 
from 10 percent to 7 percent in October 2008 (European Commission, 2010). 
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The importance of the study is to investigate the impact of the reform program, Arab 
Spring, Global Financial Crises and the Basel I, II, and III on the Jordanian commercial banks 
during the 2003 and 2015 as the Jordanian market faced a huge event affected the banking 
sector directly as mentioned above. The research studied of 13 Jordanian commercial banks 
that are listed in Amman Stock Exchange which they present 94% of the Jordanian banking 
system assets, the minimum CAR of the CBJ is 12% and the Jordanian commercial banks CAR 
reached 21% which give the importance to study the impact of the high CAR on the bank 
performance and the risk-taking behavior. The research  examines eleven hypotheses covering 
four empirical topics that investigated the factors which affecting the Jordanian commercial 
banks performance, competition, efficiency, capital and risk-taking behavior, which they are 
trend areas needs to study especially after the Global financial crises 2008.  One of the main 
reasons behind this investigation is the rare of the studies that examined the same topic in the 
Middle East in general and especially in Jordan. Findings of the study takes it’s important as it 
give and highlight the impact of the new capital requirement regulations, liquidity risk and risk-
based capital regulation on the Jordanian commercial banks which directly may help the CBJ 
regulators to take the right and logical decision to improve and enhance the sector. It is helping 
the banks manager as well to take the right decision in order to minimize the banks risks. The 
study results have its main impact on the soundness and the safety of the Jordanian banking 
system as the policy maker can see the impact of the reform, liberalization and deregulation 
policy they did adopt on the banking system which give them a sight of the efficient of the 
adopted policy.  
 The study only focused on one aspect of banking sector indicators which is a risk and 
overlooked indicators related to productivity, efficiency and profitability. Thus, there is a need 
for a comprehensive empirical assessment of the impact of the recent CBJ reforms on 
performance, risk and efficiency indicators. This research is the first of its kind to cover an 
extended time span from 2003 until 2015 while considering the effects of some major 
incidences namely the 2008 global financial crises, Basel II and III accords announcements 
and regional political shocks such as the Arab Spring in the Middle East area and especially 
Jordan which makes a direct contribution to the existing literature by filling this gap in the 
Middle East area. The study's importance may be important to examine it for the Palestine, 
Syrian, Iraq and Lebanon banking system as it will show the impact of immigration from those 
countries as a result of war on the banking system. The huge amount of money that moved to 
Jordan due to the huge number of refugees also has a huge impact on the banks' performance.   
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There is a considerable gap in the literature on banking performance indicators in 
Middle Eastern countries especially Jordan. And despite the reforms undertaken there have 
been few attempts to assess the impact of the reform program on the efficiency, profitability 
and risk behavior of the Jordanian banking sector. Most of the recent studies that have assessed 
the impact of the reform policies are qualitative such as (Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009). 
While empirical studies such as (Maghyereh, 2008) ignored the significant effects of the 2008 
financial crises on the CBJ reforms and bank indicators. Also, this study only assessed the 
impact of the reforms on a set of efficiency indicators. Another study by (Jarrah, 2010) 
examined the systematic, non-systematic, and total risk of Jordan’s banking sector using data 
covering the period 2001-2009.   
1.2 Research Objectives 
In this section we will focus on the study objectives that have been developed over the years 
by researchers in banking and link the study hypotheses to the related economic theories and a 
stream of the previous literature. Based on the existing literature, the underlying objectives of 
this research are five-fold: 
First to investigate the impact of bank-specific market structure, and macroeconomic 
variables on different profitability measures. Second, to measure the impact of competition, 
risk and the interest rate environment on the profitability and risk-taking behavior of Jordanian 
commercial banks. Third, to examine the relationship between bank efficiency, capital, and 
risk of Jordanian commercial banks. Fourth, to address how competition and efficiency of the 
banking sector influence the cost of credit for borrowing firms using data from 118 firms.  And 
finally, to examine the impact of liquidity funding measures on the risk of Jordanian 
commercial banks and to assess the impact of the deposit insurance scheme applied in Jordan 
on the liquidity creation of Jordanian commercial banks. The period of our analysis covers 
2003 to 2015 and our sample consists of 13 commercial banks operating in Jordan’s banking 
sector. 
 
The study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
• How and in what ways have the competitive conditions affected by the profitability of 
Jordanian banks?  
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• Does liquidity risk influence the profitability of Jordanian banks? 
• To what extent have changes in interest rates affected the profitability of Jordanian 
banks? 
• Which market type monopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect competition, best 
represents the Jordanian banking sector? 
• Does bank capital affect the risk-taking behavior of Jordanian banks? 
• Does bank capital affect the efficiency of Jordanian banks? 
• To what extent does risk affect the efficiency of Jordanian banks? 
• Does bank size affect liquidity funding? 
• Does capitalization affect the liquidity funding requirement of Jordanian banks? 
• To what extent have crisis periods affected the liquidity funding requirements of 
Jordanian banks? 
• Does the size of a bank affect its liquidity creation? 
• Does bank capitalization affect liquidity creation? 
• To what extent has crises periods affected the liquidity creation of Jordanian banks? 
To reach the study objectives and questions, we examined the following hypothesis: 
 
H1.1: There is a positive relationship between bank competition and profitability. 
Given its importance in extending the literature for Jordanian banks, the empirical evidence 
offers some guidance in this respect. Only a few studies address the role of bank competition 
in relation to bank profitability. (Buchs and Mathiesen, 2005), for example, reveals that 
banking competition helps foster higher economic growth which leads to improving bank 
profitability. Also, (Petria et al., 2015); (Hsieh and Lee, 2010), (Coccorese, 2004) and 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Peria, 2010) found a positive impact of competition on bank profitability.  
 
H1.2: There is a significant positive relationship between liquidity risk and profitability. 
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Because few studies have addressed the role of bank liquidity risk using Jordanian bank data, 
our second hypothesis holds out the prospect for finding such a relationship. Some prior studies 
such as (Arif and Nauman Anees, 2012) who examined the effect of liquidity risk on banks’ 
profitability found a significant positive effect of liquidity risk on bank profitability. (Bourke, 
1989) found evidence of a positive relationship between liquidity risk and bank profitability 
for 90 banks in Europe, North America, and Australia. (Naceur and Kandil, 2008) also found 
a positive significant influence of liquidity risk on financial profitability. 
 
H1.3: There is a positive relationship between the interest rate and profitability. 
To fill the literature gap of the impact of the interest rate on the Jordanian bank profitability 
especially after the liberalization, our empirical evidence offers some guidance in this respect. 
We hypothesized our third hypothesis. (Bourke, 1989) for example investigate the determinants 
of bank profitability, he found that interest rates are positively related to profitability. 
(Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) replicated (Bourke, 1989) study and found that interest rates 
have a significant positive association with bank profitability. (Genay and Podjasek, 2014) also, 
found that the low-interest-rate environment is associated with decreased profitability for 
banks. Similar findings were postulated by (Bikker and Vervliet, 2018) for all U.S. commercial 
and savings banks. 
 
H2.1: There is a positive relationship between bank capital and efficiency. 
Few studies address the relation of bank capital into bank efficiency of the Jordanian banks and 
as a result of its importance in extending the literature, we hypothesized our fourth hypothesis. 
(Kwan et al., 1997) for example, found that bank efficiency is affected by bank capital and they 
argued that banks with more capital operate more efficiently than banks with less capital. 
(Fiordelisi et al., 2011b) found that higher bank capital levels increase bank efficiency.  
 
 
H2.2: There is a negative relationship between risk and bank efficiency. 
Our fifth hypothesis addresses the relation of bank risk to the Jordanian banks' bank efficiency, 
which covers the gap in the literature of the Jordanian bank studies. (Fiordelisi et al., 2011b) 
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for example, found that inefficient banks typically have higher risk levels. Also, (Berger and 
De Young, 1997) and (Williams, 2004) suggest that declines in efficiency will temporarily lead 
to increases in banks’ risk. (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005) indicating that bank managers tend to 
take on more risk when the banks have lower levels of capital or the banks are less efficient. 
 
H2.3: There is a negative relationship between capital and risk. 
Studying the impact of the capital requirement regulation and the relationship between capital 
and risk of the Jordanian banks takes its important especially after implementing the 
requirements. we are extending the literature by hypothesized our sixth hypothesis. Several 
studies found that the incorrect design of capital requirements leads to excessive risk-taking 
behaviour by banks (Yehuda and Kahane, 1977, Kim and Santomero, 1988, and Koehn and 
Santomero, 1980). (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992), (Jacques and Nigro, 1997) and (Matejašák et al., 
2009) all share the view that banks tend to adjust their capital ratio by increasing capital and 
decreasing their risk when the regulatory pressure increases. Empirical studies such as 
(Demsetz et al, 1997) and (Salas and Saurina, 2003) report a negative effect of capital on the 
levels of risk taken by banks. (Demsetz et al., 1996) and (Salas and Saurina, 2003) report a 
negative effect of capital on the levels of bank risk taken by banks. 
 
H3.1: There is a negative relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of credit. 
There is shortage of studies that address the relationship between Jordanian bank efficiency 
and the cost of credit.  We are filling the gap by hypothesized our seventh hypothesis. 
(Shamshur and Weill, 2019) found that bank efficiency reduces the cost of credit, where 
improvements in bank efficiency tend to be strongly associated with a lower cost of credit. 
(Sapienza, 2002) note that efficient banks can offer borrowing firms’ loans at lower costs than 
their less efficient competitors. 
 
H4.1.  Lower funding liquidity risk incentivises banks to take more risk. 
The importance of extending the literature for the relationship between bank risk and bank 
funding liquidity risk. The empirical evidence offers some guidance in this respect, extending 
the few studies that address this relationship. Based on the theoretical insights of (Acharya and 
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Naqvi, 2012) and (Wagner, 2007), banks with higher deposits were characterized as having 
less funding liquidity risk, which then feeds into the bank risk-taking behaviour. (Jensen, 1986) 
found that banks with lower funding liquidity risk might be tempted to make poor investment 
decisions that increase bank risk-taking behaviour. (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) found that 
banks have lower funding liquidity risk because of large amounts of deposit inflows, which 
leads bank managers to take more risk by aggressively lowering the lending rate to increase 
loan volumes to enhance their own compensation.  
 
H4.2. Banks with higher capital buffers are less risk-taking in response to lower funding 
liquidity risks. 
Given the importance of the capital requirement regulation, we are extending the literature for 
Jordanian banks by addressing the relationship between bank capital and bank risk-taking. 
(Konishi and Yasuda, 2004) for example found that the implementation of capital adequacy 
requirements has reduced risk-taking by commercial banks. Similarly, (Repullo, 2005) finds 
that bank risk-taking is negatively related to capital requirements. Empirical studies such as 
(Demsetz et al, 1997) and (Salas and Saurina, 2003) report a negative effect of capital on the 
levels of risk taken by banks.  
 
H4.3. Larger banks take less risk in response to lower funding liquidity risk. 
Only a few studies address the relationship between bank size and bank risk-taking of the 
Jordanian banks. Our hypothesis extending the literature for Jordanian banks which offers some 
guidance in this respect. Earlier on (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997) provided evidence that 
increases in banks’ total assets reduce firm-specific risk. Similarly, larger banks take less risk 
as bank size increases banking stability as founded by (Mercieca et al., 2007) and (Stiroh, 
2004). (Wagner, 2007) also notes that banking system instability increases with higher 
liquidity.  
 




Finally, and after the last global financial crises 2008, few studies address the relationship 
between bank risk and the global financial crises for Jordanian banks. In this aspect, we 
hypothesized our last hypothesis to offers some guidance in this respect. (Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010) for example found that bank excessive lending behaviour during times of 
access to large deposit funding contributed to the triggering of the 2008 global financial crises.  
In the next chapter (chapter 2) the study focuses on the theories related to that have 
been developed over the years by researchers in banking and related to the study objectives and 
hypotheses.  
1.3 Research Method 
Several econometric methodologies are implemented in this study to provide a rigorous and 
robust set of empirical evidence on the effects of liquidity risk, risk-based capital requirements 
and capital regulations on Jordanian banks.  
Following the work of (Olalere, Bin Omar, & Kamil, 2017); (Sufian & Habibullah, 
2009); (Nathan & Neave, 2016),  we use the methods of Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects (FE), 
Random Effects (RE), and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) approaches to aid our 
research strategy in Chapter 4, that is the first empirical chapter. This chapter aims to 
empirically assess the impact of competition, liquidity risk, interest rate, bank profitability, and 
risk-taking behavior. We start our analysis by implementing the model of (Panzar and Rosse, 
1987) which is based on a test statistic H, to assess the state of competition in the Jordanian 
banking sector. Since the H-statistic measures the elasticity of total revenues with respect to 
factor input prices and is calculated from a reduced-form bank revenue equation, it will allow 
us to gauge how a change in input prices is reflected in the equilibrium revenues earned by 
banks. Both the FE and RE methods are used to account for biasness in omitted variables that 
arise from ignoring the time-invariant characteristics that are correlated with the dependent 
variables and which cannot be accounted for. The GMM method is a dynamic modeling 
technique that permits the inclusion of lagged dependent variable as one of the right-hand side 
variables while accounting for the endogenous nature of some of the variables by replacing 
them with their lagged and lagged different values.  
In chapter 5, we empirically examine whether there exists any relationship between bank 
efficiency and productivity, capital and risk in the Jordanian banking system. This chapter uses 
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the pooled OLS, FE and RE methods previously discussed in addition to the Three-Stage Least 
Square (3SLS) method which I use to estimate a system of equations that employ different risk 
indicators. This method has been used by (Tan and Floros, 2013) and (Rime, 2001). 3SLS is a 
remedy for the problem of endogeneity between bank efficiency, risk and capital. It should be 
noted that 3SLS estimates systems of structural equations where some equations contain 
endogenous variables among the list of explanatory variables. These endogenous variables are 
then defined in the system as the dependent variables of the other equations in the system and 
thus enables us to define other endogenous variables other than the dependent variables. The 
reason for using 3SLS is that it not only provides consistent estimates of the parameters but is 
also a full information modeling technique that estimates all the parameters simultaneously and 
incorporates the cross-equation correlations and produces parameter estimates which are 
asymptotically more efficient than Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS). To calculate bank 
efficiency (Eff/O), I use the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) which uses distance functions 
to measure changes in productivity. I measure technical efficiencies using the non-parametric 
method, Data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique which has been used by (Paul & 
Kourouche, 2008) and (Alkhathlan and Abdul Malik, 2010a) among others. 
Chapter 6 is the third empirical chapter and investigates the effects of bank efficiency 
and competition on the cost of credit for borrowing firms empirically. We estimate our cost of 
credit models using Pooled OLS, FE and RE methods. We evaluate five models incorporating 
each one of the efficiency measures as the leading independent variables while controlling for 
a set of firms, industry, and macroeconomic variables. We start our analysis by pooling the 
panel data and estimating it using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This method ignores 
the firms' heterogeneities and un order to correct for this bias, we use both FE and RE 
approaches to account for the distinct nature of each firm and control for the unobserved fixed 
effects that are constant over time and correlated with the dependent variables, such as Jordan's 
geographical location and cultural norms. These methods capture the within-variation across 
firms and time-related shocks that affect all firms such as global financial crises (Bjorvatn and 
Farzanegan, 2013). We also use RE method, wherein the main difference between RE and FE 
is that RE uses GLS to produce the estimates while assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity 
is uncorrelated with the regressors. To calculate bank efficiency (Eff/O), I use the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI) which uses distance functions to measure changes in productivity. I 
measure technical efficiencies using the non-parametric method, Data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) technique. We use the non-parametric methods represented by the Malmquist index 
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proposed by (Malmquist, 1953) and later developed by (Douglas et al., 1982). This index 
measures total factor productivity between two banks or one bank over time. We also measure 
technical efficiencies using the non-parametric method, DEA. DEA technique utilizes the 
number of variables (inputs and outputs) and not their prices and thus does not require any 
relationship between inputs and outputs. Using more than one form of inputs and outputs of 
the Decision-Making Unit (DMU) is one of the DEA advantages (Graham et al., 2005). 
Defining and selecting banks’ inputs and outputs for the DEA method is based on one of three 
approaches, production approach, intermediation approach, and value-added approach. We 
also use the intermediation approach in the selection of inputs and outputs which defines the 
bank as an intermediary that transfers assets from surplus units to deficit units (Paul and 
Kourouche, 2008), (Alkhathlan and Malik, 2010). In calculating the index we  are using four 
inputs (number of full-time employees, total deposits, total assets, and interest expenses) and 
two outputs (loans and interest income) following (Varesi, 2015). Loans are considered one 
form of output from deposits (inputs) as noted by (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), (Lang and 
Welzel, 1996), and (Ashton and Pham, 2011). 
Chapter 7 is the fourth empirical chapter which investigates the impact of banks’ 
funding liquidity risk on Jordanian commercial banks' risk-taking behavior. For this empirical 
exercise, I use the FE and RE estimation methodologies to empirically define the main 
determinants of the different risk measures of Jordanian commercial banks. The analysis 
undertaken is extended to determine the major factors of the banks' liquidity funding. I also use 
the Difference in Difference (DID) method to analyze the impact of the deposit insurance 
scheme which was implemented in Jordan in 2000 as way of gauging Jordanian banks' liquidity 
creation. In this respect, I compared changes in liquidity creation before and after the 
implementation of deposit insurance. The DID approach is usually used to estimate the effect 
of a specific intervention (deposit insurance scheme) by comparing the changes in outcomes 
over time between a group that is enrolled in a program and a group that is not. The DID 
approach also provides results that are robust to the potential endogeneity bias as noted by 
(Cao, Zhun et al., 2011). 
While some researchers may prefer one measure over another. There is no consensus 
regarding the best measure by which to gauge competition. Therefore, the choice of Panzer 
Ross techniques involves trade-offs. The usefulness of the different approaches hinges on data 
availability, the conceptions of competition assumed, and the questions being addressed. This 
study objective is to present the most widely applied methods in banking, highlighting their 
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strengths and weaknesses. This method has been used by several authors to determine the 
structure of banking market in some countries that have the same conditions. For example, in 
Tunisia, (Haffani, 2002) examined the market structure of Tunisian’s banking sector during the 
period 1980 to 1999, by using the Panzar-Rosse assessment. This study of competition shows 
that throughout this period, the Jordanian banking market has been characterized by a 
monopolistic structure, but the indicator of competition has steadily increased since. This 
method has been much more widely used in empirical banking studies. 
Since the data from developing country, it is appropriate to observe and duplicate (with 
some modifications) the methods used by (Bourk, 1989). Using multiple regression analysis, 
(Bourk 1989) examined the relationship between profitability and various independent 
variables such as interest rate, liquidity concentration, market growth, and inflation. The 
proxies for profitability are return on assets, return on capital and value added. The value-added 
concepts introduced by (Bourk 1989) is a proxy that allows testing of the expense’s theory and 
risk-aversion theory. The used variables in the study regression and directly influence the bank 
profitability are used to test the expense-preference theory, the risk- aversion theory, and the 
structure-conduct-performance theory. For example, the capital ratio, liquidity, and other 
variables as an internal variable used to test the (Bourk 1989) hypothesis that well capitalized 
banks enjoy access to cheaper resources of fund maintained in the loan portfolio, which 
improve profitability as the case in the Jordanian commercial banks. In the case of liquidity, 
banks with higher liquidity will prevent themselves from long term investments opportunities 
and thus reduce their cost and expenses. Other overhead cost will have an adverse effect on 
profitability. The study tested hypotheses and results that are in line with and supports the 
existence of the expense-preference and the risk- aversion theory.  
The panel data are commonly used because it gives more informative data. It consists 
of both cross-sectional information that captures individual variability and time series 
information, which captures dynamic adjustment. Moreover, it allows the studying of impact 
of macroeconomic and financial industry development on profitability after controlling bank-
specific characteristics as in this study. The study used panel data, the panel data regression 
techniques have two models, Fixed effect model and Random effect model (Sarafidies & 
Wansbeek, 2020). Using the FE and RE is the appropriate technique for the data that has been 
used. 
An important aspect of this model is reorganization that changes in both capital and risk 
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have an exogenous as well as an endogenous character. Hence, the present study differs from 
previous studies, it examines the most banks in the H.K. of Jordan, namely those have at least 
five years financial statement throughout the estimation period. It should be stressed that Jordan 
banking market has not reached a high level of development and hence sophisticated financial 
instruments are not widely available which make the used method is the more appropriate in 
regards to the data availability and the consider the changes in the regulation especially in term 
of bank capital and risk. 
1.4 Research summary and conclusion 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the literature on banking sector performance indicators and 
discusses the main theoretical and empirical findings of previous studies and identify the main 
gaps in the literature that present thesis fills as applied to the Jordanian banking sector. The 
chapter covers separate performance indicators and lists the existing evidence of its impact 
performance and risk-taking behavior.  
Chapter 3 discuss the evolution of the Jordanian banking sector and consider the recent 
reforms that have helped shaped the banking sector into a more modern banking system. The 
chapter highlights the reform phases while addressing the objectives of each phase and how 
it affected bank performance. Chapter 4 shows that the Jordanian banks results support the 
favourable spillovers of the reform policies on Jordanian banks' overall profitability and 
efficiency. However, the evidence suggests that there is still a need to improve the banking 
market and that higher total banks assets may not necessarily lead to higher profits. Moreover, 
careful management is required for the larger number of deposits and the acquired capital by 
Jordanian banks due to the inward migration of Iraqi and Syrian refugees to Jordan in recent 
times.  
Chapter 5 is one of the first attempts to assess the effects of the CBJ reforms and 
deregulation policies on the productivity of the banking system in Jordan. The analysis 
provides robust evidence in favor of the positive effects of these reforms. The range of 
policies adopted by Jordanian banks such as the increase in their dependence on interbank 
funding and the capital reserve as well as their enhanced access to the deposit market, have 
all contributed to the improvement of profitability, cost-efficiency and overall operational 
efficiency. Another important factor contributing to enhancing Jordanian bank efficiency 
during the study period was the decline in total provisions, which reduced the banks' total 
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expenses. The decrease in non-performing loans (NPLs) further improved banks overall 
operational efficiency.  
Chapter 6 assess the impact of reform program and deregulations on the Jordanian 
banking system and the impact of banks competition and efficiency on the cost of credit for 
a 118 Jordanian firm in response to the imposed capital requirements covering the period 
2003-2015 as well. The results show the favorable impact of the program and liberalization 
on the bank efficiency which improve the household and business to accesses credit.  
Chapter 7 turns to in an examination of liquidity funding and risk-taking behavior of 
Jordanian Commercial Banks. The findings show that bank size and capital buffers help 
minimize Jordanian commercial banks' risk-taking behavior in response to decreased funding 
liquidity risk. Jordanian commercial banks are the more conservative even during the 
financial crises as they are monitored and controlled by the CBJ. Findings reveal that the 
implementation of the deposit insurance scheme from 2000 onwards did not change the 
negative relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. There appears to be a clear 
tradeoff between imposing bank capital requirements to maintain the financial system 
stability and the process of liquidity creation to enhance banks’ capital assets. However, this 
trade-off needs to be carefully considered when decision-makers and regulators design new 
policies or levy new measures on Jordanian commercial banks. 
The issues examined throughout this thesis are motivated by several recent studies. In 
chapter four, our study builds on the work of (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) and (Bikkera 
and Vervliet, 2018). We extend the analysis to data on a sample of 13 Jordanian commercial 
banks by incorporating more variables and assessing the impact of competition, liquidity risk 
and interest rate on bank profitability and risk-taking behavior. The study also makes use of 
more factors to show its impact on Jordanian bank profitability. Chapter five builds on the 
contribution of (Tan and Floros 2013) by extending their study using data for 13 Jordanian 
commercial banks to examine the magnitude and direction of the dynamic relationships 
between bank efficiency/productivity, capital and risk in response to the imposed capital 
requirements covering the period 2003-2015. Chapter six examined the impact of banks 
competition and efficiency on the cost of credit for a 118 Jordanian firm in response to the 
imposed capital requirements covering the period 2003-2015 on the contribution of 
(Shamshur and Weill, 2019) and (Fungáˇcováa et al., 2017). Chapter seven builds on the 
contribution of (Khan et al., 2017) by investigating the relationship between funding liquidity 
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and bank risk-taking and extend their study by looking at the impact of imposed Jordanian 























Liquidity Risk, Risk-Based Capital Requirements, and 
Capital Adequacy Regulations: A Review of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Middle East and North African countries promote reform programs in order to promote a 
rapid and lasting economic growth and an efficient financial system. The MENA region covers 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, 
and Yemen. In the MENA countries, progress on financial system reforms has been uneven. 
Some countries now have a well-developed financial system, particularly banking sectors, such 
as the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC, comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates or U.A.E.), Lebanon, and Jordan. Others have 
made important advances over the past three decades. In terms of regulation and supervision, 
GCC countries, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, they took strengthened banking 
supervision and regulation steps, such as conforming to international Basel standards by 
reducing non-performing loans and increasing capital adequacy ratios.  Most of the MENA 
countries experienced financial development although in a few countries’ political instability 
or conflict. In financial development, the research shows that the MENA region ranks well 
below the industrialized countries but above most other developing country regions. Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia are the countries in the MENA region that have been important 
advances in financial system development since the 1960s while in the countries, the level of 
financial development has improved only slightly. The MENA countries (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia) share similarities in terms of economic structure. Despite the 
substantial transformation of the countries’ banking and financial system in recent years. In the 
MENA region, the banking system has many similarities but are also quite different from each 
other. For example, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia are classified as lower-middle-
income countries, while Lebanon classified as a middle-income country. The financial 
development has been shown to have a main role in enhancing the economic growth (Beck et 
al, 2006); however, empirical evidence indicates that without the necessary institutional 
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development, financial systems may lead to increased risk (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2006). Cross country differences are apparent for example, Jordan outperforming the other 
countries in the MENA region in terms of stock market development and the capital adequacy 
ratio. 
In 1988 the agreement referred to as the Bank established the Basel Accord for 
International Settlement (BIS) for measuring bank capital adequacy for banks in the Group of 
Ten (G-Ten) countries and Luxembourg. This Accord established a framework consisting of 
several core rules designed to regulate bank capital and to minimize credit risk, referred to as 
Basel I which classified bank assets into five risk categories in percentages (0%, 10%, 20%, 
50%, and 100%) depending on the nature of the debtor. Cash, central bank and government 
debt are classified as 0% risk assets. The 50% category which includes residential mortgages 
and private sector debt is classified as 100% risk asset. This framework mandated the minimum 
required capital, Tier 1 and Tier 2 equal to at least 8 percent of a bank’s capital adequacy 
requirements which became standard for banks internationally. Since the BCBS do not have 
legal influence, members are free to choose whether to implement the established standards 
and the methods of applications. A major criticism of Base I concerned the arbitrary nature in 
which it was applied especially the 8 percent minimum capital requirement applied to risk-
weighted assets remained irrespective of (a) whether the degree of credit-risk varied over the 
business cycle (b) whether the bank was domiciled in an industrialised or developing country 
and (c) the types of risk banks engaged with. As a result of the limitations of Basel I, the 
framework was amended in 1996 and went into effect in 1998 and required all commercial 
banks engaged in significant trading activity to set aside additional capital under the 8 percent 
mandate to cover the market risks in their trading accounts. In addition, a new Tier III capital 
was brought in consisting of short-term subordinated debt which could be used to accommodate 
the capital requirements on market risk. Considering other emerging limitations, such as 
operational risk, which include fraud, computer failure and poor documentation which many 
observers considered as significant risk. In 1999 the Basel Committee proposed a new capital 
adequacy framework referred to as Basel II. Basel II which is based on three mutually 
reinforcing pillars – minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review process and the 
effective use of market discipline was supported by central bank governors and bank 
supervisors in the G-10 countries and came into effect in June 2005. Basel II adopted the 
minimum capital requirements of 8 percent, but also distinguished the required minimum 
capital ratio based on three tiers. The higher the tier, the fewer securities banks can include in 
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it. Another important part of the Basel II framework is improving the calculation formula for 
Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA), which imposed a penalty for the excessive risk-taking 
behaviour by banks whenever the banks significantly increased risk-weighted assets 
intentionally. Risk-weighted assets are used as a denominator in the calculation of the 
regulatory capital ratio and is calculated by using the sum of assets that are multiplied by the 
corresponding risk weight for each type of asset. Steering these measures was meant to create 
uniform conditions for better risk measurement and regulating international competition on 
financial markets.  
Following the adverse effects of the 2008 global financial crisis exposed deficiencies 
in the Basel I and II framework. Many banks encountered difficulties to maintain adequate 
liquidity, primarily due to the lack of traditional funding sources,  due to the valuation of assets 
and due to capital adequacy issues, which resulted in large financial losses. As a result, in 2010 
the G-10 central banks and supervisory authorities established a set of new regulations,  named 
Basel III in the form of a substantial strengthening of the existing regulatory capital framework 
and which requires  increased minimum Common Equity Tier 1 capital from 4 percent to 4.5 
percent and minimum Tier 1 capital from 4 percent to 6 percent in an effort to mitigate the 
adverse effects of the financial crises as well as to prevent future potential crisis and bank 
bailouts. The thinking behind Basel III was to ensure a build-up of bank capital buffers that 
can be drawn down during periods of financial stress, strengthen the quality of bank capital, 
and introduce a leverage ratio requirement that would control the excess of leverage.   
Following the Basel III regulations, the banks become entitled to increase their core 
capital ratio from 4 to 6 percent to ensure the overall financial system's efficiency and stability 
and lower the risk of default. Basel III adopted the same guidelines of Basel II in calculating 
risk-weighted assets and introduced leverage and liquidity requirements to ensure that banks 
have sufficient liquidity to hedge against excessive borrowings and in comparison, to Basel II, 
Basel III adopted stricter regulatory capital ratios.  
The introduction of the various Basel capital accords has motivated a stream of studies 
that have examined the effects of bank capital regulations on banks’ risk-taking behavior and 
management. The main findings of most of these studies indicate that bank financing decisions 
are influenced by several factors, such as capital adequacy regulations, risk-based capital and 
liquidity risk management. As with other central banks, the central bank of Jordan (CBJ) 
attempted to enhance the integrity and stability of the financial sector in Jordan through the 
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application of the Basel international standards, particularly the standards of the Basel I and II 
and Basel III post the global financial crisis. In 2005, a higher committee chaired by the deputy 
governor of the CBJ was formed to discuss the adoption of new standards of credit risk, market 
risk, operational risk, market discipline and the supervisory review. The CBJ began 
implementing the Basel II standards in the first quarter of 2008. The first phase incorporated 
Basel II capital adequacy ratios' adoption and utilised different measures to assess operational 
and market risks. In 2011, the CBJ informed the banks to start implementing the requirements 
of Basel III by increasing the proportion of liquidity coverage, legal liquidity ratio, and capital 
adequacy ratio.  
Several empirical studies investigate the determinants of bank profitability such as 
(Short, 1979); (Bourke, 1989); (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992);  (Abreu and Mendes, 2001); 
(Mamatzakis and Remoundos, 2003); (Goddard et al., 2004); (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007); 
(Bennaceur, 2008); (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009); (Lee and Hsieh, 2013); (Sufian and 
Habibullah, 2009); (Naceur and Omran, 2011). The drivers of bank profitability are categorized 
into internal and external factors. The internal factors are related to a bank’s management and 
strategies while the external factors are related to the economic and legal environments inside 
the country. Factors such as loan loss expenses, loan/deposit ratio, capital, liquidity ratios, 
market dynamics, interest rates, concentration and overhead expenditures are investigated in 
the literature considering their effect on profitability. The findings covering these factors are 
found to be sensitive to the sample selection, bank size, level of capital and the adopted risk 
management practices. Studies such as (Abreu and Mendes, 2001) found a positive impact of 
risk on bank profitability in France, Spain, Portugal and Germany. (Ahmed and Khababa, 1999) 
examined the impact of business risk, market size and the size of the Saudi banks’ profit and 
found that business risk and bank size are the only significant drivers of profitability, while 
business risk and bank size had a significant and negative influence on banks' profitability. 
Since the introduction of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, Capital adequacy requirements 
became one of the most important measures of bank asset-liability management. Bank 
regulators are required to assess whether banks are adequately capitalized to ensure the stability 
of the banking system against temporal shocks. Several empirical studies have focused on 
investigating the impact of the introduction of the Basel Capital Accord in 1988 on capital 
adequacy requirements across different countries. Empirical evidence suggests that capital 
adequacy requirements amplify demand and supply-side shocks in the US (Blum, 1999), 
reduce the risk-taking behavior of US commercial banks (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004) and force 
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less-capitalized banks to increase their capital levels (Zhang et al., 2008).  
Another strand of the literature discusses the theoretical and empirical effects of risk-
based capital regulations on financial systems. However, in terms of bank performance, capital 
ratio is considered a better performance indicator than the risk-based capital ratio (Avery and 
Berger, 1991). Some studies have shown that risk-based capital requirements have minor 
effects on loan growth (Allen et al., 1994). On the other hand, it has been argued by (Brinkmann 
and Horvitz et al., 1995) that risk-based capital requirements have influenced banks' portfolio 
decisions and loan growth significantly. 
Many banks have reduced their credit supply to meet capital regulations when they were 
first introduced in the late 1980s, but after the global financial crises, capital regulation 
requirements became a major concern for bank managers and regulators. As suggested by 
(Yehuda Kahane, 1977) capital regulations cannot reduce the overall bank portfolio risk unless 
the assets included in the portfolio are subject to these regulations but has noted by (Keely and 
Furlong, 1990), capital regulation can potentially reduce asset risk, while (Santos, 1999)  
showed that capital regulation improves bank's stability. Regarding the risk (Hussain and 
Hassan, 2005) suggest that banks' portfolio risk dropped following the adoption of capital 
requirement regulations while (Delis et al., 2011), and (Beatty and Gron, 2001), suggest that 
capital regulations reduce risk in general but for banks with high market power the risk 
mitigation effects become weaker though in some cases, they can be reversed. 
It is widely recognized that financial institutions require effective management to hedge 
against different types of operational risks. Several studies on developing and developed 
countries have examined different risk measures and the related practices that were adopted by 
different banks to mitigate potential losses. In classical theories, there is a close relationship 
between liquidity risk and credit risk (Bryant, 1980). Previous studies by (Goldstein and 
Pauzner, 2005), (Goderis et al., 2011), (Gatev et al., 2009), (Cai and Thakor, 2011), and 
(Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011) have shown that the inter-correlations between liquidity and 
credit risk affect bank stability. However, since the 2008 financial crises, the literature in this 
area has produced mixed results. For example, (Archarya and Viswanathan, 2011) find 
evidence which suggests a positive relationship between liquidity and credit risks while 
(Goderis et al., 2011), (Gatev et al., 2009), (Cai and Thakor, 2011), and (Acharya and 
Viswanathan, 2011) report evidence suggesting that the relationship between liquidity and 
credit risk is negative. In a study of advanced economies, (Chen et al., 2018) found that liquidity 
33 
 
risk reduced profitability due to the higher cost of fund but increases banks’ net interest margins 
while (Young and Jang, 2016) found that the implementation of the Basel III net stable funding 
ratio standards had significant positive effects on U.S bank liquidity management.  
Given the various themes of this thesis, the purpose of the present chapter is to provide a 
review of a selection of the most important literature covering the work presented in the 
empirical chapters of the thesis. The chapter is divided into six subsections wherein section 2.2 
focuses on studies on banks’ profitability indicators. Section 2.3 discusses capital and capital 
adequacy requirements while section 2.4 discusses the literature on the risk-based capital, 
section 2.5 capital regulation and its impact on banks’ performance and section 2.6 the related 
literature on bank's liquidity, liquidity and credit risk. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Bank profitability indicators literature review 
 
Banks, like all businesses, operate to maximize profit or shareholder wealth by earning more 
money than what they pay in expenses. Some of this also comes in the form of fees that banks 
charge for services provided and the interest on assets. Normally interest paid on bank liabilities 
is the major expense of banks. Loans to individuals, businesses and other organizations and the 
securities that it holds are the major assets of banks, while deposits and the money it borrows 
forms its liabilities. Over the years, bank profitability has been a popular research topic with 
most studies investigating the determinants of bank profitability. These include (Moylneux and 
Thornton, 1992), (Demerguç-Kunt and Huizingha, 1999), (Barajas et al. 1999), (Bashir,2000), 
(Ben Naceur and Goaied, 2001), (Abreu and Mendes, 2002),  (Guru et al., 2002),  (Jiang et al., 
2003) and (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007).  
(Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) found evidence of a positive and significant relationship 
between bank size and profitability, while (Abreu and Mendes, 2001), using a loans-to-assets 
ratio as a proxy for risk, found a positive impact of risk on bank profitability for banks in 
France, Spain, Portugal and Germany. On the other hand, a negative and significant 
relationship was found between the level of risk and bank profitability by (Bourke, 1989) and 
(Molyneux and Thornton, 1992). (Bourke, 1989), (Demirgüç-Kunt andHuizinga, 1999), 
(Abreu, and Mendes, 2001), (Goddard et al., 2004); (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007), and 
(Bennaceur, 2008) found that banks with a high level of equity relative to their assets have 
higher profitability than their counterparts and (Goddard et al., 2004) report that the cost-
income ratio affects bank profitability positively. Other studies such as (Bourke, 1989), 
(Molyneux and Thornton, 1992), (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999), (Athanasoglou et al., 
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2008), (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009) indicate a positive relationship between inflation, 
GDP growth and bank profitability. According to (Bourke, 1989) and (Molyneux and 
Thornton, 1992),  high bank concentration ratio (CR) enhances profitability, though 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) and ((Staikouras and Wood, 2011) have argued that 
concentration ratio reduces profitability.  
Bank liquidity, capital adequacy, deposit growth, credit risk, GDP, and inflation are 
considered the main determinants of bank performance (Azam and Siddiqui, 2012). (Flamini 
et al., 2009) suggests that credit risk, market power, capital, size, GDP and inflation are the 
most important profitability triggers. At the same time (Ahmed and Khababa, 1999) considers 
business risk, market size, market concentration and bank size as the main determinants of 
bank profitability. (Short, 1979) and (Bourke, 1989) examined the determinants of bank 
profitability using a linear functional form and found that linear modeling yields better results 
relative to other functional forms. (Short, 1979) found that greater market power leads to higher 
profitability, while concentration ratio was not significant in influencing profitability. 
(Smirlock, 1985) investigated the relationships between bank profitability, market share (MS), 
and market concentration using annual data consisting of 2700 banks over the period 1973-
1978. Using different profits proxies, ROE, return on total capital and return on total assets and 
a wide set of control variables such as growth in market deposits, a ratio of demand deposits to 
total deposit, total bank assets, the effect of holding company affiliation and state law with 
respect to multibank holding companies, he estimated cross-sectional profit. The findings 
indicate that concentration is insignificant in explaining bank profit rates. The results also 
showed that market share is positively and significantly related to profitability. Additionally, 
the control variables: growth in assets, market deposits, and the ratio of demand deposits to 
total deposit were found to have a positive relationship with profitability while holding a 
company affiliation and state law had negative coefficients. Using annual financial data for 90 
banks across twelve countries/regions (Belgium, New York, Denmark, Australia, Ireland, 
Massachusetts, California, Canada, England and Wales, Holland, Norway and Spain.) for the 
period 1972-1982, (Bourke, 1989) investigate the determinants of bank profitability. Using 
capital ratio, liquidity, staff expenses, concentration, government ownership, interest rate, 
market growth and inflation as independent variables and return on capital, return on assets, 
value-added return on total assets as dependent variables. The results showed that all capital 
ratios, liquidity ratios and interest rates are positively related to profitability. Government 
ownership and staff expenses were found to have an inverse relationship with pre-tax return on 
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assets. Concentration is moderately and positively related to pre-tax return on assets and 
negatively with the value-added. (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) replicated (Bourke, 1989) 
study using annual data for a sample of banks covering 18 European countries for the period 
1986-1989. They used government ownership, concentration, long-term bond rate, money 
supply, capital and reserves, cash and bank deposits, consumer price index, and staff expenses 
as independent variables and net profit before and after taxes as dependent variables. The 
findings indicate that staff expenses have a positive relationship with ROA and that government 
ownership and the level of interest rates have a significant positive associations with ROE, 
which contrast with the findings of  (Bourke, 1989). Liquidity was found to have a weak and 
inverse relationship with profitability due to the costs of liquidity holdings. And in line with 
(Bourke, 1989), concentration was found to have a positive and statistically significant impact 
on pre-tax return on assets.  
Using ROA and ROE as proxies for bank profitability, (Berger, 1995) examined the 
impact of concentration, market share, x-efficiency, scale efficiency, and other control 
variables on profitability. The findings revealed that X-efficiency and market share have a 
positive impact on bank profitability and that the concentration-profit relationship is 
ambiguous as its influence was primarily due to the level of correlation with other variables, 
particularly market share. (Ahmed and Khababa, 1999) using ROE, ROA, and PEPS as profit 
measures, examined the impact of business risk, market size, and bank size on bank 
profitability for a sample of eleven commercial banks in Saudi Arabia for the period 1987-
1992. They found that business risk and bank size are the only significant drivers of 
profitability, while business risk and bank size had a significant but negative influence on 
banks' profitability. (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) contributed to the existing literature 
on bank profitability by investigating the determinants of the commercial bank profitability 
using annual data of 80 banks from developed and developing countries and applied the 
weighted least squares method. Their findings indicate that well-capitalized banks had lower 
funding costs than less capitalized banks due to the low probability of the cost of bankruptcy 
and that well-capitalized banks had lower needs for external funding relative to less capitalized 
banks. The results also find the presence of a positive relationship between capital ratio and 
profitability but found no evidence of a relationship between profitability and overhead 
expenses as banks usually transfer these costs to their customers invoices. The reported 
findings also show that loans to total assets negatively influenced bank profitability, whilst 
short-term funding had a negative but significant impact on profitability. A negative 
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relationship between profitability and non-interest earning assets was also reported, since banks 
with high non-interest earning assets were found to be less profitable while banks that consider 
deposits as their main source of funding were found to be less profitable due primarily to the 
nature of deposits which required high branching costs and other related expenses. 
Interestingly, in the case of developing countries, the findings suggest that foreign banks 
produced greater profitability than domestic banks, with a high level of concentration 
accounting for the enhanced profitability owing to the lack of competition. This particular 
result contradicts (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2015) findings, who reported a negative 
relationship between the level of concentration and bank profitability. 
In their contribution to the literature, (Guru et al., 1999) examined the determinants of 
high-profitable banks in Malaysia using quarterly data for a sample of seventeen banks during 
the period 1986 to 1995. They used liquidity, capital adequacy, expenses management, assets 
composition, firm size, inflation, market growth, market interest, market share and regulation 
as explanatory variables and used net income before and after-tax as a percentage of total assets, 
net income before and after-tax as a percentage of shareholders capital, and reserves are used 
as proxies for bank profitability. They found that poor management was the main reason for a 
low-profit share, while liquidity, high capitalization, and asset composition reduced 
profitability. The size variable was found to have no impact on the profitability of Malaysian 
banks, while market growth was reported to have a negative relationship with bank profitability 
which contradicts the findings reported by (Bourke, 1989).  
 (Chirwa, 2003) also investigate the relationship between market structure and 
profitability of commercial banks in Malawi using annual time series data for eight commercial 
Banks during 1970-1994. The study employed as explanatory variables the ratio of capital to 
assets, total deposits of the banking industry, growth rate of total deposits, the ratio of demand 
deposits to total deposits, loans to assets, concentration, and bank size, while ROA, ROE, and 
ROC were used as measures of profitability. Based on the work of (Gilbert, 1984), (Smirlock, 
1985), (Clark, 1986), and (Maudos, 1998). (Chirwa, 2003) report that demand deposit to 
deposits ratio and concentration had positive and significant effects on commercial bank 
profitability, and that loan to assets ratio had a positive and significant impact on bank’s 
profitability in both the short and long-run. (Goddard et al., 2004) add to the literature by 
examining the profitability drivers for European banks for a selection of six countries during 
the period 1992 to 1998 using both static and dynamic GMM models. The findings of  
(Goddard et al., 2004) showed that off-balance-sheet activities and profitability are positively 
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correlated, but only for English banks while more generally, the profitability was found to be 
influenced by liquidity and capital to assets ratio. (Al-tamimi, 2008) compared the determinants 
of bank performance between the national and foreign banks in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) during the period 1987 to 2002. The findings indicate that bank size and portfolio 
composition are the significant determinants of national banks’ profitability, while for foreign 
banks, capitalization, leverage economic condition, and capital productivity are the main 
drivers of profitability. The findings also suggest that concentration, portfolio composition and 
costs are more relevant to the profit shares of national banks than foreign banks. In another 
related study, (Bennaceur, 2008) looked at the impact of bank-specific characteristics, covering 
financial structure and macroeconomic indicators in the Tunisian banking industry from 1980 
to 2000 and used NIM and ROA bank profit measures. The ratio of equity capital to total assets, 
overhead to total assets, the ratio of bank’s loans to total assets, the ratio of noninterest-bearing 
assets to total assets, bank concentration, GDP, inflation and bank size were used as 
independent variables. The study applied both Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) 
methods. The reported results indicate positive relationships between the two profitability 
measures and the amount of capital and that a well-capitalized bank can raise capital with low 
costs. ROA was reported to be significantly and cyclically correlated with large overheads and 
bank loans, while noninterest-bearing assets had no significant impact on both NIM and return 
on assets, proving that interest-bearing assets are the main sources of bank profit. Interestingly, 
bank size showed a negative and significant impact on profitability which contradicts the 
findings of (DeYoung and Rice, 2006), while stock market capitalization was found to enhance 
bank profitability. However, the level of concentration had a negative and significant impact 
on net interest margin.  
 In another strand of the literature, (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) examined a wide scope 
of bank-specific, industry-related and macroeconomic profitability determinants using panel 
data for a group of South-Eastern European (SEE) credit institutions. Using a fixed effect and 
a random effect method. The results indicate that bank size had a positive and significant impact 
on bank profitability contrary to (Goddard et al., 2004), and also showed that all bank-specific 
determinants significantly affect bank profitability, except the liquidity variable. Bank 
concentration and capital were reported to be significant drivers of profitability, which is 
consistent with the findings of (Goddard et al., 2004), while Loan-loss provisions and operating 
expenses are significant moderators of profitability. Bank loans were found to have no 
significant bearing on the profitability of SEE credit institutions. Regarding the 
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macroeconomic indicators, inflation was the only found to be a significant driver of bank 
profitability.  
 (Flamini, et.al., 2009) studied the determinants of bank profitability using a sample of 
389 banks for a sample of 41 Sub-Saharan Africa countries (SSA) for the period 1998 to 2006 
using the c two-step GMM approach. They found that all foreign banks in SSA channeled their 
activities into the service sector to avoid financing riskier sectors such as agricultural. Bank 
size, diversification, capital and private ownership were found to be the main drivers of bank 
profitability which support the reported findings of (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). (Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011), using a sample of 453 Swiss commercial banks for the period 1999-2006, 
looked at bank profitability by employing internal and external determinants of bank 
profitability (with ROA and ROE being proxies of profitability). They found that profit is 
significantly driven by capitalization, bank loans and GDP growth while those banks with a 
higher share of interest income were found to be less profitable than their counterparts. 
(Al-Jarrah, 2010) examined the competitiveness and contestability in the Jordanian’s 
banking industry for the period 2001-2005 using (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) “H statistic”. He 
found that the Jordanian’s banking market cannot be characterized by either perfect 
competition or monopoly and the banks found to earn their revenues as if operating under 
conditions of monopolistic competition in that period.  The analysis of changes in competitive 
structure shows a lower degree of competition in the later years of the sample period and the 
large banks operating in a relatively more competitive environment compared to small . These 
developments trigger the need for further structural deregulations and liberalization to the 
banking system of Jordan, to reduce the market concentration and enhance the 
competitiveness of this market. 
  (Heffernan and Fu, 2011) examined the profitability of 96 Chinese banks for the period 
1999-2006 using EVA, return on average assets (ROAA), return on average equity (ROAE) 
and NIM as proxies of bank profitability and estimated the GMM motivated method. The 
findings suggest that EVA and NIM are better performance indicators than the remaining 
variables while specialization and bank profitability are positively correlated. The findings also 
indicate that banks that finance rural development were more profitable than their counterparts, 
and that bank listings, ownership, and size had no significant impact on the profitability of 
Chinese banks. However, loan loss reserve ratio was found to enhance all profitability 
measures, except for the variable ROAE. 
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 Following the approach of (Brooks, 2008), (Anbar and Alper, 2011) examined bank-
specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability in Turkey for the period 2002- 
2010 using FE approach. Their findings indicate a positive and significant relationships 
between bank size, asset size in relation to the profitability measures ROA and ROE and NIM, 
which highlights the profit impact of economies of scale. A negative and significant influence 
of assets quality and loans on ROA was also found. More recently, (Hussainey et al., 2018) 
looked at the impact of efficiency on the performance of 151 Islamic banks with a global 
presence for the period between January 2013 and December 2013 by estimating OLS model. 
They found bank cost-to-income ratio (CIN) to be negatively associated with the performance 
of Islamic banks globally and a positive association between risk-based capital adequacy, the 
existence of Sharia auditing department and the performance of Islamic banks, but the evidence 
on the impact of bank size on profitability was inconclusive.  
(Guglielmo,etal, 2017)  examined the internal and external factors impact on the banking 
sector in the Middle East and North Africa region, on the profitability. They found that the size 
does not appear to play a role determinant of profitability, whilst the liquidity ratio and net 
interest revenues seem to have a negative and positive effect respectively; GDP has a positive 
effect. 
Using uses the generalized method of moments (GMM), Least Squares (LS) and 
Generalized Linear Model (GLM), (Huq, et al, 2020) examined the impact of competition and 
cost efficiency on the profitability of banks using an unbalanced panel of emerging economic 
MENA countries over the period between 2011 and 2017. They found a significant and 
negative impact of competition on profitability of banks. They suggested that MENA banks 
should more improve the process of managing and monitoring the loan segment business; 
reducing the level of credit risk leads to higher profitability. 
2.3 Capital and capital adequacy requirements literature review 
It is well established that capital adequacy plays a significant role in maintaining the safety and 
soundness of banking systems globally. This is because, capital adequacy and capital adequacy 
regulation ensures that banks are adequately capitalized and thus equipped to withstand 
unexpected shocks that might otherwise impact negatively on bank operation such that it affects 
bank depositors. The term capital adequacy reflects the capacity and efficiency of banks to 
measure, control and monitor every type of risk. The importance of capital adequacy for the 
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Jordanian banking system is not limited to simply providing sufficient capital coverage to 
hedge against potential risks but is also directed towards developing proper strategies in the 
maintenance of sufficient levels of capital that is higher than the imposed fixed regulatory 
capital ratio.  
 Understanding how capital requirements are operating and what effects they have on risk 
and efficiency measures of the banking sector is essential for maintaining the balance between 
liquidity reserves as a form of protection and profitability. Thus, steering the capital adequacy 
requirement may be considered one of the most important policy measures of Basel II, if only 
because it helped to protect the global banking system from the adverse effects of potential 
stresses and the risk of default. In turn, it has given rise to a growing literature covering issues 
ranging from best practice, stress testing, scenario analysis relating to bank’s portfolio, among 
other related issues. For example, (Bernanke et al, 1999) used cross-sectional data of state-by-
state US banks for the period 1990-1991 and report that banks’ capital-to-asset ratio had a 
positive impact on loan growth, while (Cecchetti and Li, 2008) and (Blum, 1999) found that 
capital adequacy requirements may amplify demand and supply-side shocks. (Choi, 2000) in a 
study of Korean banks found that the imposition of the 8 percent capital adequacy requirement 
on banks led to a decline in bank lending, while (Konishi and Yasuda, 2004) argue that applying 
capital adequacy requirements reduced the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks. In their 
study of Spanish banks, (Barrios and Blanco, 2003) analyzed how banks set their capital ratios 
(the rate of equity capital over assets). (Barrios and Blanco, 2003) report that the imposed 
regulatory constraints were not significant in explaining the effectiveness of Spanish 
commercial banks but that the biggest impact had more to do with the pressure of market forces. 
(Toby, 2008) investigated the effects of capital adequacy regulation on Nigerian bank asset 
quality for the period 2002-2004. The capital adequacy ratios are captured by equity to-total 
assets, equity-to-loans and advances, and permanent assets-to-equity. The reported findings 
indicate that equity-to-total assets ratio is insignificant in determining the level of classified 
loans in the total loans’ portfolio, while an increase in the equity-to-loans and advances ratio 
are found to significantly reduce the ratio of classified loans as a percentage of equity stock. It 
is also noted that a high ETA can minimize the ratio of operating expenses to total revenue 
because of economies of scale and scope and that the ratios of equity to loans and advances 
have a significant inverse association with CLR.  
In their study of 12 Chinese commercial banks for the period 2004-2006, (Zhang et al., 
2008) examined the impact of capital adequacy requirement on bank’s risk-taking behavior by 
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applying the GMM method. (Zhang et al., 2008) found that the compulsory enforcement of 
capital adequacy requirements forced less-capitalized banks to increase their capital levels and 
that higher capital level reduced the overall risk-taking behavior of banks, particular the 
portfolio risk of banks.  
In response to the 2008 global financial crises, (Kudinska and Konovalova, 2012) 
examined the main determinants of bank capital adequacy for Latvian banks using a stepwise 
method to estimate a regression model incorporating bank capital adequacy ratio as the main 
independent variable (cap-adeq) and report credit risk to be the most important driver of bank 
capital adequacy. The findings suggest that during the financial crises, Latvian commercial 
banks were operating on the verge of capital adequacy as a result of substantial losses during 
the period of the crises which resulted in the use of inflows of new shares and subordinated 
capital. Provisions for outstanding debts and banks’ assets were also found to be key factors 
influencing the capital of Latvian commercial banks.  (Bridges et al., 2014) examined the effect 
of changes in micro-prudential regulatory capital requirements on bank capital ratios and bank 
lending for 53 UK banks using (FE). (Bridges et al., 2014) found that changes in capital 
requirements had a significant effect on the observed capital ratio which is consistent with the 
findings of (Alfon et al., 2005) and (Francis and Osborne, 2010) and also note that in response 
to an increase in capital requirements, the banks examined raised their capital ratios above the 
minimum requirement while also reducing their lending. (Lee et al., 2015), following a 
disequilibrium equation modeling approach which is considers the diversity of ownership 
structures of Chinese banks and examined the impact of the capital regulatory regime on the 
effectiveness of Chinese bank capital levels on 15 listed and 62 unlisted banks considering new 
regulations enforced by bank regulators in 2004 following China’s membership of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 for the period 2004- 2011. The found that the Chinese 
regulatory regime induced banks to increase their capital level and that CBRC regulations 
affected unlisted banks, joint-equity banks and foreign bank's capital levels strongly. The 
findings also show that the new regulations influenced bank capital movements more so than 
recent market pressures. On the issue of the banks' ownership, the findings indicate that 
regulations had the expected risk control effects in localized and less centralized rural and 
urban commercial banks. (Daniel, 2015) examined the relationship between liquidity, capital 
adequacy, bank size and GDP growth rate for a sample of Kenyan commercial banks. The 
findings suggest that capital adequacy, bank size and GDP growth rate had a significant effect 
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on the liquidity of Kenyan commercial banks. (Klepczarek, 2015) using data for 49 European 
banks, looked at the impact of both financial and economic indicators on the level of bank 
capital following the 2008 global financial crisis, in particular, the factors affecting common 
equity Tier1 ratio (CET1) which is a measure of the relationship between core capital and the 
risk-weighted assets of banks. The reported findings suggest that the increase in the ratio of 
risk weights of assets (RWA) reduced banks’ capital buffer and that competitive pressure is 
positively correlated with capital adequacy while the profitability indicators and the average 
inflation rate on capital adequacy was found to have no effect.  
2.4 Risk-based capital literature review 
To enhance the risk coverage of the capital framework, new rules of solvency margins were 
imposed by bank regulators. These rules placed higher capital weights on bank assets and 
during the early phase of transition in the implementation of the new rules many banks 
struggled to adapt to the new capital framework. This was most certainly the case with 
Jordanian banks as some bank assets proved inadequate for banks to maintain a diversified 
portfolio of liquid and profitable assets. Therefore, understanding the wealth effects of these 
standards is critical in any attempt to allocate capital across various activities of banks’ 
operations and activities. Early studies along this direction, such as (Gjerde and Semmen, 
1995) examined the effectiveness of risk-based capital adequacy standards when bank’s 
deposits are fully insured by using the level of bank leverage as a measure of the effectiveness 
of different bank regulation mechanisms and a state-preference model that incorporate the 
requirements of the risk-based capital plan. Gjerde and Semmen, 1995,  found the risk-based 
capital plan to be an effective regulatory mechanism and, moreover, that a combination of 
risk-based equity ratio and leverage restriction appear to be the best approach to manage 
portfolio risk’s, which is consistent with the findings of (Mayer, 1992). Similarly, (Cai and 
Thakor, 2011) showed that risk-based capital requirements reduced bank lending, while 
(Jacques and Nigro, 1997a) report that the new regulations reduced the portfolio risks of US 
banks, and (Blum, 1999) report that capital requirements are associated with higher risks but 
only if the costs of raising new capital are excessively high. Moreover, (Acosta  et al., 2018) 
found that leverage ratio and risk-based capital requirements are beneficial for bank stability. 
(Eyssell and Arshadi, 1990), using data for a sample of 27 banks examined the wealth effects 
of risk-based capital requirement by employing seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
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approach. (Eyssell and Arshadi, 1990) found that at the time of the announcement of the new 
risk-based capital requirements, the equity values of large publicly traded banks decreased 
and the banks with deficient capital ratios suffered the greatest loss in value. 
 (Cooper et al. 1991) added to the debate by investigating the effects of risk-based capital 
requirements adoption for a number of international banks in the US, UK, Canada, and Japan 
for the period 1985-1989. For securities prices, a market model approach was used to derive 
abnormal returns changes in the periods surrounding the announcements. They used the OLS 
and the variance of two-index model. (Cooper et al. 1991) report mixed results for the impact 
of the new regulations on equity returns in Japanese banks due to the uncertainty among 
investors regarding the new risk-adjusted capital rules. On the other hand, and in response to 
the announcements, the findings indicate a significant decline in equity returns for US, 
Canadian, and UK banks. In an influential paper, (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992) investigate the 
relationship between risk and capital using data for US commercial banks for the period 1983-
1987 by utilizing a simultaneous equation approach. They found that risk exposure and 
capital levels are simultaneously related and that the majority of US banks raised their asset 
risk posture to mitigate the effects of increases in capital level.  
 (Ediz et al., 1998) examined the impact of risk-based capital requirements on UK bank 
behavior by using quarterly data over the period 1989-1995. They formulated a dynamic, 
multivariate panel regression model in which changes in capital ratios depend on the lagged 
level of the ratio, in addition to a range of control variables such as net interest income over 
total risk-weighted assets, fee income over total risk-weighted assets, bank deposits over total 
deposits, total off-balance-sheet exposures over total risk-weighted assets, and provisions 
over total risk-weighted assets. The regression results concluded that UK banks responded to 
risk-based capital requirements by adjusting their portfolio risk, while capital ratios have not 
changed. (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992) also found that banks met capital requirements by raising 
new capital rather than alternating the loan composition in assets portfolio. Their finding also 
suggests that capital regulations were effective in reinforcing banks' stability without 
disrupting banks’ lending choices. Using a simultaneous equation modeling approach by 
(Shrieves and Dahl, 1992), (Rime, 2001) examined the impact of regulatory capital 
requirements on Swiss banks' risk-taking behavior by using the ratio of capital to total assets 
and the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (RCWA) as dependent variables. (Rime, 2001) 
found that regulatory pressure had a significant and positive impact on the ratio of the bank 
capital to total assets but no significant impact on bank risk-taking while a positive and 
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significant relationship is observed between risk and ratio of capital to total assets. Size is 
found to increase risk and reduce capital while regulatory pressure and PCAU have 
significant positive effects on the ratio of capital to RWA and no significant impact on banks' 
risk. (Calem and Rob, 1999) examined the required value of economic capital that is 
necessary to cover credit risk. They found that required capital cover varies substantially with 
portfolio risk, bank geography, assets’ diversification and loan characteristics and that the 
regulatory capital standards were generally much too high for banks with regionally 
diversified portfolios and that adopting regulatory capital requirements would most likely 
reduce the incentive for such institutions to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage. (Hussain 
and Hassan, 2005) using data of banks in developing countries examined the impact of capital 
requirements on credit risk-taking. They employed both 3SLS and GMM methods and found 
that these regulations did not raise the banks’ capital ratio and that bank size reduced capital 
while also increasing bank risk taking behavior.  
 (Francis and Osborne, 2010) examined the efficacy of regulatory capital requirements 
for a sample of UK banks’ during the period 1998-2006 using FE and GMM methods. They 
found that these requirements direct banks’ capital management practices to maintain targeted 
buffers above regulatory thresholds. (Hogan, 2015) examined both the capital and risk-based 
capital ratio of US banks holding companies for the period 1999-2010 to predict banks’ equity 
risk and risk of solvency. He measured bank’s equity risk by the standard deviation of their 
stock returns and the risk of solvency by bank’s Z-scores. He report that risk-based capital 
ratio was not a better predictor of bank risk than the standard capital ratio and that the capital 
ratio is consistently and significantly much better than the risk-based capital ratio as a 
predictor of both stock return volatility and banks’ Z-scores which are in line with the findings 
of  (Dowd et al., 2011) who found that risk-based capital regulations based on the Basel 
accords suffered from the lack of information which meant that risk-based capital ratio is a 
poor performance indicator. 
(Lemonakis. et al, 2015) measured the efficiency of the banking industry in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region during the period: 2003–2012. Using external and 
internal to the firm factors and panel data econometric modelling. They attempt to present 
new evidence on the relationship between efficiency, capital and risk of MENA region’s 
banking industry. They found that bank capitalization is positively related to efficiency and 
profitability and negatively to size, amount and quality of loans and risk measured with 
Altman’s Z-score and negative relationship between efficiency and risk.  
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2.5 Capital regulations literature review 
The maintenance of a robust infrastructure and legislative structure is generally considered 
to be the main factors for achieving a stable financial system. In line with this objective, the 
Central Bank of Jordan has sought to develop the financial system’s infrastructure and the 
relevant financial regulations in order to improve the legislative scheme of the financial 
system in order to secure the stability of the Jordanian financial system, especially given the 
experiences of OECD countries which showed that inadequate supervisory and regulatory 
rules can contribute significantly to initiating and intensifying crises faced by banks. In this 
regard, it is important to investigate how capital regulations have affect the stability and safety 
of Jordanian banks' since very little or no evidence of this exists in the current literature. 
One of the earliest studies examining the effectiveness of infrastructure and legislative 
structure is detailed in the work of (Kahane, 1977) who looked at the effectiveness of 
regulatory instruments in protecting intermediary's solvency and found that capital regulation 
was unable to reduce overall bank portfolio risk unless the asset composition of the bank’s 
portfolio is subject to these regulations and that constraining the portfolio composition of the 
intermediary cannot generally be regarded as an effective means for bounding the firm's 
probability of bankruptcy. (Keeley and Furlong, 1990), using a mean-variance approach 
examined the effects of bank capital regulation on the asset and bankruptcy risk of insured, 
utility-maximizing banks. They found that the shift in the risk-return frontier is triggered 
manly by capital regulations. (Mayer, 1992) studied the consequences of capital regulations 
on the portfolio choices of commercial banks. He concluded that risk-based deposit insurance 
premiums are stronger moderators for portfolio risk than capital requirements. In contrast to 
a setting of incomplete markets, limited liability and shareholder-utility-maximizing banks, 
he found that capital regulation can potentially reduce asset risk which is consistent with the 
findings of (Keeley and Furlong, 1990). (Mayer, 1992) point out that there are three possible 
scenarios when capital requirements are unexpectedly introduced by complete-market, 
deposit-insured and value-maximizing banks. The first one is that no increase in capital is 
observed and the bank invests in a combination of one risky asset and one riskless asset, the 
second scenario is when no increase in capital is observed and the bank invests in a 
combination of two risky assets and the third scenario occurs when the bank invests only in 
one single risky asset to meet the imposed requirements.  
 (Cai and Thakor, 2011) analyzed the effects of capital regulation on bank behavior 
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using data of US banks for the period 1986-1993. (Cai and Thakor, 2011) report that increases 
in risk-based capital requirements and regulatory subsidies stochastically reduced aggregate 
bank lending especially for those banks with higher capital costs. In addition, (Barrios and 
Blanco, 2003) using a disequilibrium estimation approach examined how 76 Spanish 
commercial banks (over the period 1985-1991) set their rate of equity capital over assets 
(capital ratios) to avoid bankruptcies. They report that regulatory constraints are not 
significant moderators of capital augmentations in Spanish commercial banks and that the 
pressure of market forces is the main determinant of banks' capital requirements. This finding 
is in clear contrast with the findings of (Kim and Santomero, 1988) who showed that tight 
capital regulations encouraged banks to reduce their credit facilities which adversely affected 
the level of productive investments. (Gonzalez, 2005) also examined the impact of bank 
regulation on bank risk-taking using a panel of 251 banks from 36 countries using a two-
stage least squares method. The findings show that regulatory restrictions influenced banks’ 
risk-taking behavior though this was inconsistent. (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009) examined 
the effects of capital regulation on the European bank's stability for the period 1997 -2005 
and found Eastern European banking markets to be less diversified and more concentrated. 
These markets are more prone to financial fragility. The findings also showed that market 
concentration harmed European banks’ financial soundness. 
 (Stolz and Wedow, 2011) analyzed the effect of the business cycle on the regulatory 
capital buffers of German local banks for the period 1993-2004 using GMM method. They 
report that capital buffers behaved counter-cyclically and that the results varied depending on 
the level of bank capitalization, where less-capitalized banks decreased capital buffers and 
raise risk-weighted assets over the business cycle while well-capitalized banks maintained 
capital buffers and risk-weighted assets in booms and increased capital buffers by 
accumulating capital and lowering risk-weighted assets during the market downturn. 
(Teixeira et al., 2014) investigated the impact of capital requirements on banks’ equity capital 
using panel data for a sample of 560 banks from the US and Europe. They found that 
regulatory capital requirements are not the main determinants of banks’ capital structure. 
According to the type and region of the bank, the determinants of the banks’ share of equity 
vary. Based on the work (Blundell and Bond, 1998),  (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2015) 
examined the impact of the new Federal Reserve (FED) regulations on capital levels and 
buffers held by banks before the U.S. financial crisis using a sample of 4433 banks. They 
found that the Federal regulations failed to force the banks to build capital buffers or alter 
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their adjustment speeds during the economic upturn that preceded the crisis. (Rahman et al., 
2015) using a panel dataset of 30 Bangladeshi commercial banks for the period 2008-2012, 
examined the impact of bank size on bank regulatory capital ratios and risk-taking behavior 
by employing GMM and simulated equation models. They found that large banks are riskier 
and have a higher level of capital relative to their smaller counterparts and that bank risk 
exposure decreased with a high level of regulatory capital. (Ashraf et al., 2016) using annual 
data consisting of 8689 banks from 58 countries examined whether common equity-based 
and risk-based capital requirements forced banks to restrict dividend payments or not using 
the random-effects method. They found that banks paid lower dividends in countries where 
regulators imposed common equity-based capital regulation but after extending the sample 
period from 1998 to 2012, they found that regulatory capital requirements are less effective 
in restricting bank dividend payments during the crisis period. 
(Yameen and Ali, 2016) evaluated the financial soundness of thirteen Jordanian 
commercial banks, between 2002 and 2011. They found that all the Jordanian Commercial 
banks are financially sound. They concluded that the Bank meter could help the commercial 
Jordanian banks’ internal management to avoid insolvency issues with proper control over their 
operations. (Al-Homaidi. Etal, 2018) examined the relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure level and profitability of Yemeni Islamic banks and measure the level of voluntary 
disclosure information and its association with the profitability of 30 annual reports of Yemeni 
Islamic banks covering the period from 2005 up to 2014. They found that corporate governance 
information, corporate social disclosure, bank size and bank age have a negative and significant 
relationship with return on assets. Concerning (ROE), the results reveal that background about 
the Islamic bank, financial ratios, corporate governance information, corporate social 
disclosure, zakat information, and bank size have a negative and significant effect with return 
on equity. 
(Haryanto, 2020) analyzed the factors that affect the profitability of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia using quarterly data from 2006-2019. He aimed to analyze the effect of efficiency, 
risk, liquidity, capital and macroeconomic conditions on the profitability of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia. He found that the efficiency and risk had a positive effect on profitability. Inflation 
has a negative effect on profitability. While liquidity, CAR and GDP do not affect the 
profitability of Islamic banks. 
2.6 Bank liquidity, liquidity risk, and credit risk literature review 
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Banks are widely known to experience various types of risk, ranging from interest rate risk 
to credit risk. Therefore, understanding risks and their impact on bank performance is critical 
to all banks which also applies to Jordanian banks since banks in Jordan are themselves 
exposed to different types of risks and because of the important role that Jordanian banks play 
in the financial system and the real economy. Therefore, if these bank specific risks are not 
properly managed, they may have untold repercussions for the real economy. It is worth 
noting that the banking sector in Jordan does not have a functioning credit risk management 
system to be able to anticipate future risks that might affect the system. As a result, serious 
events have risen due to such inadequacy. One example of this is the excessive losses incurred 
by the Housing Bank, which is one of the largest banks in Jordan, a result of the collapse of 
subsidiaries in neighbouring countries such as Syria. In light of these losses, bank officials 
confirmed that such losses could have been avoided had there been a functioning credit risk 
management system in place to correctly anticipate future crises. Therefore, identifying the 
major type of risks faced by Jordanian banks should assist in helping the Central Bank of 
Jordan’s reform policies in the direction of mitigating these risks while also maintaining the 
stability of the banking system.  
 Using annual data of banks in 12 advanced economies during the period 1994-2006, 
(Chen et al., 2018) employed alternative liquidity risk measures besides liquidity ratio and 
examined the main drivers of liquidity risk while also using a set of control variables 
consisting of bank-specific, supervisory and macroeconomic characteristics. The authors 
used 2SLS IV methods. The finding indicates that liquidity risk reduced profitability due to 
the higher cost of funds but increased banks’ net interest margins. The study classified the 
financial systems of the countries’ in the sample as either bank-based or market-based, and 
report liquidity risk to be negatively correlated with bank performance mainly in market-
based financial systems. (Cucinelli, 2013), using annual data for 1080 listed and non-listed 
Eurozone banks for the period 2006- 2010, he report that over the long-run well-capitalized 
banks have large liquidity covers and high-risk exposures and that assets quality, 
capitalization, size, and specialization are significant factors in planning effective liquidity 
risk management. (Distinguin, et al., 2013) examined the relationship between bank 
regulatory capital and bank liquidity using annual data for European and US publicly traded 
commercial banks for the period 2000-2006 using control variables that include total assets, 
total loans/total assets, total deposits/total assets, loan loss, provisions/total loans, Tier1 
capital/total assets, Tier1 and 2 capital/RWA, ROA, and total interest income/total income. 
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They employed FE and GMM methods and found banks in their sample to be less likely to 
regulate capital buffers for the purpose of raising liquidity levels. And considering minimum 
liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios enforced by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulation and Supervision, the findings indicate that small banks tended to strengthen their 
solvency standards when exposed to liquidity deficits while large banks might underestimate 
liquidity risks because of their too-big-to-fail status. (Yan et al., 2014) estimated liquidity risk 
for UK banks’ using annual data for the period 1997-2010 by utilizing an exposure-based 
cash-flow-at-risk (CFaR) approach that has been adopted by a number of international and 
national banks such Barclays, RBS (the Royal Bank of Scotland’s) and Lloyds for liquidity 
management. The findings showed that in 2011 RBS faced the largest liquidity risk while 
only HSBC managed to maintain positive CFaR throughout the study period. Over the same 
period, the most volatile cash flows were observed for Lloyds and Nat-west banks, as 
measured by the decreasing cash flow at risk as a percentage of expected cash flow. On the 
same issue, (Roman and Sargu, 2015) examined the determinants of liquidity risk for a 
sample of banks in CEE countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Romania) using  OLS. They report a significant and positive relationship between 
total capital ratio (TCR) and overall liquidity and, moreover, a negative impact of impair 
loans on banks’ liquidity. The adverse effects of the global financial turmoil and internal 
macroeconomic downturn were found to enhance the overall liquidity profiles of the banks. 
Taking a different approach and based on a partial-adjustment model similar to (Berger et al., 
2016) using data for 127,828 U.S. banks during the period 1992-2012 looked at how the 
liquidity management plans changed following the 2008 global financial crises 2008 using 
FE and GMM. They report that a typical U.S. commercial bank actively managed its balance 
sheet liquidity and that the implementation of the Basel III 'net stable funding ratio standards' 
had significant positive effects on bank liquidity management. They also report that the loans-
to-core deposits and net stable funding ratio standards are strictly implemented in smaller 
banks than bigger banks. (Khan et al., 2017) examined the relationship between funding 
liquidity and bank risk-taking for U.S. bank holding companies using quarterly data for the 
period 1986-2014 and report evidence which show that banks, in general, with low liquid 
profiles, have high-risk exposure. (Aydemir and Guloglu, 2017) examined the impact of 
credit and liquidity risks on banks’ spreads during business cycles in emerging markets. Their 
findings showed that credit risk was more important than liquidity risk in explaining bank 
spreads and that the spread effects of credit and liquidity risks vary over the business cycle. 
Interestingly, the findings suggest that during periods of recession, liquidity risk had a larger 
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significant impact on spreads while during economic booms, credit risk replaced liquidity 
risk in influencing bank spreads.  
(Altarawneh, 2018) investigated the impact of operational risk, credit risk, and liquidity 
risk on bank performance in Jordan. He found that operational and credit risks have a 
significant negative relationship with ROA while liquidity risk is found to have an 
insignificant positive relationship with ROA, the relationship between firm size and ROA is 
negative while the relationship between bank age and ROA is found to be positively 
significant, the relationship between management change and ROA is positively 
insignificant. 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter presents a survey of the literature underpinning the research contained in this 
thesis covering a selection of critical studies that have influenced the growing literature on 
the determinants of bank performance, studies on the impact of capital, capital adequacy 
requirement, risk-based capital, liquidity risk, capital regulation and other factors on banks’ 
performance measures. Generally, bank performance is affected by internal and external 
factors. In contrast, changes in bank-specific characteristics such as size, capital and risk 
management are found to cause significant changes in bank profitability. Liquidity and 
liquidity risk are also known to adversely affect bank performance, while capitalization, GDP 
growth and inflation are profitability triggers.  
Each of the separate themes of the foregoing literature reveals gaps in the literature, 
suggesting areas of research using Jordanian data. In this respect and on the issue of risk and 
capital adequacy requirement. It is the case that the majority of studies investigating the 
impact of capital adequacy requirements on banks’ performance have been more interested 
in examining bank specific data from developed countries. Most of these studies report that 
high risk is associated with high capital levels and the adoption of capital adequacy rules may 
increase bank's riskiness. While other studies have found that the implementation of capital 
adequacy requirements reduced risk-taking by commercial banks. This ongoing debate is 
lacking in strong empirical evidence from developing countries, especially Middle Eastern 
countries.  
The Jordanian banking system has a high capital adequacy ratio, which ranged between 
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18-21 percent. These rates are higher than both the Central Bank of Jordan and the Basel 
limits of 12 percent and 8 per cent, respectively. Thus, it is of interest to investigate how and 
how steering capital requirements have helped stabilize and therefore protect Jordanian 
commercial banks against risks. Similar questions can be raised with respect to the impact of 
bank risk-based capital on risk exposure and Jordanian commercial bank stability. As this 
review has shown, the literature in this area is mixed as some studies have found that risk-
based capital has had a negative impact on bank performance while other studies report that 
it has enhanced stability. Other studies have also looked at the impact of risk-based capital 
on bank lending behavior and report a minor impact on loan growth. Since high risk-based 
capital levels make lending more expensive. In line with risk-based measures, the literature 
on the criticality of liquidity and credit risk in influencing bank stability support the existence 
of a positive relationship between liquidity and credit risk, especially after the 2008 crisis, 
where liquidity risk has been shown to be one of the main reasons for bank failures. Regarding 
the impact of capital regulations on the banking sector behavior, one strand of the literature 
suggests that capital regulation reduces asset risk, while another strand suggest that adopting 
capital requirement regulations increases the chance of bank failure. Bank capital and 
operational efficiency are also considered important risk determinants. And the literature in 
this area has shown that capital regulations improve banking sector stability because it helps 
to foster the efficient allocation of risks while also supporting financial stability.  
The empirical study set out in each of the subsequent chapters fills an important gap in 
the literature on bank performance determinants by considering the impact of bank-specific, 
market structure and macroeconomic variables on different profitability measures for a 
sample of 13 Jordanian banks for the period 2003-2015. In this respect Chapter 4, investigate 
the profitability of Jordanian banks in light of bank reform and the deregulation programs, 
and looks at the impact of competition, risk, and interest rates on bank performance. Chapter 
5 studies the relationship between Jordanian banks' capital, risk, and efficiency, while 
Chapter 6 examine the impact of Jordanian banking system efficiency and competition on the 
cost of credit. Chapter 7 examine liquidity funding risk and the impact of the deposit 
insurance scheme on the risk-taking behavior of Jordanian banks. 
In consideration of the gaps in the literature previously mentioned, the study seeks to 
answer the following research questions: 
• How and in what ways have the competitive conditions affected the profitability of 
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Jordanian banks?  
• Does liquidity risk influence the profitability of Jordanian banks? 
• To what extent have changes in interest rates affected the profitability of Jordanian 
banks? 
• Which market type monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect competition, best 
represents the Jordanian banking sector? 
• Does bank capital affect the risk-taking behavior of Jordanian banks? 
• Does bank capital affect the efficiency of Jordanian banks? 
• To what extent does risk affect the efficiency of Jordanian banks? 
• Does bank size affect liquidity funding? 
• Does capitalization affect the liquidity funding requirement of Jordanian banks? 
• To what extent have crisis periods affected the liquidity funding requirements of 
Jordanian banks? 
• Does the size of a bank affect its liquidity creation? 
• Does bank capitalization affect liquidity creation? 
• To what extent has crises periods affected the liquidity creation of Jordanian banks? 
In relation to these questions, we hypothesize that: 
H1.1: There is a positive relationship between bank competition and profitability. 
H1.2: There is a significant positive relationship between liquidity risk and profitability. 
H1.3: There is a positive relationship between the interest rate and profitability. 
H2.1: There is a positive relationship between bank capital and efficiency. 
H2.2: There is a negative relationship between risk and bank efficiency. 
H2.3: There is a negative relationship between capital and risk. 
H3.1: There is a negative relationship between bank efficiency and the cost of credit. 
H4.1.  Lower funding liquidity risk incentivises banks to take more risk. 
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H4.2. Banks with higher capital buffers are less risk-taking in response to lower funding 
liquidity risks. 
H4.3. Larger banks take less risk in response to lower funding liquidity risk 
H4.4. In response to reductions in funding liquidity risk, bank risk decreased during the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
In this section we will focus on the theories related to that have been developed over the years 
by researchers in banking and related to the study objectives and hypotheses.  
Conducting research on the performance of the banks begin between 1970 and 1980. 
They applied efficient structure theory and market power theory (Athanasoglou et al., 2006). 
Portfolio theory as well helps in determining banks’ profits and used in the study of the 
profitability of banks (Nzongang and Atemnkeng, 2006). The bank performance is affected by 
the market structure of the industry stated by market power theory which was given by 
(Tregenna, 2009). The SCP and the RMP theorem are the two different approaches of the 
market power theory. Efficiency theory states that banks are more efficient earn more profits 
and it possesses two different approaches named as Scale efficiency hypothesis and X 
efficiency. X efficiency states that efficient firms have lower cost hence, they are more 
profitable than others. On the other hand, approach of Scale efficiency focuses on high scale 
production and ignores any differences in management and technology of production. Large 
firms size has the benefit of economies of scale which produce higher profit as a result to the 
low per-unit cost. Hence, they have a high market share which leads to higher profits 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2006). Balanced portfolio theory also plays a vital role in the study of the 
performance of the banks. (Nzongang and Atemnkeng,2006). This theory states that decisions 
regarding the policy affect the optimal presence of each asset in the investment of shareholder 
which affected by factors such as rate of return, size of the portfolio and risks associated with 
the holding of each asset. High profits can be achieved by a possible set of liabilities and assets 
which are recognized by management and expenses incurred by banks. Bank performance 
affected by risk-return trade-off and the equity to asset ratio. According to financing theory, 
high levels of debt and low value of equity to asset ratio results in high risk which results in 
high rates of return which also explains the risk-return trade-off theory (Van Ommeren, 2011). 
Some studies explained that higher profits can be fetched by high equity to asset ratio. The 
market value of the bank increases with high equity ratio according to the signalling hypothesis 
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(Berger, 1995). On the other hand, bankruptcy cost hypothesis states that banks hold high 
equity as a result of unexpectedly high bankruptcy costs to avoid financial debt (Berger, 1995). 
Starting with the literature assessing competition in the banking sector. They are 
divided into two types of research: (1) studies that adopt a structural approach and (2) studies 
that adopt a non-structural approach. The structural method has its roots in the theory of 
industrial organization that measures competitiveness following the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm and the alternative efficiency hypothesis (EH). The SCP 
paradigm, having its origin in the work of (Bain, 1951). In our study, we employ one of the 
“Non-Structural Model” approach suggested by (Rosse and Panzar 1977) and Panzar and Rosse 
(1982, 1987) which used by several scholars to determine the structure of the banking market 
in some countries and its impacts on the bank profitability. In Jordan, we used the Panzar-
Rosse assessment as it is the appropriate method that complies with the available data. (Gilbert, 
1984), pointed out that a major weakness in most bank market structures studies is the absence 
of a theoretical foundation which takes account of bank regulation when considering the effect 
of market structure on bank profitability. The competition-efficiency hypothesis recommended 
that efficiency leads to reduce banks’ costs which further proceed to higher 
profitability. Conversely, studies in favour of SCP hypothesis suggested that less competition 
in banks tend to expand their business activities and higher profitability. 
The risk- aversion hypothesis was first introduced in the manufacturing industry by 
(Galbraith, 1967) and then expanded by (Cave, 1970). The Galbraith- Cave or risk avoidance 
hypothesis as referred by (Edwards and Heggested 1973) indicates that banks located in more 
concentrated markets may choose to trade off some of their potential monopoly profit for 
reduction in risk by choosing safer portfolios. Thus, (Clark, 1986) had indicated that selecting 
a safer portfolio of assets and liabilities in line with their risk-preference, banks located in 
concentrated markets with monopoly power, may reduce risk at the expense of some monopoly 
profit. Hence, the risk avoidance hypothesis may provide an explanation for the lack of 
relationship between concentration or monopoly power and profitability. (Clark, 1986) also 
analyzed the existence of a systematic interrelationship between market concentration, risk and 
profitability as suggested by the risk-avoidance hypothesis. He argued that asset and liability 
portfolio selection, risk and profitability are interrelated and hence determined simultaneously. 
Thus, he estimated a simultaneous equation model by using the two-stage least squares 
technique. The results indicated that concentration had a significant negative effect on overall 
bank risk and a significant positive effect on profitability. (Kushner et.al, 1989), examined the 
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impact of firm size on the profit rate and the level of risk for chartered banks and the national 
trust and loan companies in Canada. The 10 firms used for the study account for more than 75 
% of all trust companies’ assets in Canada. Results somewhat showed mixed support for the 
Galbraith-Caves hypothesis. Firstly, the results did not support the hypothesis that larger firms 
can reach desirable sets of profit and risk. However, it is suggested that larger firms and firms 
with greater market power operate at lower levels of risks. These findings provide evidence in 
favour of the risk-avoidance hypothesis among large commercial banks in addition to 
demonstrating the importance of risk as a determinant of bank profitability. The implication of 
the presence of risk-avoidance behaviour in the banking industry is that credit will only be 
extended to safe business firms which are usually large establishments in monopolistic markets. 
Several possible explanations have been put forward for the bank’s risk adverse behaviour. 
(Vernon, 1971), pointed out that banks are generally controlled by managers rather than 
owners. These managers do have considerable control over the risk exposure of their banks in 
their daily portfolio decisions. However, the adverse effects of an unsuccessful managerial 
decision may far outweigh the rewards for a successful management decision. As a result, a 
major impact of managerial control in banking is a tendency is for more risk adverse behaviour. 
To this extent, (Edwards and Heggestad, 1973) found that the degree of risk, as measured by 
the coefficient of variation of large banks‟ profits over time tends to fall significantly as the 
level of concentration in the respective bank’s market increases. Thus, providing further 
support for the risk avoidance hypothesis. Another possible explanation provided by 
(Heggestad, 1977) was that the banks‟ risk adverse behaviour may be a consequence of 
regulation, since one of the main objectives of bank regulation is to limit the risk exposure of 
banks by restricting their portfolio choices. Effective portfolio regulation would thus constrain 
banks to safer portfolios and thus provide apparent evidence in favour of the risk-avoidance 
hypothesis. The structure‐conduct‐performance hypothesis states that highly concentrated 
markets positively impact bank profitability through greater market power and therewith the 
ability to charge high rates for loans and low rates for deposits. Empirical evidence for the 
structure‐conduct‐profit hypothesis is found in (Goddard et al., 2004) for Europe. On the other 
hand, the efficient‐structure theory claims that greater market shares are gained from higher 
efficiency which increases profitability, see (Berger, 1995). The theory of capital structure 
states that a higher use of debt (equity) financing within a certain range, might actually reduce 
(increase) firms' cost of capital. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient estimate for equity-to-
assets indicates an efficient (inefficient) management of banks’ capital structure. Besides 
efficiency, competition between banks can influence the stability of the sector (Carletti and 
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Hartmann, 2002). The link between competition and financial stability has been recognized in 
theoretical and empirical research. Indeed, competition affects the stability of the sector in the 
sense of either fragility or excessive risk-taking (Geraldine and Weill, 2008).  
Balanced portfolio theory also plays a vital role in the study of the performance of the 
banks. (Nzongang and Atemnkeng,2006). This theory states that decisions regarding the policy 
affect the optimal presence of each asset in the investment of shareholder which affected by 
factors such as rate of return, size of the portfolio and risks associated with the holding of each 
asset. High profits can be achieved by a possible set of liabilities and assets which are 
recognized by management and expenses incurred by banks. Bank performance affected by 
risk-return trade-off and the equity to asset ratio. According to financing theory, high levels of 
debt and low value of equity to asset ratio results in high risk which results in high rates of 
return which also explains the risk-return trade-off theory (Van Ommeren, 2011). Some studies 
explained that higher profits can be fetched by high equity to asset ratio. The market value of 
the bank increases with high equity ratio according to the signalling hypothesis (Berger, 1995). 
On the other hand, bankruptcy cost hypothesis states that banks hold high equity as a result of 
unexpectedly high bankruptcy costs to avoid financial debt (Berger, 1995). 
From a theoretical point of view, sound competition in the banking market is of great 
economic importance as it is lowering prices and improves the quality of services and 
performance. The degree of competition in the financial sector can influence the efficiency of 
the production of financial services (Jiménez et al., 2007). Increased competition in the 
financial sector to lead to lower costs and enhanced efficiency and profitability. Furthermore, 
competition can affect the quality of financial products, it forces banks to improve their 
efficiency, thus will help households and firms access to financial services and finance, which 
improve profitability and economic growth. Moreover, the higher the degree of competition in 
the banking sector, the higher its efficiency in allocating funds and operating as an intermediary 
between lenders and borrowers (De Nicolò and Loukoianova, 2007). 
According to financing theory, high levels of debt and low value of equity to asset ratio 
result in high risk, resulting in high rates of return, which also explains the risk-return trade-
off theory (Van Ommeren, 2011). Some studies explained that higher profits can be fetched by 
high equity to asset ratio. According to the signalling hypothesis, the market value of the bank 
increases with high equity ratio (Berger, 1995). On the other hand, bankruptcy cost hypothesis 
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states that banks hold high equity as a result of unexpectedly high bankruptcy costs to avoid 






























The theoretical structural model implies that the financial system is included in one of many 
factors that can be treated as economic growth determinants as the institutional framework of 
the financial system and its performance is also an important determinant of economic 
growth. its stability and development have a positive impact on economic growth. However, 
when verifying this hypothesis, some questions appear: Is the relationship between the 
financial sector and economic growth strengthened after the last global crisis and the crisis? 
(Matysek-Jedrych, 2007) define the financial system as it is the structure of ‘‘interconnected 
financial institutions, financial markets and elements of financial system infrastructure; 
through this structure, entities belonging to the real environment (first of all households, 
enterprises and government) can source funding, invest savings and satisfy the rest of their 
needs relating to the financial aspect of their functioning’’ (Matysek-Jedrych 2007). 
As one of the financial system main drivers of the economy is the banking system. 
Many of the economics is a bank-based financial system. The bank is a financial institution 
involved in borrowing and lending money. It plays an important role in the economy by 
offering a service of saving and financing for household, people, business, and government. 
These services, such as providing loans, are essential for enabling economic growth. The 
banking system consists of banks such as commercial banks, investment banks, Islamic 
banks, agriculture and industrial banks. Commercial banks play an essential role in the 
banking system and the economy, a vital component of the financial system. One of the main 
functions of commercial banks is to allocate funds from savers to borrowers efficiently by 
providing different and specialized financial services. These financial services help to make 
the overall economy more efficient. 
(Werner, 2012) shows that the macroeconomic feedback of banking activity had been 
neglected. The study that one of three theories of banking has been dominant: The credit 
creation theory of banking maintains that through accounting operations each bank can 
individually create money out of nothing. The fractional reserve theory states that only who 
can collectively create money is the banking system as a whole, and they are a financial 
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intermediary, gathering deposits and lending money. The third one is the financial 
intermediation theory which considers banks as financial intermediaries both individually and 
collectively, showing that the bank banks are indistinguishable from other non-bank financial 
institutions in their behaviour.  
The first empirical test published on this issue was (Werner, 2014b), who examine the 
actual operations and accounting entries taking place when a ‘live’ bank loan is granted and 
paid out. He found that only the credit creation theory was consistent with the observed 
empirical evidence. Previous literature discussed the linkage between banking sector 
development and economic growth and confirmed that the banking system financing enhance 
and improve economic growth. (McKinnon, 1973) found that increases in banking services 
and financial activities are accelerating economy toward growth. (King and Levine, 1993) 
argued that providing more funds to the economy stimulates the movement of economic 
wheels. Using a data for in emerging and developed countries, (Hshin-Yu Liang and Alan 
Reichert, 2006) examined the relationship between banking system development and 
economic growth and found a strong supply–leading relation between banking sector 
development and economic output. Moreover, for 10 Europeanan Union countries throughout 
1994 to 2007, (Caporale M. et al, 2009) found that stock and money markets are still 
underdeveloped and their contribution to economic growth is limited, whilst banks enhanced 
economic growth. 
In developing countries, using a data that covered the Palestine banking system during 
the period of 1995 to 2011, (Alfara, 2012) discussed the role of the banking sector in financing 
economic development and found that banking credits have a positive effect on gross 
domestic product. While in some neighborhood countries, (Owdeh, 2012) studied the 
relationship between banking sector growth and economic development in Lebanon and 
found a positive impact on the role of the banking system in economic growth. Similarly, 
(Al-Khatib and Al-Saffar, 2013) examined the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth in Jordan and found that banking sector development and economic 
growth has a strong demand-leading relationship and the banking system development is 
significantly influenced by economic growth. 
The previous literature suggested that both bank-specific factors (internal) and 
macroeconomic factors (external or environmental), may have an influence on the bank’s 
performance (Bourk,1989). The importance of that analysis of both bank-specific factors 
(internal) and macroeconomic factors (external or environmental) on the bank’s performance 
should be carried out, which will help decision-makers improve banks’ performance by 
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manipulating internal by mitigating/capitalizing on the influence of external factors.  
The theoretical and empirical studies show that the banking system affected by various 
internal and external variables (Ugwunta et al., 2012). Bank characteristics divided into 
internal and external factors. Internal factors include capital adequacy, cost to income ratio, 
liquidity; calculated as loans to customers, and the accounting value of the bank’s total assets 
and external factors, including the annual inflation rate and real gross domestic product 
growth. The internal factors are those that can be controlled by the bank management and 
influences decision-making. While external factors are those factors that cannot be controlled 
by bank management and influence decision-making. However, managers can analyze the 
external factor and environment to benefit from any changes that could be happened. 
 
Over the last years of the deregulations and the economic reform program since 1980, 
a number of factors have contributed to the Jordanian banking system performance (internal 
and external). For example: In regards to increasing the sector competition, the CBJ attempt 
to use deregulation, reform program, and liberalization that promoted by the Central Bank 
Directive on the banking system. This directive provides the competitive conditions for all 
Jordanian banking institutions, which will influence banks’ profitability. It has its important 
for stakeholders such as the central banks, governments, bankers’ associations, and other 
financial authorities and the managers of the banks. the mentioned steps that carried by CBJ 
it has its role to improve and enhance the economic growth as well. Previous work such as 
(Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007); (Rajan and Zingales, 1998); and (Levine, 1998) work, show 
the impact of both internal and external factors on the banking performance. 
 
The banking sector in Jordan is the cornerstone of the Jordanian economy. This is 
because when the real economy was left shaken by the global financial crises of 2008, the 
banking sector not only showed considerable resilience also provided much needed liquidity 
that enabled the economy to withstand the spillover effects of the negative externalities 
brought about as a result of the fallout from the U.S. subprime crisis. Since the beginning of 
the 1990s and the launch of the joint venture of the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) and the 
World Bank (WB) to reform the banking sector following the 1980s crises, the banking sector 
continued to grow and with that growth has attracted interest from both domestic and 
international investors.  
The Jordanian banking system consist of the CBJ including Islamic banks, foreign 
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banks, commercial banks, specialized lending institutions, real estate institutions, saving and 
other financial institutions, specialized credit institutions, housing banks, and money-
changing companies. In 2010, the number of working banks stood at 25, including 3 Islamic 
and 9 foreign banks. Over the years, Jordanian banks have accommodated the financial needs 
of individuals and large corporations and, as a result, has the highest concentrations of credit 
payments covering trade, construction, and industry sectors. In terms of total bank equity, 
since 2007, the banking sector has experienced continued growth. This has enabled the sector 
to support bank lending activity on the one hand, and on the other to support increased non-
distributed bank earnings and the demands of the new minimum capital requirements of the 
CBJ.  
 As is the case in all developed and developing countries, the primary objectives of 
commercial banks in Jordan is to maximize shareholder profit. But unlike conventional profit-
seeking banks, Jordanian banks face several types of risk while undertaking banking 
operations and also operate in a highly regulated legislative environment which is designed 
to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system. The purpose of this chapter is to 
give a brief overview of the developing banking sector in Jordan and thereby provide the 
context underpinning the study carried out in this thesis.  This is discussed in the next section, 
which provides an overview of the development of the Jordanian banking sector starting from 
the 1990s, including a brief discussion of the evolution of the CBJ and CBJ regulations in 
light of the Basel accords. The structure of this chapter divided into 4 sections as follows: 
Section 3.1 introduction. Section 3.2 present the overview of the banking system in Jordan. 
Then in section 3.3, we apply indicators of financial soundness to discuss the development 
of Jordanian banks' assets and liabilities over the period 1993-2015. Section 3.4 concludes 
the chapter. 
3.2 Overview of the banking system in Jordan  
In the last century, the Jordanian banking sector was founded when the British Othoman Bank 
became the first bank to commence banking operation in Jordan in 1925. The Ottoman Bank 
operated solely in the market until 1935 when the Arab Bank Limited opened its first branch 
in Amman at the end of 1934 (The Ottoman Bank changed its name in 2003 to the Standard 
Chartered Bank). However, due to the political instability in Palestine, the Arab Bank was 
forced to relocate its headquarters to Amman. On 14 April 1949, two more banks were 
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established, the British Bank for the Middle East and the Arab Nation Bank (ANB). Initially, 
the ANB did not practice banking activities and, as a result, was liquidated.  In 1957, the Arab 
Real Estate Bank commenced conventional banking activities in Jordan as a commercial bank 
and also provided specialized real estate finance services. Five more banks were later 
established in the 1950s – the Jordan National Bank, Cairo Amman Bank, Rafidain Bank, 
Saudi Riyadh Bank, and Intra Banks. Since the Saudi Riyadh Bank did not engage in bank 
related activities, its registration was cancelled. In contrast, the activities of Intra Bank were 
suspended as a result of its insolvency in 1970. However, it was later re-established in 1977 
under the new name of Al-Mashreq Bank following the merger with Jordan Bank when the 
latter was liquidated in 1989. In addition, three specialized government owned credit 
institutions were established in 1960 – the Agriculture Credit Corporation, the Housing and 
Urban Development Corporation, and the Cities and Village Development Corporation, and 
in 1961 the Holy Land Bank registered a domestic bank but its registration ceased in 1965. 
Barclays Bank was one of the earliest foreign banks to operate in Jordan, followed by HSBC 
Bank in the late 1950s.  
Until 1964, the Jordanian monetary board did not exercise any influence over the 
Jordanian banking sector. It was only when the CBJ was established in 1964 as an 
independent legal entity owned by the Jordanian government that the CBJ obtained powers 
that made it the only official monetary authority of Jordan. The CBJ is managed by a board 
of directors who are appointed by the council of ministers. Its main role is to administer 
monetary and credit policies, as well as to ensure the day to day stability of the Jordanian 
banking and financial system. 
In the 1970s, five banks were established: one Islamic bank (Jordan Islamic Bank for 
Finance and Investment) and four domestic banks (Jordan Kuwaiti Bank, Housing Bank for 
Trade and Finance, Arab Jordan Investment Bank, and Jordan Gulf Bank, known now as 
Jordan Commercial Bank). Two more domestic banks (Arab Banking Corporation and Jordan 
Investment and Finance Bank) were established in the 1980s. In the 1990s, four banks were 
established, including one Islamic (Islamic International Arab Bank Plc) and three domestics 
(Union Bank for saving and Investment, Société Générale De Banque-Jordanie, and Export 
and Finance Bank). During the 2000’s, seven banks were established, including a local and 
six foreign banks(Standard Chartered Bank, National Bank of Kuwait, Audi Bank, BLOM 
Bank, Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank, National Bank of Abu Dhabi, and Al Rajhi Bank). The 
CBJ supervised all banking operations in Jordan. 
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Over the period 1927-2017 structural changes and mergers and acquisitions have 
helped reshape the banking system in Jordan. The most notable restructuring was the Arab 
Banking Corporation of Bahrain (ABC) which converted to a commercial bank with a capital 
of 10 million Jordanian Dinar (JD) following the restructuring of the Jordan Securities 
Corporation in 1989.  On June 25, 2014, the Arab Jordan Investment Bank (AJIB) announced 
the takeover of HSBC Middle East Limited banking operations as part of its strategy to 
expand its operations. Other banks, such as the Jordan Gulf Bank changed its name to the 
Jordan Commercial Bank in 2004, while in 2005 the Export and Finance Bank changed its 
name to Capital Bank. Table 3.1 lists the banks currently operating in the Jordanian banking 
system.  
 
Table 3.1 Profile of the Jordanian Banks Until 2015. 
Branches Number of ATM Type Year of establishment Origin Bank Name 
75 inside 
116 outside 
151 Commercial 1930 Local Arab Bank 
27 inside 51 Commercial 1989 Local Arab Banking Corporation 
18 inside 
1 outside 
51 Commercial 1978 Local Arab Jordan Investment Bank 
38 inside 59 Commercial 1991 Local Bank Al Etihad 
70 inside 
14 outside 
118 Commercial 1960 Local Bank of Jordan 
72 inside 
22 outside  
165 Commercial 1960 Local Cairo Amman Bank 
12 inside 38 Commercial 1996 Local Capital Bank of Jordan 
11 inside 28 Commercial 1989 Local Invest bank 
56 inside 
6 outside 
100 Commercial 1956 Local Jordan Ahli Bank 
27 inside 
4 outside 
45 Commercial 1978 Local Jordan Commercial Bank 
56 inside 
3 outside 
83 Commercial 1977 Local Jordan Kuwait Bank 
17 inside 17 Commercial 1993 Local 




214 Commercial 1974 Local 
The Housing Bank for Trade and 
Finance 
73 inside 169 Islamic 1978 Local Jordan Islamic Bank 
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Source: ASE (2015), CBJ (2015); ABJ (2015) 
 
3.2.1 Composition of Jordanian financial sector 
The Jordanian banking sector has three types of banks: commercial banks, Islamic banks, and 
investment banks. These banks are regulated by the CBJ, with the exception of foreign banks, 
who remain subject to their home country regulations. Commercial banks are banks that deal 
with traditional borrowing and lending functions while Islamic banks are banks that offer 
services and products in accordance with Islamic practices and Shariah Laws. These banks 
incur more operational costs than the other Jordanian banks as a result of their role in financing 
social services, while their depositors share in the profit and loss of their operations. Investment 
banks are, however, more specialized and are involved in selected capital market activities such 
as the issuing, distribution and selling of securities, brokerage services and the underwriting of 
new share issue and debt.  All of these banks, except foreign banks, are listed on the Amman 
stock market. 
In Jordan, commercial banks dominate the banking market. The average total assets of 
commercial, investment, and Islamic banks are approximately 80 percent, 10 percent, and 10 
percent respectively. Of these banks, commercial banks play the largest role in the economy 
by virtue of their ability to finance various economic sectors, individual and corporate agents. 
The operation of investment banks is, however, limited and tend to be more focused on 
proprietary trading and brokerage services. The reasons for this can be explained by their 
underdeveloped operations, and by the small daily trading volume of the Amman stock 
market.  
21inside 35 Islamic 2009 Local Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 
41 inside 57 Islamic 1997 Local Islamic International Arab Bank 
13 inside 25 Commercial 2004 Foreign Banque Audi 
14 inside 14 Commercial 2004 Foreign Blom Bank 
2 inside 0 Commercial 1974 Foreign Citi Bank 
10 inside 14 Commercial 1951 Foreign Egyptian Arab Land Bank 
3 inside  4 Commercial 2009 Foreign National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
3 inside 6 Commercial 2004 Foreign National Bank of Kuwait 
2 inside 0 Commercial 1957 Foreign Rafidain Bank 
6 inside 8 Commercial 2002 Foreign Standard Chartered 
6 inside 36 Islamic 2011 Foreign Al Rajhi Bank 
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With regard to bank ownership, domestic banks are owned by Jordanians and foreign 
resident’s while foreign banks are fully owned by foreign residents. Article 4 of the 2000 
Banking Law states that “no person shall engage in banking activities without first obtaining 
a final license from the Central Bank, in accordance with the provisions of this law’’. The 
minimum capital required by a foreign bank to operate in Jordan is 50 million JD. Before 
1997, foreign ownership of domestic banks had a ceiling of 49 percent, but following the 
removal of capital restrictions in 2006, the foreign ownership ceiling was raised to 55 percent 
of the total assets of Jordanian banks. At the end of 2014, the total foreign ownership ratio, 
Arab and foreign, in Jordanian licensed banks’ capital was 47 percent. 
3.2.2 Restructuring the Jordanian banking sector: banking crisis and financial 
liberalization. 
Prior to the 1980s, the banking sector in Jordan was heavily regulated to protect the domestic 
banking market from foreign competition. This suggests that Jordanian commercial banks 
operated in an oligopolistic environment whereby the interest rates on both credits and 
deposits were determined in a monopolistic manner. Over the period 1988–1991, following 
the devaluation of the JD, interest rates were raised to encourage savings. But as a result of 
the collapse of Petra Bank and six other financial institutions linked to it, the banking system 
suffered a crisis which ultimately dented the confidence of savers in August 1989. The main 
reasons for the crisis and the lack of savers confidence were due to inadequate banking 
regulations, which fostered widespread fraud (since the monitoring authority were 
preoccupied with ensuring that Jordanian banks comply with operating ratios, while at the 
same time imposing credit limits in order to force banks to do proper risk credit analysis of 
their loan portfolios), the high level of non-performing loans resulting from the overexposure 
of banks to the real estate market, and the speculative activities of banks in the foreign 
exchange market which resulted in excessive exposure and losses. 
In 1989, the Jordanian government, with the assistance of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), launched a reform program aimed at restructuring 
the banking sector. These reforms gave new powers to the CBJ, including responsibility for 
monetary policy and stability, determining the size, cost, and direction of credit facilities and 
the restructuring of banks financial portfolios. In parallel with these reforms, in 1993, the 
Jordanian government began the process of liberalising the banking system by removing 
restrictions on the entry of foreign banks (thereby increasing competition), reducing 
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government direct lending, expanding product deregulation, reducing restrictions on foreign 
exchange transactions and the de-regulation and liberalization of financial markets. In line 
with the wholesale reforms, all licensed banks and financial companies were instructed by 
the CBJ to deposit 35 percent of their total deposits as a required reserve ratio in order to 
enhance soundness and confidence in the banking industry. 1992, the CBJ instructed all 
commercial banks to restrict the maximum credit in local currency to 5 percent of their total 
credit facilities, and in 1997 the CBJ increased the minimum paid-up capital for all domestic 
banks to JD 20 million, and foreign banks to JD 10 million. This was later increased to JD 40 
million. 
In 1995, the CBJ allowed Jordanian banks to grant loans exceeding 100,000 JD and 
in 1996 granted banks managers to use 20 percent of their reserve requirements in the inter-
bank market and to invest this sum in loans and other investment in order to enhance bank 
revenues. At the same time, the CBJ reduced the mandatory reserve requirements on foreign 
currency deposits from 35 percent to 14 percent which gave banks more room to invest this 
sum. In the year 1997, the CBJ removed all restrictions on foreign exchange systems and also 
allowed foreign investors to invest over 50 percent of their capital in Jordanian banks. In 
2000, a new banking law was introduced by the CBJ to improve the global outreach and scope 
of local banking services. This law also helped the banking system by protecting deposits, for 
example, through the creation of the Deposit Insurance Company, and by regulating the 
practice of e-banking. Continuing with the deregulation of the financial system, in 2000 the 
CBJ allowed banks to own insurance companies, as well as to decide on the price of 
commission and other banking fees, and also allowed banks, in 2005, to control the level of 
credit concentrations and foreign currency activity.  
 Following the Basel II accord, the CBJ implemented measures designed to equip 
banks to manage risk based on the best global practices, including also international best 
practices in corporate governance practices, as advised by the Organization Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), to strengthen corporate governance in Jordanian 
banks.  As a result, the board of directors of banks were required to adopt clear policy and 
procedures regarding the treatment of bank customers covering a wide range of bank business 
including clients’ portfolios in foreign currencies. The CBJ also issued a number of 
instructions related to corporate governance and audit committee that it required the branches 
of foreign banks operating in Jordan to implement. 
In 2007 the CBJ amended the method of calculating bank liquidity to ensure that 
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commercial banks were equipped to meet all its obligations at maturity. The CBJ followed 
this action in 2008 with instructions regarding the liquidity of Islamic banks to ensure the 
safety of their financial position. As a result, Islamic banks were required to maintain cash 
balances and semi sufficient cash to cover accrued liability, and were prevented from using 
subsidiaries assets to cover local obligations.  
3.2.3 CBJ Regulation and the Implementation of Basel II and III in Jordan 
The regulatory powers of the CBJ have evolved over the last 15 years and closely follows the 
Basel guidelines. The focus of CBJ regulation is on improving the efficiency of the banking 
system in order to ensure its stability. Regulation is also aimed at providing sound supervision 
of banking activities, bank reporting and data warehousing through the by adoption of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). From the standpoint of capital regulation, the 
Basel Committee defines the value of equity ratio to be 8 percent of the risk-weighted assets 
which has become an international standard for banks around the globe. As a result of reforms 
to the Basel I accord, in 2004 Basel II focused on three risk measures: minimum capital 
requirements, banks’ supervision assessment and market discipline of banks.  These measures 
were designed to create uniform conditions for better risk measurement and the regulation of 
international competition on the financial markets. As a result, the CBJ has ensured that all 
banks apply Basel II capital adequacy requirements to hedge against different types of risk, 
while also instructing banks to steer their capital adequacy ratios according to Basel II 
guidelines. To ensure compliance, the CBJ conduct regular field visits to all banks. In 2010 
the managers of the central banks and supervisory authorities of selected developed countries 
established a set of protective new regulations to mitigate the adverse effects of the 2008 
financial crises and to prevent further bank bailouts of too big to fail institutions. Under the 
new Basel III framework, banks are required to increase core capital ratio from 4 to 6 percent 
to ensure not only the efficiency and stability of the overall financial system but also the risk 
of banks default. Following a study on the impact of Basel III on Jordanian banks, in 2011 
the CBJ required all banks to increase the proportion of liquidity coverage. Banks were also 
required to assess their capabilities with respect to: (a) determining the amount of capital 
required to meet the physical risks they might experience, (b) forecasting the capital needed 
to face crises, (c) harmonizing between current reserves and reserves required under the Basel 
III initiative, and (d) updating the corporate governance. 
To strengthen the resilience of the Jordanian banking sector against regional shocks 
such as the Arab spring and the war in Yemen. New regulatory and structural reforms were 
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implemented. These include regular stress tests to ensure that banks are adequately 
capitalized to withstand regional and global shocks and to be able to hedge against various 
types of risks. Based on these tests, banks have also become more capable of being able to 
determine their own level of capital and liquidity to protect banking operation 
Since 2013, the CBJ has developed and implemented a systematic template of stress 
test of potential stressful situations based on the IMF methodology known as Next Generation 
Balance Sheet Stress Testing. This method uses Top-down Macro Stress Testing /Satellite 
model methodology which considers the impact of macro-economic indicators on non-
performing debt ratio and its proportion of solvency (capital adequacy ratio). This new 
generation of balance sheet frameworks is easy to use, since it is Excel-based, and is also 
quite flexible as it can incorporate hundreds of banks over a duration of five years and aims 
to enrich balance sheet tests with portfolio elements in accordance with Basel II and III. This 
approach integrates assumptions about potential shocks to allow the stress testers to simulate 
different scenarios, and also translates the simulated response of selected key risk indicators 
into an economic assessment of solvency (Schmieder et al., 2011).  
3.3 Financial soundness indicators of the Jordanian banking sector 
 
3.3.1 Assets, Deposits and Loans Structure 
This section provides an overview of the structure of Jordanian banks' assets and liabilities 
between 1993 and 2015. Total bank Assets in Jordanian banks rose from 5979 JD million in 
1993 to 47133.2 million JD in 2015. A series of events triggered substantial changes in the 
assets/liabilities structure of the Jordanian banking system over the last twenty years 
including political incidences associated with the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the first 
Gulf War in 1990, and the United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq. Major sectors such as 
transportation, agriculture, and industry were severely affected by the economic sanctions 
imposed on Iraq, given the close trading ties between Iraq and Jordan which lead to the halt 
in export and import.  
Since 1999, several local financial turmoils’ have affected negatively the Jordanian 
banking sector, including the bankruptcy of the Philadelphia bank in 2002 and some asset 
quality-related problems at Jordan National Bank, Jordan Gulf Bank, Jordan Investment 
Bank, and Export Bank in 2001 and 2002 due to provision of loans amounted to 300 million 
JD to falsified company (Standard and Poor’s, 2007). The global financial crises of 2007-
2009 also had a serious effect on the operation of the Jordanian banking sector. Before the 
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crisis, Jordanian banks benefited substantially from the rapid rise in the demand for credit, 
which was fueled by the economic boom, especially in the real estate sector. But following 
the 2008 crisis, the CBJ decided to reduce interest rates to boost economic activity· As a 
result of the low rates on deposits at banks, depositors withdrew their money, which led to a 
decline in the number of deposits in foreign currency from 5370.1 million JD in 2007 to 
4754.1 million JD in 2008. The confidence of Jordanian bank customer only returned when 
the government declared that it would fully guarantee all bank deposits. At the same time, 
the CBJ imposed the requirement on Jordanian banks that they should increase their capital 
(both JD and foreign currency) to cover potential liquidity shortages.  
(Alzoubi, 2013) notes that post the global financial crisis, external financing in Jordan 
became more difficult and expensive, causing shareholders to value cash at a premium since 
the crisis. In the short-term, the profitability of the banking sector was also adversely affected 
following the crises (Zeitun and Benjelloun, 2013). With respect to the impact of the financial 
crisis, (Ahid and Augustine, 2012) note that the impact of the financial crisis on Jordan can 
be separated into two periods. From April 2008 to December 2008, and from 2008 – 2011. 
They also noted that during the first period, the impacts of crises were mainly driven by the 
downturn in the values of grants from developed and international donors who were 
themselves adversely affected by the crises. And although the CBJ applied some policy 
measures to protect the banking sector, it had also imposed a much stricter loan classification 
designed to reduce unnecessary exposure while also setting interest rate at 10.5 percent for 
housing loans (European economy, 2009). During the second period, all sectors in Jordan had 
been affected by the crisis, except the banking sector due to the imposed CBJ regulations.  
Figure 3.1 shows that just before the onset of the global financial crisis – 2006-2007 – 
that total assets were 24237.6 and 26815.6 million JD respectively, compared to the period 
following the financial crisis, 2009 and 2010, 31956.9 - 34973.1 million JD respectively. In 
2008, total assets were 29796.6 million JD, a change that was due to the increase in bank 




Figure 3.1 Total assets in foreign and local currency (2003-2015). 
 
It is clear from Table 3.2 that the growth of assets, deposits and loans was a direct 
outcome of the removal of restrictions on investment activities by the CBJ during the period 
of 1993-2015. Over the same period, Jordanian banks' assets increased significantly, rising 
from 15701.5 million JDs in 2003 to 47133.2 million JDs at the end of 2015. Bank deposits 
are generally considered a good indicator of the strength and effectiveness of the banking 
system.  
Table 3.2 Assets, loans, and deposits structure for Jordanian Banks 2003-2015. 
Year Total Assets (in foreign and 
local currency) (MJD)1 
Total Deposits (in foreign and 
local currency) (MJD)1 
Total Loans (in foreign and local 
currency) (MJD)1 
2003 15701.5 9969.4 5,262.4 
2004 17821.1 11564.1 6,189.2 
2005 21086.5 13119.3 7,744.3 
2006 24237.6 14591.9 9,761.9 
2007 26815.6 15988.1 11,295.6 
2008 29796.6 18102.6 13,044.3 
2009 31956.9 20298.4 13,317.2 
2010 34973.1 22504.8 14451.4 
2011 37686.4 24377.9 15851.2 
2012 39275.4 24969.7 17829.8 
2013 42802.8 27593.2 18939.7 
2014 44868.1 30261 19274.5 
2015 47133.2 32598.5 21103.5 




Figure 3.2 shows total deposits in foreign and domestic currency. Over the period 
2003-2015 the general trend of the volume of deposits rose and continued its increasing trend 
from 9969.4 million in 2003 to 32598.5 million in 2015, but these rates slowed as a result of 
the repercussions of the global financial crisis, as reflected in the decline in interest rate on 
bank deposits which declined from 5.2 percent at the end of 2001 to 3.46 percent at the end 
of 2012. The nature of bank deposits suggests that the ratio of the total savings deposits to 
total deposits is greater than the percentage of total demand deposits to total deposits. 
Figure 3.2 Total deposits in foreign and domestic currency (2003-2015). 
 
Another important indicator that reflects the level of financial leverage that the 
banking sector provides for the whole economy is the domestic credit (loans) index. Credit 
facilities are also the biggest source of revenue for banks. Figure 3.3 shows the trend of the 
domestic credit structure granted by Jordanian banks during the period 1993-2015. 




The figure shows that total domestic credit increased from 5262.4 million JD in 2003 
to 21103.5 million JD at the end of 2015. A fall in credit is observed in 2009 due to the global 
financial crises. This fall in credit was due to the conservative lending practices of banks and 
bank lending criteria, as well as the decline in the demand for loans, especially mortgage 
loans. During 2010-2015 the ratio of credit facility began to grow as a result of the imposition 
of tighter monetary policy to curb inflationary pressures. 
3.3.2 Sources and uses of funds of Jordanian banks  
The banking sector in Jordan plays an important role in mobilizing domestic savings and 
channeling them in the form of loans to different economic sectors. To accomplish this task, 
funds are divided into external (short or medium termed deposits from inter-bank loans, 
customers, and loans from the CBJ) and internal (long term subordinated debt by shareholders 
and banks’ capital and reserves) sources. Bank funds are mainly channeled in the form of 
granted loans for both private and public sectors, purchase of firms’, governments' stocks and 
bonds, to create deposits in local and foreign banks, and the purchase of CBJ ' CD’s. 
3.3.3 Financial strength indicators for the Jordanian banking sector 
The financial strength indicators assess the resilience of the banking sector to internal and 
external shocks and risk. Table 3.3 presents the most important strength indicators during the 
period 2003– 2015. These indicators can be classified into three main groups. “Asset quality 
indicators”, which include the proportion of non-performing debt to total debt and the 
coverage ratio. Second, “capital adequacy indicators”, which include capital adequacy ratio 
and financial leverage and the last one is “profitability and efficiency” indicators, which 




Figure 3.4 Non-performing loans to total loans (2003-2015). 
 
 
A significant improvement in Jordanian bank assets quality occurred during the period 
2003-2015, Figure 3.4 shows there was an intense decline in the debt ratio of non-performing 
loans/total debt from 15.50 percent at the end of 2003 to 4.2 percent at the end of 2008, with 
the ratio climbing to an increasing trend in 2011, reaching 8.5 percent. As a result of the 
outcome from the financial crisis and the political problems in the region – the Arab Spring 
– bank customer struggled to repay bank loans. However, the ratio began a declining trend 
from 2012 until 2015 reaching 4.9 percent. This decline in NPLs is attributed to the decision 
of banks to write off part of their NPLs in exchange for provisions allocated to them. With 
regard to the coverage ratio which measures a bank’s ability to meet non-performing debt. 
Figure 3.5 shows the increase in the coverage ratio for the period 2003-2015. 




The coverage ratio reached its highest level of 80 percent in 2006 before declining in 
2009 to 52.0 percent due to the global financial crises, before rising to 79.7 percent in 2014. 
The ratio rose significantly in 2015 reaching 74.7 percent as a result of the increase in credit 
facilities. The figure suggests that Jordanian banks were able to maintain adequate provisions 
to cover more than 60 percent of their debt with the coverage ratio for NPL continuing the 
upward trend that started in 2011, reaching 74.7 percent at the end of 2015, which is an 
indication of the continuous improvement in Jordanian bank asset quality. 
Figure 3.  6 Capital adequacy ratio (2003-2015). 
 
The capital adequacy ratio measures the required minimum capital buffer at banks 
and thus their ability to function when faced with potential risks. Banks operating in Jordan 
have been able to cope with a high capital adequacy ratio which amount to more than 7 
percent for the period 2003-2015. It is worth noting further that Jordanian banks have always 
been able to cope with a high mandated capital adequacy ratio that exceeds the minimum 
required rate imposed by the CBJ (12 percent) and the minimum required rate suggested by 
the Basel Committee (8 percent) as Figure 3.6 shows. The ratio reached to15.9 percent in 
2003 and its highest level of 21.4 percent in 2006. As a result, the economic boom just before 
the crises that increased banks’ capital size and profits. In fact, the ratio began to increase in 
2009 reaching 20.3 percent in 2010, despite the fallout from the global financial crisis which 
resulted a decline in the ratio to 18.4 percent in 2013. This decline was due to the continuous 
improvement in the credit levels granted by banks to the private sector which usually carries 
with it relatively high-risk weights. In 2015 the ratio reached to 19.10 percent, which was 
much higher than the limit set by the CBJ (12 percent) and the limit specified by Basel 
Committee- Basel III (10.5 percent).  
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Figure 3.7 shows the leverage ratio for Jordanian banks for the period 2003-2015. The 
leverage ratio measures how efficient a bank is in financing assets from liabilities and is 
calculated by dividing shareholders' rights on total assets. As Figure 3.7 shows that 
percentage grew significantly during the period between 2003-2015, reaching 7.5 percent at 
the end of 2003 before continuing an upward trend to 13.2 percent in 2007. 
Figure 3.  7 Leverage ratio (2003-2015). 
 
As with the other indicators previously discussed, the repercussions of the global 
financial crises of 2007-2009 are reflected in the decreasing trend of the leverage ratio from 
the period 2008-2013. In 2014, the ratio decreased to 12.5 percent as a result of the credit 
facilities expansion before increasing to 12.7 percent in 2015. The high point of the leverage 
ratio reflects the productivity and profitability of Jordanian banks as many banks were able 
to maintain a high leverage ratio by accumulating profits over time. Figure 3.8, shows the 
changes in interest margin to gross income during the period from 2003 to 2015. The interest 
margin to gross income ratio measures the contribution to net profit from interest in the bank's 
total income and reflects the contribution of the primary banks' functions in banks’ profit. 
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Figure 3.  8 Interest margin to gross income (2003-2015). 
 
Despite the volatile nature of the ratio during the period 2003-2015, it was remained 
between 63.7 percent and 77.4 percent, which means that more than two-thirds of income 
generated by Jordanian banks come from interest bearing assets. Notice from Figure 3.8 how 
the ratio began a sharp decline in 2004 and 2005 before reaching the high point of 58.30 
percent. This was as a result to the political problems in the region, referred to at the time as 
the Arab Spring, which caused bank customers to walk away without servicing their loans 
and interest, thereby forcing banks to focus more on the non-interest sources of income such 
as off-balance sheet activities. In 2011, the ratio declined to 70.10 percent as a result of the 
CBJ decision to reduce the interest rate and so commenced an upward trend in 2012, reaching 
77.40 percent in 2015.  
Figure 3.9 shows the return on equity (ROE) which was increased significantly from 
9.9 percent in 2003 to 20.9 percent in 2005 due to improvements in bank profitability. But 
gradually declined to 8.3 percent in 2011 then start increasing onwards as a result of favorable 
economic conditions which helped to enhance the profitability of the banking sector, but then 
it declined in 2015 due to unfavorable banking situations.  
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Figure 3.  9 Rate of Return on Equity (2003-2015). 
 
Regarding the return on assets (ROA), Figure 3.10 shows that the ratio has been a 
little unstable, reaching 2 percent in 2005 before commencing a steady decline through to 
(1.10%) in 2009 as a result of the impact of the global financial crisis. This decline may be 
attributed not only to the increase of income tax rate on banks but also to the conservative 
approach to bank lending followed by the banking sector.  
Figure 3.  10 Rate of return on assets (2003-2015). 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the liquidity ratio which measures a banks liquid assets’ available 
to cover its obligations for the banking sector for the period 2003-2015. According to the 
bank finance literature, a high level of liquidity is an indication of the degree of soundness of 
the banking sector and its ability to fulfill its obligations. A sustained significant decline in 
the level of liquidity implies that a bank is faced with liquidity risk. For the period evidence 
by the data, Figure 3.11 shows that there was a significant change in the liquidity ratio. For 
example, in 2003 the ratio was 179.6 percent, but began to gradually decline as a result of the 
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impact of the global financial crises before increasing in the mid-2008-2009 as a result of 
measures adopted by the banks to redirect their investments towards liquid assets at the 
expense of credit facilities. 
Figure 3.  11 Liquidity ratio (2003-2015). 
 
 





























2003 15.9% 7.5% 9.9% .7%0 63.7% 51.9% 15.5% 179.6% 6.4% 2.7% 
2004 17.8% 8.9% 13.1% 1.1% 58.3% 63.8% 10.5% 173.0% 15.9% 19.3% 
2005 17.6% 10.5% 20.9% 2.0% 56.4% 78.4% 6.6% 168.0% 13.4% 25.9% 
2006 21.4% 13.2% 15.0% 1.7% 70.2% 80.0% 4.3% 161.4% 11.4% 27.2% 
2007 20.8% 13.3% 12.6% 1.6% 66.7% 67.8% 4.1% 157.7% 9.6% 16.1% 
2008 18.4% 12.9% 11.5% 1.4% 71.3% 63.4% 4.2% 141.2% 13.2% 17.2% 
2009 19.6% 13.0% 8.8% 1.1% 71.6% 52.0% 6.7% 159.1% 12.1% 2.1% 
2010 20.3% 13.1% 8.8% 1.1% 74.3% 52.4% 8.2% 161.4% 10.9% 8.6% 
2011 19.3% 13.1% 8.3% 1.1% 70.1% 52.3% 8.5% 152.9% 8.3% 9.8% 
2012 19.0% 13.3% 8.6% 1.1% 76.6% 69.4% 7.7% 143.5% 2.4% 12.5% 
2013 18.4% 12.9% 9.9% 1.2% 77.6% 77.0% 6.8% 149.1% 10.5% 6.3% 
2014 18.4% 12.5% 11.1% 1.4% 77.9% 79.7% 5.6% 152.2% 9.3% 5.2% 
2015 19.1% 12.7% 10.3 1.3% 77.4% 74.7% 4.9% 149% 7.7% 9.6% 
Source:  CBJ Database (2003-2015). 
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3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed developments in the Jordanian banking since the 1990s including the 
CBJ regulations and its response to the various Basel accords and also provided an overview 
of measures of bank profitability and indicators of soundness for the banking sector. Analysis 
of the ratios suggests that the performance of the banking sector was affected by the impact of 
the global financial crisis and that the recovery of the sector was due to the policy measures 
adopted by the CBJ to help mitigate the financial distress experienced by banks which restored 
confidence in the banking system.  
The following chapters presents an empirical analysis that includes some of the 
previously discussed financial indicators using a sample of 13 Jordanian banks for the period 
2003-2015 in the light of the CBJ program of reform. To commence, I first investigate the 
impact of bank-specific, market structure, and macroeconomic variables on different 
profitability measures. Second, I then investigate empirically the impact of competition, risk 
and the interest rate environment on the profitability and risk-taking behavior of Jordanian 
commercial banks. Third, I examine the relationship between bank efficiency, capital, and risk 
of Jordanian commercial banks, and fourth I conclude the investigation by investigating how 
competition and efficiency of the banking sector influence the cost of credit for borrowing 
firms using data from 118 firms in addition to liquidity funding and Jordanian bank risk-taking 
behavior. Fifth, I examine the relationship between liquidity funding and risk-taking behavior 
of Jordanian Commercial Banks in addition to the impact of the implementation of the deposit 












Assessing the Effects of Competition, Risk, and Market 
Interest Rate on Bank Profitability: An Empirical Analysis 




In any economy, the banks’ intermediation role is to channel funds from surplus units to deficit 
units to enable growth and development. In this respect, several studies, such as (Asli 
Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2005) and (Gromb and Vayanos, 2010) report evidence 
which supports a positive relationship between the level of financial development and 
economic growth. In addition, globalization and liberalization of financial services is also 
considered to play a significant role to improving the banking industry and can take several 
forms – one of which is creating a competitive market via increasing the number of banking 
and non-banking financial institutions. Competition in the banking sector levies serious effects 
on bank performance indicators such as risk and profitability. Some researchers believe that 
increases in competition and financial innovation contribute generally to financial disruptions, 
while others such as (Anginer et al., 2012) link financial crises to highly concentrated markets 
and government support of the largest banks which mitigate access to finance by medium and 
small-sized banks. Therefore, analysing how competition might have shaped the performance 
and risk indicators of the Jordanian banking sector will be of interest to bank managers and 
policy makers, especially since there is shortage of published empirical research that has 
examined the competitiveness of the Jordanian banking sector and, more specifically, the 
evolution of competition over the reform periods since 1990.  
Studies on bank profitability and its relationship with the business cycle received 
renewed attention following the period of recession that followed the recent global financial 
crisis. Bank profitability is a predominant indicator of a sound and stable banking sector, but 
studies investigating the effect of operating in a low-interest-rate environment on profitability 
indicators are rare, especially in developing countries. In regard to this, the purpose of this 
chapter is to fill the gap in the literature by firstly, assessing the degree of competition in the 
Jordanian banking sector and the extent to which market competitiveness has changed 
following the entry of six new banks in the market or not using the non-structural approach of 
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the Panzar-Rosse model for the period 2003-2017 and, secondly, to empirically assess the 
impact of competition, interest rate and liquidity risk on bank profitability and risk-taking 
behavior for a sample of 13 commercial Jordanian banks for the period 2003-2015 using the 
Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), Generalized Least Square (GLS), and Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) methods. According to (Bikker and Haff, 2002), banking markets 
can, in general, operate under conditions of either perfectly competitive, monopolistic, or 
monopolistic competitive behavior. In the Jordanian context, the banking sector may be 
considered highly concentrated and operates under the condition of monopolistic competition 
(Hamiltona et al., 2010; Al-jarrah, 2010). Therefore, understanding the market condition under 
which Jordanian banks compete is crucial if bank managers, policy makers, and investors, are 
to have a clear understanding of how competition, risk, the level of interest rate, and bank 
profitability interact together. Interest on loans is the main source of income for Jordanian 
banks amounting to 77.4 percent of total income in 2015 and thus it is of interest to know how 
changes in interest rate affect bank profitability. Several internal and external factors have also 
influenced the banking system's profitability and performance such as individual bank 
characteristics, market factors, and macroeconomic indicators. The study examined the local 
commercial banks as it covers around 90% of the Jordanian banking system. We excluded the 
foreign bank as they are not listed in the Amman Stock Exchange and for the difficulties to 
gather the needed data. This chapter is divided into six sections: Section 4.2 presents an 
overview of the literature. Section 4.3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4.4 presents 
empirical results, and finally, section 4.5 outlines the summary and conclusion. 
4.2 Literature review 
This section is divided into three parts covering literature on the profitability-investigated 
indicators, competitiveness, risk, and interest rate. Most of the related literature apply data 
from developed countries while empirical evidence from the Middle East region especially 
Jordan is rare. 
4.2.1 Literature review on bank competitive conditions 
The literature on bank competitiveness generally applies the Panzar-Rosse H statistic (Rosse 
and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1982 and 1987) to investigate the level of bank 
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competition. This approach has been used by scholars such as (Shaffer, 1983), (Nathan and 
Neave, 1989), (Molyneux et al., 1996), (De Bandt, 2000), (Hempell, 2005), (Coccorese, 
2004), and (Casu and Girardone, 2009). (Shaffer, 1983), for example, examined the 
competitive position of banks in New York by applying the Panzar-Rosse method and report 
that banks behaved neither as monopolists nor as perfectly competitive entities in long-run 
equilibrium. (Nathan and Neave, 1989) using Canadian data assessed the state of competition 
using cross-sectional data covering 1982, 1983 and 1984 and report that banking revenues 
behave as if earned under monopolistic competition. Banking systems in regions such as U.S., 
Canada, the European Union (EU), India, China, Latin American and Japan, are found by 
(Yuan, 2006), (Matthews et al., 2007), (Prasad and Ghosh, 2007), to operate under 
monopolistic competition conditions. Semih (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007) using firm 
level data for a sample of 14 Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies 
analyzed the evolution of competitive conditions in the banking industries for the period 
1993-2000 and report findings which suggested that banking markets cannot be characterized 
as either perfect competition or monopoly, except for the banking sectors of Macedonia and 
Slovakia. Other studies such as (Duncan and Langrin, 2002), (Duncan and Langrin, 2004), 
(Mlambo and Ncube, 2011), (Anzoategui et al., 2012), (Simpasa, 2013) and (Ye, 2013), 
examine the evolution of competition in developing regions such as South Africa, Jamaica, 
Zimbabwe, China, the Middle East, and Turkey. For example, (Anzoategui et al., 2012) using 
the (Panzar and  Rosse, 1987) approach studied the Tunisian banking sector and report that 
banks in Tunisia earned their revenue in a monopolistic competitive environment. Le (2014) 
using an unbalanced panel data of 33 commercial banks also applied the Panzar–Rosse 
approach and found that Vietnamese commercial banks operate under monopolistic market 
conditions. Similarly (Simatele, 2015) using South African data and the Panzar-Rosse 
approach examine the relationship between bank structure, performance and competition. He 
estimated a revenue equation to obtain the H statistic and found that competition increased 
over time and that South African banks operate in a monopolistic competitive market 
structure. On the other hand, (Suzuki, 2015) used different concentration ratios and the 
Panzar-Rosse method for measuring competition to assess the market structure of the banking 
sector of Bangladesh and report a reduction in concentration and an increase in competition 
in the banking sector. The results show that the level of competition was higher in the interest-
based regular banking market than in the fee-based non-banking market and that banks in 
general faced more competition in the credit market than they did in the deposit market.  
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(Zarein et al., 2015) applied data for the Iranian banking sector and applied the H-
statistic to investigate the competitive condition for the period 2005-2010. To calculate H 
statistics, a reduced form of revenue equation was estimated. The results indicate that the 
Iranian banking sector operate under conditions of monopolistic competition. (Vardar, 2015), 
using Turkish bank data for the period 2002-2012 looked at the impact of bank competition 
on the risk-taking behavior of Turkish banks. And after estimating the H-statistic as a measure 
of competition, report that competition in Turkey has a negative impact on the financial 
fragility of Turkish banks, indicating that banks in a more competitive market tend to take 
lower levels of risk. (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006) using the Panzar-Rosse ‘H-statistic’ for the 
period covering 1993-2002 examine the monopolistic power of banks of Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries and report that while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE banks have 
moderately concentrated markets, they are moving to less concentrated positions, even 
though they operate under conditions of monopolistic competition. They also report that 
Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman are highly concentrated banking markets, while Omani banks 
operate under monopolistic competition. 
4.2.2 Literature review of the impact of risk on bank profitability 
Liquidity risk adversely affects overall bank earnings/profit and capital/reserve. A liquidity 
trap can occur anytime savers begin to withdraw their deposits, during such times banks are 
left with two options either to borrow money from the central bank or engage in inter-bank 
transactions at high prices. Those banks that maintain sufficient deposits in their account 
balances can mitigate the incurred potential losses during these times. The negative side of 
liquidity risk is that it can be high enough so as to cause a bank run (Kashyap et al., 2002).  
In regard to this, (Shen et al. 2009) used a unbalanced panel dataset of commercial banks in 
12 advanced economies (Canada, Australia, Germany, France, Taiwan, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, U.K, and the U.S.A) for the period 1994-2006 by employing 
alternative liquidity risk measures, besides liquidity ratio and looked at the causes of liquidity 
risk. They found that liquidity risk may lower bank profitability (return on average assets and 
return on average equities) due to the higher cost of funds, while also increasing banks’ net 
interest margins. Furthermore, they classified countries as either bank-based or market-based 
financial systems and revealed that liquidity risk is negatively related to bank performance 
especially in the market-based financial systems. (Akhtar et al., 2011) using the FE method 
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investigated the significance of variables with liquidity risk management for both 
conventional and Islamic banks operating in Pakistan and studied the impact of capital 
adequacy, size, networking capital, ROA and ROE, on the liquidity risk management for the 
period 2006-2009. They found no significant evidence of a relationship between size and 
networking capital to net assets with liquidity risks and that the capital adequacy ratio in 
conventional banks and return on assets in Islamic banks significantly influenced liquidity 
risk. (Arif and Nauman Anees, 2012) also examined the effect of liquidity risk on banks’ 
profitability in Pakistan covering the period 2004-2009 by applying multiple regression to 
assess the impact of liquidity risk on banks’ profitability and report a significant positive 
effect of liquidity risk on bank profitability and some evidence of a negative relationships 
between liquidity gap and non-performing loans on profitability.  
4.2.3 Literature review on the impact of market interest rate on bank 
profitability 
 
There is a growing literature on the impact of market interest rate on bank profitability. In the 
province of this literature, (Bourke, 1989) explored profitability determinants based on the 
financial statements of 90 banks for 12 developed countries or states using annual data for the 
period 1972-1982. Using a set of control variables (capital ratio, liquidity, staff expenses, 
concentration, government ownership, interest rate, market growth and inflation) in addition to 
return on capital, return on assets, and value-added as dependent variables, the findings indicate 
that capital ratios, liquidity ratios and interest rates were all positively correlated with 
profitability while government ownership and staff expenses had an inverse relationship with 
profitability. The author also reports the presence of weak correlation in the relationship 
between pre-tax return on assets and profitability, while concentration is moderately and 
positively correlated with pre-tax return on assets and negatively correlated with the value-
added. (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009) using the GMM estimator suggested by (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) combined with data for 10 industrialized countries covering 1981-2003 
looked at the effects of both macroeconomic and financial shocks on banking profitability by 
studying the link between business cycle fluctuations and banking sector profitability and 
report the dispersion of bank profitability among euro-area countries has declining dramatically 
since the mid-1990s. It was found that GDP influences both net interest income and loan loss 
provisions (via lending activity and credit portfolio quality respectively) and that the higher 
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level of bank profitability in the U.K and U.S.A were at least partly related to their more flexible 
cost structure. The authors also note that pro-cyclicality was slightly greater in the U.K. and in 
the U.S. and that the net interest income of banks was less affected by fluctuations in long-term 
interest rate but more affected by money market interest rate in countries such as Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal where banks have more short-term assets. It was found that net interest income 
of German banks was not significantly affected by changes in interest rates and that net interest 
income positively affected the profitability of banks conventional financial activities. While 
the ratio of total loans to GDP was found to be positively correlated with net interest income 
and further that stock market capitalization relative to GDP had a strong and significant effect 
on net interest income. 
(Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011) analyzed the profitability of commercial banks in 
Switzerland from 1999-2006 using data for 453 banks and found a positive relationship 
between capitalization and bank loans with profitability, especially when bank’s loan volume 
is growing at a much faster rate than the market, and that bank age had no impact on 
profitability. On the question of bank ownership, they note that foreign banks were less 
profitable than Swiss-owned banks while privately owned banks were found to be more 
profitable than state-owned banks and that banks reliant on interest rate yield were likely to 
be less profitable. In addition, the authors report that the variables total loan growth, funding 
costs, operational efficiency, affect bank profitability positively and that the 2008 financial 
crisis had a significant impact on the profitability and productivity of the Swiss banking 
industry. On a similar issue, (Genay and Podjasek, 2014) found that the low-interest-rate 
environment is associated with decreased profitability for banks, particularly for small 
institutions in a sample of US banks from 2003-2013. Similar findings were postulated by 
(Bikker and Vervliet, 2018) for all U.S. commercial and savings banks  covering the period 
2001-2015. Regarding the effects of the low-interest rate environment on bank risk-taking 
behavior, the authors found no conclusive evidence to suggest that banks increase their risk 
exposure to search for new income sources. However, it was found that banks operating in a 
low-interest environment had significantly lowered their level of credit loss provision.  
4.2.4 Literature review on bank profitability indicators 
Much has been written on bank profitability indicators of which the work of (Molyneux and 
Thornton, 1992) is an example. Using annual data for a sample of 18 European banks 
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covering the period 1986-1989, (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) estimated a simple linear 
equation (using government ownership, concentration, long-term bond rate, money supply, 
capital and reserves, cash and bank deposits, consumer price index, and staff expenses as 
independent variables and net profit after and before tax is used as dependent variables) and 
report that staff expenses are positively correlated with ROA and that government ownership 
and the level of interest rates had a significant positive association with ROE, which 
contradicts the earlier findings of (Bourke, 1989). They also note that due to associated costs 
with liquidity holdings, that liquidity had a weak inverse relationship with profitability and 
that concentration had somewhat of a positive, statistically significant correlation with pre-
tax return on assets consistent with the findings of (Bourke, 1989). (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999) also examined the determinants of commercial bank profitability using data 
for a sample of 80 banks drawn from developed and developing countries and found that 
well-capitalized banks faced lower cost of funding due to the lower probability of bankruptcy 
costs and the fact that these banks have much less need to borrow for assets acquisition. Their 
results also confirm a positive association between capital ratio and profitability and that 
loans to total assets have a negative influence on profitability, while short-term funding had 
a negative and significant impact on profitability. The relationship between profitability and 
non-interest earning assets was found to be negative as banks with high non-interest earning 
assets were found to be less profitable. The authors further point out that banks that use 
deposits as the main source of funding are less profitable because of the nature of deposits 
which required high branching and other expenses and that in developing countries foreign 
banks were more profitable than domestic banks.  
(Graham, 2013), using data for a sample of 55 U.S. banks and 10 Canadian banks for 
the period 1997-2009 to assess the impact of liquidity on bank profitability found that 
profitability is improved for banks holding a higher proportion of liquid assets. The author 
notes that these assets also added to reducing banks' liquidity risk and that the results show 
that the relationship between liquid assets and profitability depend on the banks’ business 
model. In addition, ((Staikouras and Wood, 2011) using the method of OLS and fixed effect 
models, examined both internal and external factors concerning the profitability of European 
banking system's (covering domestic and foreign institutions: commercial banks, cooperative 
banks, savings banks, and mortgage banks). The authors split their sample into two parts – 
large and small banks – and report that European banks’ profitability is primarily influenced 
by factors related to management decisions and to the changes in the external macroeconomic 
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environment. They also report that loans to assets ratio are inversely related to banks' return 
on assets and the proportion of loan loss provisions to total loans and the variability of interest 
rates and the growth of GDP are negatively related to banks’ return on assets.   
With regard to the literature on developing and emerging banking markets, (Owusu-
Antwi et al. 2014) investigated the determinants of banks ‘profitability in Ghana using the 
GMM method to evaluate the determinants of profitability and report that economic value 
added is better than ROA as a measure of bank performance and that inflation does not affect 
the performance of banks in Ghana. (Said, 2014) examined the profitability of Malaysian 
banks’ profitability using random and fixed effects methods and found a positive relationship 
between net stable funding ratio and banks performance indicators (ROE, ROA, and NIM). 
The author also found a positive impact of equity and size on the banks profitability and a 
negative relationship between cost to income ratio and bank profitability. (Fu et al., 2014) 
investigated the influence of bank competition, concentration, regulation, and national 
institutions on individual banks' fragility using GMM method and found that greater 
concentration and stronger deposit insurance schemes foster financial fragility.  
Considering reform measures implemented by the central bank of Jordan over recent 
years, it is likely that competition within the banking sector of Jordan will have a positive 
effect on bank performance indicators such as profitability. For as the literature suggest bank 
profitability and its relationship with the business cycle have received considerable attention 
following the global financial crisis and the economic recession that resulted. It is widely 
acknowledged that bank profitability is a predominant indicator of a sound and stable banking 
sector. However, assessing the competitiveness of the Jordanian banking sector by applying 
Panzar-Rosse model is only one objective of this chapter. The second objective is to 
empirically assess the impact of liquidity risk and other factors on the profitability of 
Jordanian banks. While the third objective is to investigate the effect of operating in a low-
interest-rate environment, utilizing profitability indicators, on Jordanian bank performance 
and in these respects the study makes a direct contribution to the existing literature.  
4.2.5 Research Questions 
In this chapter, I investigate whether or not the deregulation and liberalization program has 
affected the performance of Jordan’s banking sector. Our expectation is that the new 
regulations should enhance the profitability measures of Jordanian banks. And we empirically 
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investigate how competition, risk, and interest rates affect Jordanian banks’ profitability by 
addressing the following questions: 
1. Do competitive conditions affect the profitability of Jordanian banks?  
2. Does liquidity risk affect the profitability of Jordanian banks? 
3. Do interest rates affect the profitability of the Jordanian banks? 
4. Which market type monopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect competition, best 
represents the Jordanian banking sector? 
4.3 Data and Methodology  
4.3.1 Data 
This section assesses the degree of competition in the Jordanian banking sector by examining 
whether market competitiveness changed or not following the entry of six new banks in the 
market using the non-structural approach of Panzar-Rosse for the period 2003-2017. I also 
empirically assess the impact of competition, liquidity risk, interest rate on bank profitability 
and risk-taking behavior using a sample of 13 commercial Jordanian banks for the period 2003-
2015. The study applies data from different sources: bank statements, the CBJ, the ABJ, annual 
reports of the ASE, data stream, and Bloomberg. Variables definitions and notations appear in 
Tables 4.1-4.3.  
Table 4. 1Variables considered in assessing the impact of competition on the Jordanian banks' 
profitability (2003-2015). 
Variable Notation Measurement Type  Source 
Dependent Variables      
Revenue (CF) CF Banks revenues from commotion and fees. Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Profitability ROA  Net income/Total assets  Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Independent variables      
Unit Price of Labor PL Ratio of personnel expenses to Total Assets. Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Unit Price of Capital PK ratio of capital expenses to fixed assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Unit Price of Funds PF ratio of annual interest expenses to total loanable funds Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Number of Branch BR Ratio of number of branches of a bank to the total number of branches. Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Bank size  SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
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Risk RISKASS Ratio of provisions of loan loss to total assets. Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Competition Lerner index the difference between price and marginal cost, divided by the price Market structure CBJ 
Insurance Premium INStoGDP Insurance premium to GDP. Macro Annual Reports 
Inflation rate INF Annual Inflation Rate  Macro CBJ 
Independent variables      
Bank size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Bank risk  LLPTL Ratio of provisions of loan loss to total assets. Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Liquidity LIQUIDITY Loans/assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Capitalization CAP Total Shareholder’s equity/total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Diversification DIV Non-interest income/gross revenue Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Labor productivity LP Gross revenue/total number of employees Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Taxation TAXATION Tax/operating profit before tax Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Competition Lerner Estimated from the cost function Bank-specific  CBJ 
Concentration C3 Total assets of largest three banks/total assets of the whole banking 
industry 
Bank-specific  CBJ 
Stock market 
development 
SMD Market capitalization of listed companies/GDP Industry CBJ 
Inflation Rate INF Annual inflation rate Macro CBJ 
GDP growth rate GDP Annual GDP growth rate Macro CBJ 
Source: ASE, CBJ, ABJ 
Table 4. 2Variables considered in assessing the impact of liquidity risk on Jordanian banks profitability 
(2003-2015). 
Variable Notation Measurement Type  Source 
Dependent Variables      
Profitability ROA  Net income/Total assets  Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Profitability ROE  Net Income/Shareholder's Equity Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Tobin’s Q ratio Tobin Market value / Total Asset value Bank-specific  Bloomberg 
Economic Value Added  EVA NOPAT  − [WACC  Capital Investment] Bank-specific  Bloomberg 
Independent variables      
Bank size  SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Capital Adequacy ratio-TIER 1 TIER1 TIER 1 Capital Ratio Bank-specific  Data Stram 
Liquidity Risk LTD Total Loans / Total Deposits Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Capitalization ETA Total Equity /Total Assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
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Net interest margin ratio NIM Net Interest Income/ Total Assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Cost to income ratio CTI Total Expenses/ Total Income Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Cost of fund ratio COF Total Interest Expenses/ Total Deposits Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Concentration  CO3 Total Assets of Largest 3 Commercial Banks/Total 
Assets of the whole Commercial Banks Listed in ASE  
Market Structure Annual Reports 
GDP Growth rate  GDP Annual GDP Growth Rate  Macro CBJ 
Inflation rate INF Annual Inflation Rate  Macro CBJ 
Source: ASE, CBJ, Data-Stream. 
Table 4. 3Variables considered in assessing the impact of interest rate on Jordanian banks profitability 
and risk taking (2003-2015). 
Variable Notation Measurement Type  Source 
Dependent Variables      
Net Interest Margin NIM Difference between interest income and interest expense 
divided by total assets 
Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Profitability ROA  Net income/Total assets  Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Profitability ROE  Net Income/Shareholder's Equity Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Total Profit Profit Undivided profits and capital reserves Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Profit Margin PM Profit before tax/ Total Assets Bank-specific Annual Reports 
Total Capital Ratio TCR Total Risk-based Capital to Risk-weighted Assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Credit Risk PCL Provision for credit losses over total loans Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Independent variables      
Bank size  SIZE Natural Logarithm of total assets  Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Capitalization CAP Total equity capital over total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Diversification DIV Total non-interest income divided by total income Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Lending LEN Total loans over total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
GDP Growth Rate  GDP Annual GDP Growth Rate  Macro CBJ 
Inflation Rate INF Annual inflation Rate  Macro CBJ 
Short-term interest rate SHTI 6-month money market rate Macro CBJ 
Source: ASE, CBJ, Data-Stream. 
4.3.2 Competition model 
The selection of the variables in the different analysis is motivated by a large number of studies 
such as (Zarein et al., 2015), (Vardar, 2015), (Babic et al., 2015), (Matthews et al., 2007), (Casu 
and Girardone, 2011), and (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006). I measure bank profitability (dependent 
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variable) in the competition models using four indicators: return on assets (ROA). Revenue 
(CF) measures the revenues that come from the bank’s commotion and fees. ROA provides 
information about the management's performance in using the banks’ assets to generate income 
(Naceur, 2003). This ratio is broadly used to compare the financial performance of banks 
because it shows profit per unit of bank assets and acts as a proxy of the overall profitability of 
banking operations (Berger and Mester, 1997). Large ROA indicate high profitability. 
The analysis undertaken accounts for bank-specific, industry-specific, and 
macroeconomic indicators that could affect the profitability of Jordanian banks. For this 
purpose, price of labor (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets) price of capital (ratio of 
capital expenses to fixed assets) price of funds (ratio of annual interest expenses to total 
loanable funds) branches (ratio of number of branches of a bank to the total number of 
branches) risk (ratio of provisions of loan loss to total assets), size (bank total assets) and 
insurance to GDP (insurance premium to GDP) are included in the model. The analysis is 
extended to test the impact of some of the previously listed control variables on ROE and ROA 
using the GMM method. These models incorporate other control variables such as liquidity 
(ratio of total loans over total assets) that reflect the ability of Jordanian banks to compensate 
for the decreases in banks’ liabilities or the increase in the assets’ side of the balance sheet 
(Goddard et al., 2013). There is no conclusive evidence reported in the literature on the 
profitability effect of liquidity, though  (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) have argued that high 
liquidity levels have the effect of dampen profitability, while others such as (Bourke, 1989) 
found that liquidity and profitability are positively correlated depending on the banks’ risk 
management system.   
In this study, the ratio of loan loss provision over total loans (LLPTL) is used to measure 
the risk level. Several empirical studies, comprising (Miller and Noulas, 1997), indicate that an 
increase in risk exposure decreases bank profitability. Capitalization (ratio of shareholders’ 
equity over total assets) is used as a proxy for the efficiency of the financial institution. A 
positive impact of capitalization on bank profitability is expected for the following reasons. 
First, funding costs are lower for well-capitalized banks due to Jordanian banks having a 
relatively high level of creditworthiness. Second, well-capitalized Jordanian banks are more 
likely to engage in prudent lending which is more likely than not to fosters profit figures. Third, 
capital hedges potential losses of risky assets, and finally well-capitalized Jordanian banks are 
considered to have lower costs since they borrow less. On this point, (Berger, 1995) has argued 
that capitalization can have a negative impact on bank profitability because the higher the level 
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of capitalization that lower the relative risk position of the bank and according to the risk-return 
trade-off, lower risks lead to lower returns. This argument is supported by (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1963) and more recently by (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). This variable enters the 
GMM model as one of the endogenous variables because of the reverse causation effect, since 
higher profits can translate into higher capital.  Diversification (ratio of non-interest income 
over gross revenue) measures the diversity of bank activities. In this regard, (Tan and Floros, 
2012) note that banks that engage in different activities are better positioned to be able to raise 
their profits and to reduce costs. A countercyclical effect can be observed between 
diversification and bank profitability as there is strong competition around fee-income services 
which contributes to reducing the individual banks’ profit shares. Labour productivity (ratio of 
gross revenue over the total number of employees) acts as another proxy for banks’ efficiency. 
I expect the labour productivity variable to have a positive impact on profitability. Taxation 
(ratio of tax over operating profit before tax) is used to reflect costs. This variable is used by 
(Tan and Floros, 2012) in their study of the Chinese banking industry. And they report a 
significant and negative impact of taxation on the profitability of Chinese banks which, they 
argued, can be explained by the fact that the high level of taxes increases costs and further leads 
to a reduction in bank profitability. 
Regarding industry-related indicators, competition is measured using the Lerner index. 
Following (Tan, 2016), the structure–conduct–performance (SCP) hypothesis argues that less-
competitive firms in a financial system tend to have a high Lerner index that feeds into large 
scales of operation and higher profits. However, the competition-efficiency hypothesis does 
argue that in a highly competitive environment, bank managers have more incentive to improve 
efficiency and reduce costs, thus enhancing profit shares. In this study, I also use of banking 
sector development (ratio of banking sector assets over GDP). Our expectation is that a higher 
developed banking sector is likely to foster the demand for banking services, which attracts 
more potential competitors to enter the banking market. The subsequent reduction in supply of 
banking services relative to the increased demand is expected to increase the prices of banking 
services and to further increase bank profitability.  
Stock market development is measured as the ratio of the market capitalization of listed 
companies over GDP. Banks operating in countries with well-developed stock markets 
normally have higher profitability shares than their counterparts for the following reasons. 
Firstly, a highly developed stock market provides an alternative pool of funds for firms rather 
than conventional bank loans. Which, in turn, reduces the risks of loan default and fosters 
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profitability figures of the banks. Secondly, a developed stock market system also provides 
accurate information about listed firms and their investment portfolios which assists banks in 
the effective evaluation of the associated investment risks (Tan and Floros, 2012a). 
GDP growth rate is a measure of total economic activity within an economy. A high 
economic growth encourages banks to lend more and permits them to charge higher margins. 
Some previous studies, such as  (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) and (Kosmidou and 
Zopounidis, 2008) found a positive effect of economic growth on the profitability of banks 
while other studies such as (Tan and Floros, 2012) suggests that high economic growth 
improves the business environment and lowers bank entry barriers. The consequent increased 
competition can also dampen bank’s profitability. Accordingly, we have no prior expectations 
about the profitability impact of GDP growth on Jordanian bank profitability. Similar 
ambiguity is also observed for the relationship between inflation and profitability, as it 
depends on whether inflation expectations are fully anticipated or not. Generally, high 
inflation rates are associated with high loan interest rates which lead to increased banks’ profit 
as (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) notes. And as (Sami Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011) 
report, there is a negative relationship between inflation and bank profitability due to banks 
failing to fully anticipate inflation.  
4.3.3 Liquidity risk model 
We measure bank profitability in the liquidity risk models using four indicators – return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin Q ratio (TOBIN Q) and Economic Value Added 
(EVA). Tobin’s Q ratio is used as a profitability indicator in several studies (Demsetz and 
Lehn 1985, (Naushad and Malik, 2015) and (Morck et al., 1986). Tobin’s Q is a measure of 
the organization's competence in the market (Morck et al., 1986). To represent the market 
performance of a firm, Tobin’s Q is a standard measure of returns on investment as 
established by (Bond et al., 2004). EVA is the fourth financial profitability measure used in 
our analysis and reflects how much of the accounting profit is converted to economic profit. 
A positive EVA reflects the ability of the bank to increase the shareholder's wealth.  
Analysis of the study incorporates a large number of control variables. Size is 
generally used to measure economies or diseconomies of scale in the banking industry. 
According to (Athanasoglou et al., 2008), the profitability effect of banks’ size is 
inconclusive. A negative impact of bank size on bank profitability was found by (Sufian, 
2009), who mentioned that small banks can earn higher profit more than larger bank because 
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small banks have better performance efficiency and incur lower expenses. However, (Karim 
and Alam, 2013) found that bank size has a significant positive impact on the financial 
profitability of Bangladeshi commercial banks. Capital Adequacy (Tier-1) captures the share 
of bank capital. Tier1 capital is an essential form of capital that includes equity capital and 
disclosed reserves. A large number of studies have investigated the link between capital 
adequacy and bank profitability in different countries such as the empirical study of (Perera 
et al., 2013) who found that adequate capital has a significant positive effect on banks' 
profitability. Similar results were found by  (Kosmidou, 2008) and (Umoru and Osemwegie, 
2016). The introduction of capital adequacy rules normally intensifies banks’ capital and 
thereby improve the resilience of banks to negative shocks. 
Loans to Deposit (LTD) variable is used as an exogenous instrument for liquidity risk 
and is considered to strongly influence banks’ profitability (Rengasamy, 2014). This ratio 
indicates the percentage of banks’ loans funded through deposits. The profitability effect of 
liquidity risk remains a contentious issue. Some studies report that liquidity risk has a 
negative impact on banks’ profitability (Shen et al., 2009) although others (Bourke, 1989) 
found a positive significant link between bank liquidity and profitability. Equity to Assets 
(ETA) is used to proxy capital strength. (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) and (Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011) note that in the event of loss or liquidation, banks with high capital-asset 
ratios are considered relatively safer. A higher equity to assets ratio of banks means lower 
needs to external funding and therefore higher profitability. The theory of capital structure 
states that higher use of debt (equity) financing within a certain range, called the target capital 
structure, might actually reduce (increase) firms‟ cost of capital. Thus, a positive (negative) 
coefficient estimate for equity-to-assets indicates an efficient (inefficient) management of 
banks‟ capital structure. 
Net Interest Margin (NIM) reflects the volume of the traditional borrowing and lending 
operations of the bank. This rate measures the gap between what the bank pays for the 
depositors and what the bank receives from borrowers. The interest yield is one of the major 
income sources for banks. Profit is based on the positive difference between the interest on 
loans and interest on deposits. (Muriith, 2016) notes that fluctuations in net interest margin 
are one of the main important sources of uncertainty in bank profitability but  (Hanweck and 
Ryu, 2011) points out that bank net interest margins are negatively related to interest-rate 
volatility but positively related to increases in the slope of the yield curve. The cost of Fund 
(COF) shows the management efficiency for the banks’ funds. Only a few researchers have 
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studied the effect of the COF on bank profitability. High-cost of funds mean low-profit 
shares. (Zarein et al., 2015), (Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011), and (Islam and Nishiyama, 
2016) found that COF has a significantly negative impact on bank profitability. The Cost to 
Income (CTI) measures the overheads or expenses required to run a bank and also acts as a 
measure for the overall efficiency in managing banks’ expenditures (Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007) and (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). The lower the ratio, the more 
profitable the bank is. For example, (Said, 2014) found a negative relationship between cost 
to income ratio and bank profitability.  
Concentration (CO3) is a measure of the competitiveness of the banking sector. 
According to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, banks in highly 
concentrated markets tend to collude and earn more monopoly profits (Short, 1979, Gilbert, 
1984 and Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Mixed findings of the relationship between 
concentration and bank performances are mentioned in the empirical studies.  A positive 
impact of concentration on banking performance was suggested by (Staikouras and Wood, 
2011b) while a negative relationship between concentration and bank profitability was 
reported by (García-Herrero et al., 2009). We also employ the GDP growth rate and Inflation 
as macroeconomic indicators. These variables were discussed in the previous section.  
4.3.4 Interest rate model 
The following dependent variables are used in the interest rate model – NIM, ROA, and 
ROE, profit (a measure for the undivided profit and capital reserves). The net effect on profits 
might be positive as a result of the low-interest rate environment which results in better 
economic outcomes that are proxied by profit margin (before-tax profits as a share of total 
assets that reveal the welfare consequences for banks and their customers). Total Capital 
Ratio (TCR) (ratio of total risk-based capital over risk-weighted Assets) (Genay and 
Podjasek, 2014). As banks engage in risky investments. They constantly search for sufficient 
yield, translating into a lower TCR ratio), and credit loss provisions to total loans ratio (PCL) 
(A measure for the level of credit risk and acts as a proxy for the provision for credit losses 
over total loans. It is hypothesized according to (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) that the negative 
impact of credit risk creates a higher level of provisioning on bank profitability).  
The following variables are used as control variables – size, lending, capitalization, 
diversification, PCL and TCR, real GDP growth, Inflation and short-term interest rate. Most 
of these variables have been previously discussed. But other indicators include short-term 
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interest rate which is represented by the 6-month money market rate. In the literature, the 
short-term interest rate has received much attention because nominal interest rate steering is 
the main instrument that central banks use to stimulate the economy. The effect of short-term 
interest rate and the slope of the yield curve for loan loss provisions are positive as founded 
by (Bolt, et. al, 2012) and (Borio and Zhu, 2012) who showed that short-term interest rate 
negatively affects net interest income and that long-term interest rate positive affects net 
interest income. (Alessandri & Nelson, 2015) found that the net interest margin increases 
with short-term interest rate (since banks raise their lending rates and reduce their lending 
volume in response to higher interest rates). (William, 2002) argue that interest rate volatility 
negatively affects net interest margins. (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999)  found a 
positive effect of short-term interest rates on the net interest margin for smaller banks. 
However, (Delis and Koureatas, 2011) note that low-interest rate reduced the default 
probability on outstanding loans, and hence, reduces provisions for non-performing loans. 
4.3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 4.4-4.6 show the variables’ descriptive statistics. Regarding the competitiveness 
model in Table 4.4, The average value of the revenue (CF) is 2 percent, with a standard 
deviation of 3.5 percent.  The ROA mean value is 2.3 percent, with a standard deviation of 
0.69 percent. The average size is 9.1 percent with a standard deviation of 0.48 percent.  The 
average RiskAss is 0.4 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.4 percent.   The average PL is 
1.07 percent with a standard deviation of 0.4 percent.  The average PF is 3.0 percent with a 
standard deviation of 1.1 percent. The average PK is 1.8 percent with a standard deviation of 
1.04 percent.  The average BR is 7.4 percent with a standard deviation of 5.6 percent. The 
average INP to GDP is 1.1 percent with a standard deviation of 8.09 percent. LLPTL, size, 
CAP have mean values of 0.70, 9.14 and 14.21 percent and standard deviation values of 6.96, 
0.49, and 6.35 percent respectively. Liquidity, taxation, diversification and LP have mean 
values of 43.83, 33.37, 16.06 and 4.93 percent, and standard deviation values of 10.5, 45.33, 
6.40 and 0.284 percent respectively. Lerner's index and C3 have means of 0.37 and 68.81 
percent, and standard deviations of 0.05 and 3.70 percent respectively. BSD, SMD, GDP and 
INF have means of 461.21, 8.51, 4.74 and 3.80 percent, and standard deviations of 35.23, 




Table 4. 4Summary Statistics (Competition model). 
VARIABLES   Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.        Min         Max   
Revenue (CF) 195     2.0507     3.5107      .6980    1.7108  
ROA 195     2.3818 .69246        -.01        5.97  
Size 195     9.1763 .4898    7.8249    10.4126  
RiskAss 195     .4068      .4762    -.9356    3.2434  
PL 195     1.0790    .4394    .3994     4.4646  
PF 195     3.0121     1.1379     .9787    7.7400  
PK 195     1.8211     1.0426    .3989     6.5572  
BR 195     7.4432     5.6989    .2890    27.7456  
INPtoGDP 195     1.1610     8.0909    1.6909 2.5710  
INF 195     3.8086     3.3784         -.7 14  
LLPTL 166 .70046     6.9611   -83.9113 19.3130  
Size 169 9.1438 .49730 7.8249 10.4126  
Cap 169 14.210 6.3536 -31.3545 37.5247  
Liquidity 169 43.8393 10.5195 .2785 60.2789  
Taxation 169 33.3723 45.3375 -36.2378 401.9836  
Diversification 169 16.0606     6.4081    5.8757    52.3875  
LP 168 4.9373 .2847 3.3242 5.6586  
LernerIndex 169 .3721     .0546         .22     .4365  
C3 169 68.8130 3.7012 62.6021 76.0322  
BSD 169 461.2179     35.2337    393.5676    512.5951  
SMD 169 8.5143    20.1217     .2036   150.9594  
GDP 169 4.7430 2.4796 2.3 8.53  
Note: statistics calculated using STATA 5.1. 
The statistics of the variables in the liquidity risk model are reported in Table 4.5. The 
profitability rates ROA, ROE, Q, and EVA have means of 1.43, 10.52, 1.07 and 1.70 percent 
respectively with standard deviations of 0.71, 5.55, 0.11 and 3.20 percent respectively. The 
means of the bank size ratio is 9.14 percent with standard deviation approaching .49 percent. 
Capital adequacy is, on average, 17.91 percent with a standard variation of 5.19 percent. 
Liquidity risk is, on average, 60.04 percent with a standard variation of 17.44 percent. Equity 
to assets is, on average, 13.20 percent with a standard variation of 4.65 percent. The mean of 
the net interest margin is 2.93 percent with a standard deviation of 0.70 percent. The mean of 
the cost of the fund is 3.09 percent with a standard deviation of 1.16 percent. The mean of 
the cost to income ratio is 56.77 percent with a standard deviation of 19.28 percent. The mean 
98 
 
of concentration is 68.81 percent with a standard variation of 3.70 percent. GDP and inflation 
rates have average values of 4.74 percent and 4.14 percent respectively with a standard 
deviation of 2.47 percent and 3.44 percent.   
Table 4. 5Summary Statistic (Liquidity Risk Model). 
VARIABLES Obs         Mean     Std. Dev. Min         Max 
ROA 169     1.4343    .7122 -1.01 4.97 
ROE    169     10.5227     5.5591       -2.24       39.84 
Q       167     1.0799     .1193 .9407      1.5085 
EVA   168     1.7068 3.2055     -8.0411 15.7714 
size 169     9.1438     .4973 7.8249    10.4126 
TIER1 154     17.9116    5.1908 9.4 36.07 
LTD 169     60.0479     17.4401    .4010 101.9485 
ETA 169     13.2010     4.6502   -31.3545    21.9639 
NIM 169     2.9356 .7025 1.2743    4.40077 
COF 169     3.0906     1.1612    1.1323   7.7400 
CTI 169     56.7750     19.2847    15.2895   193.2614 
C3 169     68.8130      3.7012    62.6021   76.0322 
GDP 169     4.7430     2.4796         2.3        8.53 
INF 169     4.1469     3.4460        -.7 14 
Note: statistics calculated using STATA 5.1. 
Finally, Table 4.6 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the interest rate 
model. The profitability rates ROA, ROE, NIM, Profit, and Profit margin have means of 1.43, 
10.52, 2.9, 2.15 and 1.9 percent respectively with standard deviations of 0.71, 5.55, 0.70, 5.4, 
and .95 percent respectively. The mean value of bank size ratio is 9.1 percent with the 
standard deviation approaching .49 percent. Capitalization is, on average, 13.20 percent with 
a standard variation of 4.65 percent. Diversification is, on average, 16.06 percent with a 
standard variation of 6.40 percent. Lending is, on average, 43.83 percent with a standard 
variation of 10.51 percent. The mean of the TCR is 18.03 percent with a standard deviation 
of 4.87 percent. The mean of the PCL is 1.28 percent with a standard deviation of 2.24 
percent. The mean of the GDP is 5.05 percent with a standard deviation of 2.5 percent. The 
mean of the Inflation is 4.14 percent with a standard variation of 3.44 percent. Short-term 




Table 4. 6 Summary Statistic (Interest rate Model). 
Variable          Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 169 1.4343 0.7122 -1.01 4.97 
ROE 169 10.5227 5.5591 -2.24 39.84 
NIM 169 2.9356 0.7025 1.2743 4.4007 
Profit 169 2.1508 5.4308 -7.2307 2.8209 
Profit margin 169 1.9790 0.9525 -0.9693 6.0685 
Size 169 9.1438     .4973 7.8249   10.4126 
CAP 169 13.2010 4.6502 -31.3546 21.964 
DIV 169 16.0606 6.4081 5.8757 52.3876 
LEN 169 43.8393 10.5195 0.2785 60.279 
TCR 141 18.0349 4.8713 9.6 36.71 
PCL 153 1.2849 2.2437 -0.7266 19.313 
GDP 169 5.0584 2.5113 2.3 8.53 
INF 169 4.1469 3.4460 -0.7 14 
Shortir 117 4.0497 1.6993 2.05 6.734 
Shortir2 117 19.2636 15.3733 4.2025 45.34676 
Note: statistics calculated using STATA 5.1. 
4.3.6 Empirical models 
4.3.6.1 Models of competition and bank profitability  
Following (Shaffer, 1983) and (Nathan and Neave, 1989), we develop an empirical model to 
investigate the impact of competition on bank profitability. We employ (Rosse and Panzar, 
1977) and (Panzar and Rosse, 1982, 1987) nonstructural approaches. Using bank-level data 
the Panzar–Rosse model uses H-statistic to measure the magnitude of the impact of input 
price fluctuations on banks’ equilibrium revenues. The H-statistic measures the elasticity of 
total revenues with respect to factor input prices and is calculated from a reduced-form bank 
revenue equation following (Gutiérrez de Rozas, 2011). In this regard, there are three possible 
scenarios. First, under monopolistic conditions, the increase in input prices can be expected 
to raise marginal costs and reduce output and hence total revenues will decline. The second 
scenario shows that under monopolistic competitive market conditions, revenues will 
increase less proportionally than input prices because the demand for banking products is 
inelastic. Third, when banks operate in perfectly competitive markets, it is expected that their 
marginal costs and will increase proportionally to input prices. With regard to the H-statistic, 
the value varies and interpreted as follows: H ≤ 0 indicates a situation of monopoly. H =1 
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indicates perfect competition; and 0 < H <1 indicates monopolistic competition.  
We test whether the variables are in a state of long-run equilibrium which involves 
estimating parameter E, where E = 0 indicates equilibrium and E < 0 indicates disequilibrium. 
Following (Molyneux et al., 1996), the model is based on a number of assumptions – banks 
are treated as single-product firms. In which case Jordanian commercial banks can be 
considered to act as an intermediation channel between savings and loans. Since Jordanian 
banks are considered to operate as profit maximizing firms and therefore high input prices 
are not necessarily associated with high revenue-generating services. Following (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002), the theoretical PR-model is written as the following reduced form revenue 
function, where c is a vector of n bank-specific variables and w is the factor price elasticity. 
 
𝑙𝑛 𝑅 =  𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 +  ∑ δtlnci
n
t=1                                     (4.1) 
𝐻 =  ∑ βi
m
i=1                                                                          (4.2) 
 
Table 4. 7Interpreting the Rosse-Panzar H-statistic. 




Perfect colluding oligopoly 
Conjectural variations short-rum oligopoly 




Natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market 
Sales maximizing firms subject to breakeven constraints 
Equilibrium test  
E<0  Disequilibrium 
E=0  Equilibrium 
Source: (Rosse and Panzar, 1977), (Panzar and Rosse, 1982, 1987), Shaffer (1982, 1983), (Nathan and Neave, 1989), Molyneux et al. 
(1994), Hondroyiannis et al. (1999), amongst others. 
 
Pooled OLS and Generalized Least Square (GLS) methods are used to empirically test 
the Panzar-Rosse model while GLS is used empirically to estimate panel data with no serial 
correlation while relaxing the assumption related to heteroskedasticity (Maddala and Lahiri, 
2006). We also take natural logarithms of all variables. According to (Matthews et al., 2007) 
and (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006), the test for equilibrium can be calculated using the same 




𝐼𝑛𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑡  𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐾 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾1𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡   +   𝛾2𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + εit                                                   (4.3)                             
…………………………………………………………………                                                                                                                  
𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 1𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0
⌃ +  𝛼1







⌃  𝐿𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 +  εit                                                            (4.4) 
 
Where CF is the revenue from commission and fees. The H statistic equals 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 +
𝛼3. The measure ROA is actually calculated 1+ROA to adjust for (small) negative values ROA. 
We define the equilibrium E-statistic as 𝛼1
⌃ + 𝛼2
⌃ + 𝛼3
⌃. The estimation results appear in Tables 
4.8- 4.12. 
We check the robustness of our results by using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) difference and system estimators to estimate Models 4.5 and 4.6. The GMM estimator 
is used in the current study to account for unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, profit 
persistence over time, and endogeneity of some right-hand side variables such as capitalization. 
The next section presents a detailed discussion of the GMM method. These models use ROA 
and ROE as dependent variables while controlling for bank-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic characteristics. These models also incorporate lagged risk measures to test risk 
persistence over time.  
Lerner index is used as a measure of bank competition in the Jordanian banking sector 
and represents the ability to which a particular bank has the power to set its price above 
marginal cost. The index value ranges from a maximum of 1 to a minimum of zero, in which 
1 represents the largest market power and the lowest competition. Following (Tan, 2016), the 
index is calculated as the difference between a bank’s price and marginal cost divided by the 
price. The predetermined variables in the models are instrumented using one-period lagged 
variables, while the endogenous variables are instrumented using two-periods lagged variables. 
The estimation results appear in Table 4.13. 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = c +  𝛼0
⌃ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛼1






⌃  𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾2






⌃𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + εit                                                                                                                   (4.5) 
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𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = c +  𝛼0
⌃ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛼1






⌃  𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾2






⌃𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + εit                                                                                                                               (4.6) 
 
4.3.6.2 Models of liquidity risk and bank profitability  
We use pooled OLS, fixed effects, as well as random effects methods to estimate models 4.7-
4.11. These models aim to investigate the relationship between risk measures and bank 
profitability using our sample of Jordanian banks. Hausman specification test is applied to each 
model to decide whether to use FE or RE models (Hausman, 1978). We start our analysis by 
pooling the panel data and estimating it using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This 
method ignores bank specific heterogeneities and could generate biased and inefficient results. 
To correct for this bias, we use both FE and RE approaches to account for the distinct nature 
of each bank and control for the unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time and 
correlated with the dependent variables such as Jordan's geographical location and cultural 
norms. These methods capture the within-variation across banks and time-related shocks that 
affect all banks such as global financial crises (Bjorvatn and Farzanegan, 2013). The main 
difference between RE and FE is that RE estimates are produced using GLS method while 
assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors. (Gujarati, 
2009) states the basic framework for the fixed effects as follows:  
                                            𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡                          (4.7) 
Where i refers to an individual bank, t refers to the year, yit is the dependent variable, a is the 
intercept term, α is a vector of parameters to be estimated on the explanatory variables. The 
explanatory variables are classified into three categories. First, 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the bank-specific 
factors, second, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the banking industry determinants, and third, 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡  is the 
macroeconomic determinants and εit is an error term. We use the performance indicators ROA, 
ROE, Tobin Q ratio and EVA as dependent variables and develop the estimation models 
following ((Staikouras and Wood, 2011) and (Said, 2014) as follows:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛼7𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡   +   𝛼8𝐶𝑂3𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝑖𝑡                                         .                 (4.8) 
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𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛼7𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡   +   𝛼8𝐶𝑂3𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝑖𝑡                                                      .(4.9)  
                                                                                                               
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛼7𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡   +   𝛼8𝐶𝑂3𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝑖𝑡                                                           (4.10)    
.                                                                                                                  
𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛼7𝐶𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑡   +   𝛼8𝐶𝑂3𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝑖𝑡                                                           (4.11)     
 
The estimation results appear in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. 
                                                                                                 
4.3.6.3 Models of interest rate, risk-taking, and bank profitability  
In this part of our analysis we use Pooled OLS and GMM approaches to estimate Models 4.12-
4.13. For our dynamic models we have three precarious issues that should be considered in the 
empirical estimation. First, some bank profitability and bank risk-taking determinants are 
potentially endogenous. In econometrics, endogeneity broadly refers to situations in which an 
explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. This either follows from omitted 
variables bias or from causality between the independent and dependent variable (García-
Herrero et al., 2009). Second, it is assumed there are some fixed effects that is specific to each 
individual bank that impact the bank’s profitability or risk-taking which are not captured in the 
model known as unobserved heterogeneity. Third, the dynamic structure of the models 
complicates the estimation. Thus, if the independent variable is correlated with the error term 
(e.g. short interest rate) in a regression model, then the estimate of the regression coefficient in 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression will be biased. In such cases, GMM or IV 
approaches are the appropriate techniques to solve the endogeneity problem. 
The system GMM estimator is widely implemented in related empirical studies on bank 
profitability and bank risk-taking (and allows for consistent estimation when the explanatory 
variables (covariates) are correlated with the error terms and are generally used in regression 
analysis when there are endogenous variables). The system GMM estimator from (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995) and (Blundell and Bond, 1998) provides consistent and unbiased estimates 
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when dealing with endogenous and dynamic models. It uses lagged values of the dependent 
variable both in levels and in differences as instruments as well as lagged values of the other, 
potentially endogenous regressors. We report a set of diagnostic tests to check whether or not 
the data are consistent with the assumptions of the (Arellano and Bond, 1991) estimator. The 
Sargan test statistic examines the over-identification restrictions. It essentially tests whether 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms in the estimated equation. The Sargan test 
statistics for all models appear with a p-value greater than 0.10. Hence, we are unable to reject 
the null hypothesis. The second test is the AR (2) Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation. 
The null hypothesis is ‘no autocorrelation’ and relates to the differenced residuals. The p-values 
for AR (2) show that all models are free from autocorrelation at the 1 percent level.  
In our models, we use the performance indicators NIM, ROA, ROE, Profit, Profit 
Margin, PCL, and TCR as dependent variables. Following (Bikker and Vervliet, 2018) we 
develop the following models to test the empirical effect of interest rate on the profitability and 
risk taking of Jordanian commercial bank. Model 4.14 uses bank profitability measures as the 
dependent variables and Model 4.15 uses bank risk-taking measures as dependent variables.  
                    𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑅 +  𝑖𝑡                                  (4.12) 
                         𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝛼𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑆 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑅 +  𝑖𝑡                                 (4.13) 
where i refers to an individual bank, t refers to the year, 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the risk measure variables for 
bank i in year t; the degree of risk persistence is captured by the coefficient 𝛼. The other 
regressors and the error term are similar to those in previous models. The empirical results 
appear in Tables 4.20 and 4.22.   
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼7𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑃𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐻𝑇𝐼 +   𝑖𝑡                                                                                                           
(4.14)                                                                                . 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼7𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑃𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼9𝑆𝐻𝑇𝐼 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                             
(4.15)                                                                       . 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼7𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑃𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼9𝑆𝐻𝑇𝐼 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                             
(4.16)                                                              . 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡  +
𝛼7𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑃𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝐻𝑇𝐼 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                              
(4.17)                                                                  . 
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𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛼7𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑃𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + +𝛼9𝑆𝐻𝑇𝐼 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                        
(4.18)                                                              .                                        
4.4. Empirical results 
 
 4.4.1 Competition results 
This section discusses the estimates of models covering the following sub-periods (2003-2005, 
2006-2008, 2009-2011, 2012-2014, and 2015-2017) as reported in Tables 4.8 to 4.12. The 
dependent variable of the Revenue (CF). The H-statistic values are equal to: 0.2662884 (2003-
2005), -0.5767809 (2006-2008), 1.1344102 (2009-2011), .8893453 (2012-2014) and 
0.2882701 (2015-2017). This study examines the competitive conditions in Jordan’s banking 
industry for the period 2003-2017. This period corresponds to a period characterized by 
important reforms undertaken by CBJ and the government to liberalize the financial systems. 
The results suggest that Jordan’s banking market cannot be described by either perfect 
competition or monopoly over 2003-2017. The results show the estimated parameters of the P-
R model, Revenue (CF) model results indicate that Jordanian commercial banks operate under 
monopolistic competitive conditions. The Jordanian commercial banks' competitiveness has 
not changed except during the period 2009-2011, wherein the H-statistic has increased to 
1.1344102. The positive change in the competitiveness state of the Jordanian banking sector 
corresponds to the entry of six new banks in 2004 and 2009 (Bank Audi, National Bank of 
Kuwait, Blom Bank, Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank, National Bank of Abu Dhabi and Al Rajhi 
Bank). Such improvement was meant by the Jordanian government and the CBJ to renew 
customer confidence in the banking system following the 2008 global financial crises.  The H 
– statistic takes a value between zero and one for the period (2003-2005), (2012-2014), and 
(2015-2017) in the second model indicating a monopolistic competitive nature in the Jordanian 
banking system. Hence, empirical findings suggest that the Jordanian commercial banks are 
competing in a monopolistic competitive nature. That is, banks earned their revenues as if 
operating under conditions of monopolistic competition during the study period except 2006-
2008 (the period of global financial crises). The study results support that high concentration 
will result in a monopoly as suggested by SCP hypothesis as shown in the result of the sup-
period 2006-2008. These results are incompatible with contestable theory. Empirical findings 
reveal that the Jordanian banking sector is under monopolistic competitive nature, but still close 
to the monopoly market with high concentration and low competition among banks. the results 
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indicating that the revenue of Jordanian commercial banks appears to be earned in conditions 
of monopolistic competition during the sample periods. Our findings not very different from 
the findings of the most empirical study’s findings that have been conducted on the banking 
sectors in various countries in the same area. The results show a lower degree of competition 
in the later years of the sample period. The findings of this study are similar to the findings of 
(Le, 2014; Kashi et al., 2015; and Babic et al., 2015). Thus, our overall findings show that the 
banking market structure can be characterized as monopolistic competition. This conclusion 
holds under a variety of specifications controlling for bank-size, risk and other macroeconomic 
variables. These findings show the need for further deregulations and liberalizations to reduce 
concentration and enhance competitiveness. The reported results are similar to the findings of 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Peria, 2010). According to the results reported in Tables 4.8 to 4.12, the 
elasticity of revenues to the financial resources' cost is mixed. In the models (4.3 and 4.4) where 
the Revenue (CF) is the dependent variables, the price of labor, and price of capital are positive 
and significant in most cases, while the ratio of the number of branches of a bank to the total 
number of branches and the price of funds is negative and significant for most cases.  
Regarding the GMM estimations reported in Table 4.13, the lagged values of the profit 
(ROE) have a positive impact on the current level of ROE. Most of the literature found that 
firms that have higher than normal profits at a given point in time tend to sustain the profile of 
high profits over time. Similar evidence regarding banks’ profit resilience is rare, profits tend 
to persist if a bank’s past rankings were good predictors of its present ranking as in the study 
of (Berger et al., 2000) for US banks. This shows that the departure from competitive market 
structure is not very large in the Jordanian banking sector. Since, according to (Sinha ad 
Sharma, 2014), profit persistence is strongly affected by the state of competition in the banking 
sector due to the asymmetry of information. Size also has a negative impact on profitability, 
suggesting that larger banks have more complicated bureaucratic procedures that affect their 
profitability negatively. Furthermore, these banks may face lessening marginal returns which 
causes a decline in their profit shares. The significant and negative impact of diversification on 
bank profitability suggests that a diversified investment portfolio causes a decline in bank 
profitability. This result can be explained by the fact that utilizing the bank resources across a 
variety of businesses reduces the funds available for traditional loan business and precedes a 
decline in the interest yield, which is one of the biggest revenue sources for banks.  
Concentration (C3) has a negative impact on banks’ profitability (ROA) while the 
Lerner index has no statistically significant effect on ROE and ROA. The competitiveness of 
Jordanian banks has been and continues to be a problem in the Jordanian banking sector, as 
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concentration is found to impair competitiveness and profitability of the banking sector. This 
has been observed by (Bikker and Haaf, 2002) for 21 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
US). A high C3 implies that the assets share of the largest three banks is large relative to all 
other Jordanian commercial banks (Arab Bank, The housing bank for trade and finance, Jordan 
Ahli Bank). Labor productivity fosters profitability as it reflects the operational efficiency of 
the bank system. The positive impact of GDP on both profitability measures suggests that an 
economic boom encourages banks to lend more and permits them to charge higher margins in 
line with the findings of (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). It’s worth mentioning that years 
2005, 2006 and 2007 was the period of economic boom in Jordan which is clearly shown by 

















Table 4. 8The Rosse-Panzar H-statistic Results for Jordanian Commercial Banks Competitive 
Environment and Equilibrium Test Using Commission and Return on Assets (2003-2005). 
 Pooled OLS GLS Pooled OLS GLS  
VARIABLES          LnCF LnCF Ln1ROA Ln1ROA  
LnSIZE 4.6055 ***    4.6055***    .1142    .1142    
 (.3502) (.3059) (.7540) (.6586)  
LnRISkASS .0688    .0688    .0219    .0219     
 (.0538) (.0470) (.1158) (.1012)  
LnBR -.1124    -.1124    -.3689     -.3689      
 (.1130) (.0988) (.2434) (.2127)  
LnPL .2655    .2655*   -.6729 *  -.6729**  
 (.1842) (.1609) (.3966) (.3465)  
LnPF -.1080    -.1080   -1.6181***    -1.6181***     
 (.2549) (.2227) (.5489) (.4795)  
LnPK .1087    .1087    -.1269    -.1269     
 (.1436) (.1255) (3093) (.2702)  
LnINStoGDP 1.2968    1.2968    5.6592*    5.6592*     
 (1.6202) (1.4154) (3.4882) (3.0473)  
LnINF .5429    .5429    2.5742**    2.5742**     
 (.5628) (.4916) (1.2117) (1.0585)  
Constant -38.4609 -38.4609 -122.1172    -122.1172 *    
 (35.7274) (31.2111) (76.9178) (67.1946)  
H-statistic  .2662     
E-Statistic  -2.4180     
Observations 38 38 38 38  
R-squared 0.9307  0.5292   
Adj R-squared     0.9116             0.3993   
Prob > chi2         0.0000  0.0000  
      
Where the dependent variables are: CF is the Revenue, ROA and ROE measured the profitability. The 
independent variables are: PL is the Unit Price of Labor, PK is the Unit Price of Capital, PF is the Unit Price of 
Funds, BR: Number of Branch, SIZE is the Bank size, RISKASS is the Risk, INStoGDP is the Insurance 
Premium, INF is the inflation rate. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. H1= 




Table 4. 9The Rosse-Panzar H-statistic Results for Jordanian Commercial Banks Competitive 
Environment and Equilibrium Test Using Commission and Return on Assets (2006-2008). 
 Pooled OLS GLS Pooled OLS GLS  
VARIABLES          LnCF LnCF Ln1ROA Ln1ROA  
LnSIZE 4.2496***    4.2496***    -.2111    .03015     
 (.4761) (.4142) (.2527) (.6185)  
LnRISkASS .0656*  .0656*  -.0479 **   .0058     
 (.0432) (.0375) (.0229) (.0561)  
LnBR -.1089     -.1089     .1071    -.0893     
 (.2042) (.1777) (.1084) (.2653)  
LnPL -.0135    -.0135     -.1245    .2829     
 (.2056) (.1788) (.1091) (.2670)  
LnPF -.6916* -.6916* .1096    .0655     
 (.4496) (.3911) (.2386) (.5840)  
LnPK .1285    .1285    .1136* .2123     
 (.1424) (.1238) (.0755) (.1849)  
LnINStoGDP 1.2816*    1.2816*    -1.0125**  -1.5890*      
 (.8057) (.7009) (.4276) (1.0466)  
LnINF -.4473    -.4473    .4912***     .7654*  
 (.3560) (.3097) (.1889) (.4624)  
Constant -30.39*      -30.3919*      22.9418***   36.1595 *   
 (16.082) (13.9900) (8.5363) (20.8903)  
H-statistic  -.5767     
E-Statistic  .0986     
Observations 37 37 37 37  
R-squared 0.9364  0.3547   
Adj R-squared     0.9182  0.1703   
Prob > chi2         0.0000  0.3765  
      
Where the dependent variables are:, CF is the Revenue, ROA and ROE measured the profitability. The 
independent variables are: PL is the Unit Price of Labor, PK is the Unit Price of Capital, PF is the Unit Price of 
Funds, BR: Number of Branch, SIZE is the Bank size, RISKASS is the Risk, INStoGDP is the Insurance 
Premium, INF is the inflation rate. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. H1= -





Table 4. 10The Rosse-Panzar H-statistic Results for Jordanian Commercial Banks Competitive 
Environment and Equilibrium Test Using Commission and Return on Assets (2009-2011). 
 Pooled OLS GLS Pooled OLS GLS  
VARIABLES          LnCF LnCF Ln1ROA Ln1ROA  
LnSIZE 5.1588 ***   5.1588 ***   -.5271    -.1852     
 (.4760) (.4174) (.3713) (.8945)  
LnRISkASS -.0793    -.0793**    -.0099    -.1033     
 (.0557) (.0489) (.0435) (.1047)  
LnBR .1520    .1520    -.2708 *   -.7017**     
 (.1900) (.16665) (.1482) (.3570)  
LnPL .1216  .1216  .1489    .8458     
 (.3188) (.2796) (.2487) (.5990)  
LnPF 1.1170** 1.1170*** -1.5865 ***   -2.9388***     
 (.4563) (.4002) (.3559) (.8574)  
LnPK -.1042 -.1042 .0715    .0411  
 (.0895) (.0785) (.0698) (.1683)  
LnINStoGDP .1662   .1662   -2.0823* -5.6148 **    
 (1.4089) (1.2357) (1.0991) (2.6477)  
LnINF   .1373   .1373 -.3114***    -.6017***     
 (.1138) (.0998) (.0887) (.2138)  
Constant -22.0692    -22.0692    59.588***  146.1527**   
 (33.2807) (29.1891) (25.9623) (62.5409)  
H-statistic  1.1344102     
E-Statistic  -1.3660736     
Observations 39 39 39 39  
R-squared 0.9447  0.5189   
Adj R-squared    0.9300  0.3906   
Prob > chi2         0.0000  0.0001  
      
Where the dependent variables are: CF is the Revenue, ROA and ROE measured the profitability. The 
independent variables are: PL is the Unit Price of Labor, PK is the Unit Price of Capital, PF is the Unit Price of 
Funds, BR: Number of Branch, SIZE is the Bank size, RISKASS is the Risk, INStoGDP is the Insurance 
Premium, INF is the inflation rate. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. H1= 





Table 4. 11The Rosse-Panzar H-statistic Results for Jordanian Commercial Banks Competitive 
Environment and Equilibrium Test Using Commission and Return on Assets (2012-2014). 
 Pooled OLS GLS Pooled OLS GLS  
VARIABLES          LnCF LnCF Ln1ROA Ln1ROA  
LnSIZE 6.1027***    6.1027***    .3939* .5236*  
 (.5073) (.4450) (.2174) (.3380)  
LnRISkASS .0148    .0148    -.1104***     -.1398***  
 (.0759) (.0666) (.0325) (.0506)  
LnBR -.44927** -.4492*** -.1929**    -.2577**     
 (.1830) (.1605) (.0784) (.1219)  
LnPL 1.0008***    1.0008***    .2114 *   .3857 **    
 (.2877) (.2523) (.1233) (.1917)  
LnPF -.1482    -.1482    -.3947**    -.7212***     
 (.3628) (.3182) (.1554) (.2417)  
LnPK .0367    .0367    .1635    .1876**  
 (.1409) (.1236) (.0604) (.0939)  
LnINStoGDP -7.4724    -7.4724    1.3035    7.5620    
 (11.5126) (10.0972) (4.9338) (7.6714)  
LnINF .3667    .3667    -.0499    -.3351     
 (.4003) (.3511) (.1715) (.2667)  
Constant 152.0335    152.0335    -31.2571    -174.7259  
 (268.0868) (235.1276) (114.8908) (178.6397)  
H-statistic  .88934     
E-Statistic  -.01971     
Observations 39 39 39 39  
R-squared 0.9123  0.5226   
Adj R-squared     0.8889  0.3952   
Prob > chi2         0.0000  0.0000  
      
Where the dependent variables are: CF is the Revenue, ROA and ROE measured the profitability. The 
independent variables are: PL is the Unit Price of Labor, PK is the Unit Price of Capital, PF is the Unit Price of 
Funds, BR: Number of Branch, SIZE is the Bank size, RISKASS is the Risk, INStoGDP is the Insurance 
Premium, INF is the inflation rate. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. H1= 




Table 4. 12The Rosse-Panzar H-statistic Results for Jordanian Commercial Banks Competitive 
Environment and Equilibrium Test Using Commission and Return on Assets (2015-2017). 
 Pooled OLS GLS Pooled OLS GLS  
VARIABLES          LnCF LnCF Ln1ROA Ln1ROA  
LnSIZE 5.4571 ***   5.4571***   -.3293    -.7575 *   
 (.6364) (.5582) (2645) (.4090)  
LnRISkASS .0835    .0835    -.0049    -.0067     
 (.0863) (.0757) (.0358) (.0555)  
LnBR -.4411**    -.4411**    -.0494 .0717     
 (.2058) (.1805) (.0855) (.1323)  
LnPL .6348 **    .6348 **    .1187  .0531  
 (.2978) (.2611) (.1237) (.1913)  
LnPF -.4710 -.4710 -.4788***     -.5205 **     
 (.3698) (.3243) (.1537) (.2376)  
LnPK .1244 .1244 -.0340    -.1738      
 (.1979) (.1735) (.0822) (.1271)  
LnINStoGDP -1.1201 -1.1201 -.8048 -1.1850     
 (1.6838) (1.4767) (.6997) (1.0820)  
LnINF .0775 .0775* .0066    .0017     
 (.0503) (.0441) (.0209) (.0323)  
Constant 10.9714    10.9714    24.7471    40.4673     
 (39.7404) (34.8546) (16.5156) (25.5384)  
H-statistic  .2882     
E-Statistic  -.3941     
Observations 39 39 39 39  
R-squared 0.8232  0.3960   
Adj R-squared    0.7760  0.2350   
Prob > chi2         0.0000  0.0156  
      
Where the dependent variables are: CF is the Revenue, ROA and ROE measured the profitability. The 
independent variables are: PL is the Unit Price of Labor, PK is the Unit Price of Capital, PF is the Unit Price of 
Funds, BR: Number of Branch, SIZE is the Bank size, RISKASS is the Risk, INStoGDP is the Insurance 
Premium, INF is the inflation rate. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. H1= 




Table 4. 13Empirical Results of GMM Model of the Impact of competition (Lerner Index) on the 
Jordanian Commercial Banks Profitability (2003-2015). 
VARIABLES ROA ROE 
L.ROA -0.00331  
 (0.0497)  
L2.ROA -0.247***  
 (0.0475)  
L.ROE  -0.132** 
  (0.0631) 
L2.ROE  -0.0916* 
  (0.0552) 
SIZE -0.816** -8.505*** 
 (0.326) (2.866) 
LLPTL -0.00680 -0.00682 
 (0.00484) (0.0413) 
CAP 0.0332** -0.181 
 (0.0149) (0.122) 
LIQUIDITY 0.00171 -0.0220 
 (0.00430) (0.0376) 
DIV -0.0241*** -0.163** 
 (0.00835) (0.0704) 
TAXATION -0.000922 -0.00514 
 (0.000601) (0.00549) 
Lerner 0.121 -1.332 
 (0.535) (4.330) 
CO3 -0.0611** -0.611*** 
 (0.0285) (0.225) 
LP 2.363*** 17.86*** 
 (0.396) (3.371) 
SMD -0.00578 0.00283 
 (0.00531) (0.0484) 
GDP 0.121*** 0.398* 
 (0.0251) (0.218) 
INF -0.00500 0.0915 
 (0.00890) (0.0764) 
Constant 4.508 84.04*** 
 (4.208) (32.07) 
Observations 141 141 
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Number of Bank 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: ROA and ROE measured the profitability. The independent variables are SIZE 
is the Bank size, LLPTL is the Bank risk, LIQUIDITY is the Liquidity, CAP is the Capitalization, DIV is the 
Diversification, LP is the Labor productivity, TAXATION is the Taxation, Lerner is the Competition, CO3 is the 
Concentration, SMD is the Stock market development, INF is the inflation annual rate. GDP is the GDP growth 
rate. Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 4.4.2 Liquidity risk results 
The estimations result of the liquidity risk models appear in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. The models 
are estimated using Pooled OLS, FE, RE methods. We hypothesize a significant and positive 
relationship between liquidity risk and profitability for Jordanian commercial banks (H2). 
Liquidity risk is measured by total loans to total deposits (LTD). Our results confirm our 
hypothesis wherein liquidity risk has a significant positive impact, but only for ROE and Q 
models with coefficients of 0.05 and 0.001 respectively. (Tafri et al., 2009) and (Alshatti, 
2016) found a similar insignificant effect of the loan to deposits ratio on bank profitability. 
Our results are in line with (Bourke, 1989) who found evidence of a positive relationship 
between liquidity risk and bank profitability for 90 banks in Europe, North America, and 
Australia. The positive relationship between LTD and the Jordanian bank profitability shows 
that for the period represented by the data that Jordanian commercial banks used their fund 
resources efficiently. The management of bank resources was one of the major concerns for 
CBJ regulators who imposed on sight monitoring during the period of banking reform.  
With regard to bank size, similar to the competition models, the size coefficients in the 
ROA, ROE, Tobin Q, and EVA models are -1.39, -2.26, -0.18, and -0.87 respectively. The 
data suggests that larger banks have more complicated bureaucratic procedures that have 
affect their profitability negatively. Also, it is likely that these banks may have faced reduced 
marginal returns, which would have resulted in declining profitability compared with their 
size as suggested by (Staikouras and Wood, 2011) and  (Ani et al. 2012). This result also 
suggests that higher total assets may not necessarily lead to higher profits. The results may 
also be linked to diseconomies of scale suffered by Jordanian banks due to the uncontrolled 
increase in the number of deposits and to the inward migration of Iraqi and Syrian refugees 
to Jordan. 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (Tier-1) and Equity to Assets (ETA) both have a robust 
negative effect on ROE as shows in table 4.19 and 4.20. Generally, capital adequacy is used 
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by bank regulators to control banks' ability to withstand a certain amount of losses. The 
inward migration of Syrian and Iraqi refugees contributed to the increase in capital adequacy, 
size of branches and the capital of Jordanian commercial banks. The capital adequacy ratio 
in Jordan reached 12 percent in 2015 exceeding the CBJ minimum rate of 8 percent. Our 
results are in line with (Al-Tarawneh et al., 2016) who found a negative correlation between 
capital adequacy and Jordanian banks' profitability. The negative ETA indicates that during 
the period examined, Jordanian banks adopted a tighter loan policy and, at the same time, 
maintained a large share of capital to offset potential losses or crises. These results also 
highlight the success of CBJ reforms. Since 1989 the CBJ has initiated a number of reforms 
to make the banking system more secure via increasing the paid-up capital of Jordanian banks 
to JD 100 million. These findings also support the argument that well-capitalized banks face 
lower chances of bankruptcy (Hassan and Bashir, 2003, Bashir, 2003, and Sufian and 
Habibullah, 2009). 
We use the Net Interest Margin (NIM) to investigate the impact of the interest 
environment on bank performance. In line with our hypothesis, NIM has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on ROA and ROE.  A one percentage increase in NIM fosters 
ROA and ROE with 0.18 percent and 0.80 percent respectively. This result corresponds to 
the fact that the interest yield is the main source of income for Jordanian banks amounting to 
77.4 percent of total income in 2015. (Khrawish and Al-Sa’di, 2011) found a similar positive 
relationship between ROA, ROE, and NIM. These results correspond with Jordanian banks’ 
attempts to extend offered loans while preserving the low levels of Non-Performing Loans 
(NPL). The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans continued its downward trend at the 
end of 2015 to touch 4.9 percent compared to 7.7 percent, 6.8 percent and 5.6 percent at the 
end of 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. The coverage ratio for the nonperforming loans 
reached 75.0 percent at the end of 2015. Bank net interest margin in Jordan was 2.16 percent 
in 2003 and 3.23 percent in 2015. This was induced by the increase in the amounts of offered 
loans from Jordanian banks to the households, businesses, and government (in general, the 
larger the value of the loan, the greater the net interest margin will be, and the higher the bank 
profits are). In line with the increase in bank loans, Jordanian banking sector credit facilities 
grew to 9.6 percent to reach 21.1 billion JD in 2015.   
The cost of fund (COF) has also a significant negative impact on ROA, ROE, Q, and 
EVA with coefficients of -0.99, -0.76, -0.008, and -1.27 respectively. The COF measures the 
impact of bank managements’ efficiency over banks' profitability. Therefore, a bank with 
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excellent managerial efficiency will be able to collect low-cost funds, thus enhancing 
profitability levels (Dietrich ans Wanzenried, 2011). The negative relationship between COF 
and Jordanian banks' profitability is consistent with the fact that banks with higher capital 
ratios tend to face a lower cost of funding due to lower prospective bankruptcy costs as 
reported by (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) and (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). 
These results also support the successful attempts by the CBJ to lower the cost of funds 
through increased banking sector liquidity while also inducing banks to lower their lending 
rates and to expand credit facilities.  
Cost to Income (CTI) negatively influences banks' profitability. CTI coefficients with 
ROA, ROE Q, and EVA are -0.02, -0.19, -0.001, and -0.042 respectively. CTI is another 
indicator of the operational efficiency of the Jordanian commercial banks, where a high ratio 
implies less efficient management. This result meets our expectation that improvements in 
efficiency feed into higher profitability. (Trujillo-Ponce, 2013) and (Athanasoglou et al., 
2008) found similar effects of higher CTI on the reduction of banks’ profitability. As a part 
of the CBJ objectives during the reform phase, the CBJ designed a unified e-banking 
methodology for all processes and for all clients, and also introduced many technological 
tools to improve banks’ overall operational efficiency.  
Concentration (C3) has a negative impact on banks’ profitability (ROA). A high C3 
implies that the assets share of the largest three banks, (Arab Bank, the housing bank for trade 
and finance, Jordan Ahli Bank) is large relative to all other Jordanian commercial banks. A 
slight improvement is also observed, over a period of 10 years, wherein the concentration 
ratio decreased from 60 percent to 53.9 percent in 2015. The analysis provides robust 
evidence about the negative impact of concentration on the Jordanian bank profitability by 
measuring concentration using assets, loans and deposits. 
Regarding the macroeconomic indicators and similar to the competition models, GDP 
growth influences banks’ profitability. This result is in line with (Samhan and Al-Khitab, 
2015) and suggests that Jordanian banks operate better and earn more profits during good 
economic conditions. One reason is that during boom periods (2005, 2006, and 2007) the loan 
loss provisions will be low, which improves the quality of banks’ assets and reduce the 
chances of default risks. The relationship between inflation and profitability depends on 
whether inflation expectations are fully anticipated or not. Inflation has a modest negative 
impact on only one of the profitability indicators (Q), reflecting the inability of banks to 
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accurately predict the levels of inflation. Accordingly, banks lose the opportunity to benefit 
from the inflationary environment to stimulate profits. 
Table 4. 14Empirical Results of Pooled OLS of the Impact of Liquidity Risk on the Jordanian 
Commercial Banks Profitability (2003-2015), CO3 measured by Total Assets. 
 (ROA) (ROE) (Tobin) (EVA) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
     
SIZE -0.214** -2.264*** 0.0113 -1.711*** 
 (0.084) (0.729) (0.015) (0.564) 
TIER1 -0.0197** -0.197** 0.00146 -0.141** 
 (0.0092) (0.0796) (0.0016) (0.0616) 
LTD 0.00273 0.0537** 0.0011** 0.0037 
 (0.0025) (0.0223) (0.0004) (0.0172) 
ETA 0.0396** -0.542*** -0.0008 0.0858 
 (0.0171) (0.147) (0.0030) (0.114) 
NIM 0.188*** 0.801 0.0022 0.535 
 (0.0574) (0.494) (0.0102) (0.382) 
COF -0.113*** -0.765** -0.0193** -0.971*** 
 (0.0407) (0.350) (0.0075) (0.271) 
CTI -0.0233*** -0.195*** -0.0009** -0.0479*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0184) (0.0003) (0.0142) 
CO3 0.0035 0.0852 0.0045* 0.0324 
 (0.0154) (0.133) (0.0027) (0.103) 
GDP 0.0682*** 0.240 0.0295*** -0.206 
 (0.0224) (0.192) (0.00397) (0.149) 
INF 0.0002 0.0362 -0.0031 0.0066 
 (0.0109) (0.0936) (0.0019) (0.0725) 
Constant 3.586** 42.62*** 0.556** 21.46** 
 (1.468) (12.62) (0.262) (9.775) 
Observations 154 154 153 154 
R-squared 0.654 0.621 0.611 0.270 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: ROA and ROE is the profitability measurement, Tobin is the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, EVA is the Economic Value Added. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, TIER1 is the 
Capital Adequacy ratio-TIER 1, LTD is the Liquidity Risk, ETA is the Capitalization, NIM is the Net interest 
margin ratio, CTI is the Cost to income ratio, COF is the Cost of fund ratio, CO (3), is the Concentration, GDP 
is the GDP rate, INF is the inflation rate Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. 15Empirical Results of Fixed and Random Effect Model of the Impact of Liquidity Risk on the 
Jordanian Commercial Banks Profitability (2003-2015). CO3 measured by Total Assets 
 (ROA) (ROE) (Tobin) (EVA) 
VARIABLES FE RE FE RE 
     
Size -1.3979*** -2.264*** -.1872*** -.8728 
 (.4222) (.7288) (.0611) (1.135) 
TIER1 -.0006 -.1966*** -.0027 -.0335 
 (.0146) (.0795) (.0021) (.0774) 
LTD .0037 .0537*** .0011*** .0123 
 (.0033) (.0222) (.0004) (.0187) 
ETA .0130 -.5416*** -.0041 .0637 
 (.022) (.1469) (.0032) (.1186) 
NIM .0751 .8005* -.0006 -.3479 
 (.1038) (.4937) (.0150) (.5237) 
COF -.0999** -.7647*** -.0058 -1.277*** 
 (.0465) (.3500) (.0069) (.2592) 
CTI -.0223*** -.1954*** -.0011*** -.0424*** 
 (.0024) (.0183) (.0003) (.0136) 
CO3 -.0545*** .0851 -.0032 -.0244 
 (.0222) (.1326) (.0032) (.1009) 
GDP .0469** .2395 .0261*** -.1680 
 (.0247) (.1923) (.0035) (.1346) 
INF .0048 .0362 -.0030** .0509 
 (.0108) (.0935) (.0015) (.0639) 
Observations 154 154 153 154 
R-squared 
(Overall) 
0.280 0.621 0.221 0.197 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: ROA and ROE is the profitability measurement, Tobin is the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, EVA is the Economic Value Added. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, TIER1 is the 
Capital Adequacy ratio-TIER 1, LTD is the Liquidity Risk, ETA is the Capitalization, NIM is the Net interest 
margin ratio, CTI is the Cost to income ratio, COF is the Cost of fund ratio, CO (3), is the Concentration, GDP 




Table 4. 16Empirical Results of Pooled OLS for the Impact of Liquidity Risk on the Jordanian 
Commercial Banks Profitability (2003-2015), CO3 measured by Total Loans. 
 (ROA) (ROE) (Tobin) (EVA) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
     
SIZE -0.214** -2.335*** 0.00740 -1.794*** 
 (0.0830) (0.715) (0.0148) (0.552) 
TIER1 -0.0203** -0.195** 0.00154 -0.130** 
 (0.00924) (0.0796) (0.00164) (0.0614) 
LTD 0.00282 0.0561** 0.00126*** 0.00477 
 (0.00255) (0.0219) (0.000452) (0.0169) 
ETA 0.0404** -0.545*** -0.000968 0.0691 
 (0.0170) (0.147) (0.00302) (0.113) 
NIM 0.186*** 0.748 -0.000687 0.526 
 (0.0567) (0.489) (0.0101) (0.377) 
COF -0.118*** -0.837** -0.0235*** -0.980*** 
 (0.0391) (0.337) (0.00730) (0.260) 
CTI -0.0236*** -0.194*** -0.000875** -0.0420*** 
 (0.00210) (0.0181) (0.000374) (0.0140) 
CO3 -1.043* -6.167* 0.355 -9.680 
 (1.491) (12.85) (0.265) (9.913) 
GDP 0.0596** 0.252 0.0298*** -0.0608 
 (0.0239) (0.206) (0.00428) (0.159) 
INF -0.000501 0.0312 -0.00339* 0.0126 
 (0.0109) (0.0940) (0.00196) (0.0725) 
Constant 3.124** 44.64*** 0.648*** 30.62*** 
 (1.386) (11.94) (0.247) (9.215) 
Observations 154 154 154 154 
R-squared 0.655 0.621 0.608 0.274 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: ROA and ROE is the profitability measurement, Tobin is the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, EVA is the Economic Value Added. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, TIER1 is the 
Capital Adequacy ratio-TIER 1, LTD is the Liquidity Risk, ETA is the Capitalization, NIM is the Net interest 
margin ratio, CTI is the Cost to income ratio, COF is the Cost of fund ratio, CO (3), is the Concentration, GDP 




Table 4. 17Empirical Results of Fixed and Random Effect Model for the Impact of Liquidity Risk on the 
Jordanian Commercial Banks Profitability (2003-2015). CO3 measured by Total Loans 
 (ROA) (ROE) (Tobin) (EVA) 
VARIABLES RE FE FE RE 
     
Size -0.214*** -11.91*** -0.239*** -1.502 
 (0.0830) (3.885) (0.0664) (1.094) 
TIER1 -0.0203** 0.0127 -0.00243 -0.0170 
 (0.00924) (0.122) (0.00208) (0.0761) 
LTD 0.00282 0.0392 0.000958* 0.0109 
 (0.00255) (0.0288) (0.000492) (0.0184) 
ETA 0.0404** -0.737*** -0.00483 0.0344 
 (0.0170) (0.185) (0.00316) (0.116) 
NIM 0.186*** 0.0919 -0.00124 -0.346 
 (0.0567) (0.867) (0.0148) (0.513) 
COF -0.118*** -0.188 0.00193 -1.191*** 
 (0.0391) (0.451) (0.00801) (0.253) 
CTI -0.0236*** -0.187*** -0.00114*** -0.0371*** 
 (0.00210) (0.0199) (0.000343) (0.0133) 
CO3 1.043 -42.08** -0.647* -16.69* 
 (1.491) (20.05) (0.344) (9.660) 
GDP 0.0596** 0.140 0.0270*** -0.0394 
 (0.0239) (0.209) (0.00360) (0.140) 
INF -0.000501 0.0927 -0.00256 0.0641 
 (0.0109) (0.0928) (0.00160) (0.0639) 
Observations 154 154 153 154 
R-squared 
(Overall) 
0.964 0.095 0.107 0.080 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: ROA and ROE is the profitability measurement, Tobin is the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, EVA is the Economic Value Added. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, TIER1 is the 
Capital Adequacy ratio-TIER 1, LTD is the Liquidity Risk, ETA is the Capitalization, NIM is the Net interest 
margin ratio, CTI is the Cost to income ratio, COF is the Cost of fund ratio, CO (3), is the Concentration, GDP 





Table 4. 18Empirical Results of Pooled OLS for the Impact of Liquidity Risk on the Jordanian 
Commercial Banks Profitability (2003-2015) , CO3 measured by Total Deposits. 
 (ROA) (ROE) (Tobin) (EVA) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
     
SIZE -0.178** -2.004*** 0.0165 -1.613*** 
 (0.0848) (0.730) (0.0150) (0.570) 
TIER1 -0.0217** -0.210*** 0.00125 -0.146** 
 (0.00914) (0.0787) (0.00161) (0.0614) 
LTD 0.00196 0.0486** 0.00105** 0.00180 
 (0.00256) (0.0221) (0.000451) (0.0172) 
ETA 0.0430** -0.519*** -0.000431 0.0943 
 (0.0169) (0.145) (0.00297) (0.114) 
NIM 0.207*** 0.932* 0.00501 0.585 
 (0.0572) (0.492) (0.0101) (0.384) 
COF -0.0908** -0.607* -0.0162** -0.912*** 
 (0.0409) (0.352) (0.00755) (0.275) 
CTI -0.0246*** -0.204*** -0.00110*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.00213) (0.0183) (0.000376) (0.0143) 
CO3 -3.043* -26.59* 0.780*** -10.03 
 (1.640) (14.11) (0.288) (11.02) 
GDP 0.0382 0.0300 0.0254*** -0.285* 
 (0.0243) (0.209) (0.00429) (0.163) 
INF -0.00144 0.0211 -0.00362* 0.000907 
 (0.0108) (0.0929) (0.00192) (0.0725) 
Constant 1.307 26.70* 0.239 15.47 
 (1.644) (14.15) (0.291) (11.05) 
Observations 154 154 153 154 
R-squared 0.662 0.629 0.623 0.274 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: ROA and ROE is the profitability measurement, Tobin is the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, EVA is the Economic Value Added. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, TIER1 is the 
Capital Adequacy ratio-TIER 1, LTD is the Liquidity Risk, ETA is the Capitalization, NIM is the Net interest 
margin ratio, CTI is the Cost to income ratio, COF is the Cost of fund ratio, CO (3), is the Concentration, GDP 
is the GDP rate, INF is the inflation rate Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. 19Empirical Results of Fixed and Random Effect Model for the Impact of Liquidity Risk on the 
Jordanian Commercial Banks Profitability (2003-2015). CO3 measured by Total Deposits 
 (ROA) (ROE) (Tobin) (EVA) 
VARIABLES RE FE FE RE 
     
Size -0.178** -4.967 -0.142* -0.488 
 (0.0848) (4.723) (0.0806) (1.206) 
TIER1 -0.0217** -0.0542 -0.00334 -0.0429 
 (0.00914) (0.127) (0.00217) (0.0778) 
LTD 0.00196 0.0506* 0.00113** 0.0111 
 (0.00256) (0.0287) (0.000491) (0.0187) 
ETA 0.0430** -0.600*** -0.00298 0.0830 
 (0.0169) (0.202) (0.00344) (0.119) 
NIM 0.207*** 0.274 0.00113 -0.312 
 (0.0572) (0.899) (0.0153) (0.529) 
COF -0.0908** -0.661* -0.00566 -1.235*** 
 (0.0409) (0.397) (0.00702) (0.263) 
CTI -0.0246*** -0.188*** -0.00116*** -0.0455*** 
 (0.00213) (0.0205) (0.000351) (0.0138) 
CO3 -3.043* -4.960 0.00746 -4.774* 
 (1.640) (26.92) (0.459) (11.45) 
GDP 0.0382 0.0392 0.0256*** -0.225 
 (0.0243) (0.216) (0.00369) (0.146) 
INF -0.00144 0.0488 -0.00313* 0.0468 
 (0.0108) (0.0959) (0.00166) (0.0645) 
Observations 154 154 153 154 
R-squared 
(Overall) 
0.972 0.542 0.716 0.061 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: ROA and ROE is the profitability measurement, Tobin is the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, EVA is the Economic Value Added. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, TIER1 is the 
Capital Adequacy ratio-TIER 1, LTD is the Liquidity Risk, ETA is the Capitalization, NIM is the Net interest 
margin ratio, CTI is the Cost to income ratio, COF is the Cost of fund ratio, CO (3), is the Concentration, GDP 






4.4.3 Interest rate results 
The estimations result of the interest rate and risk-taking models appear in Tables 4.20 - 4.222. 
The models are estimated using Pooled OLS and GMM methods. This section empirically 
investigates the impact of bank-specific, interest rate environment, and macroeconomic factors 
on bank profitability and risk-taking.  
Unlike the competition and liquidity risk models, size has a positive and significant 
impact on the profit and ROE (Table 4.20 and 4.21). The result suggests that larger banks are 
more profitable mainly due to economies of scale (Khan et al., 2017). However, the results also 
show that size reduces some profitability indicators such as ROA and profit margin, which can 
be explained by the adverse effects of the bureaucratic and routine procedures on banks' 
performance and profit. There is also non-robust evidence of the impact of size on the TCR 
and PCL risk measures. The statistics for Size shown in Table 4.20 suggests that this variable 
reduces risk and that larger banks are more able to mitigate potential credit risks relative to 
smaller banks.  
Capitalization has a significant and positive impact on all profitability measures. (Al-
Smadi et al., 1970) found a similar relationship between bank capital and profitability of 
Jordanian banks Higher bank capitalization is reflected in a better ability to manage assets 
and generate profits (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). The CBJ efforts during the period 
represented by the data contributed to the improvement in stability and soundness of the 
monetary and financial systems, resulting in an increase in the capital ratio of the commercial 
banks. The high level of capital is also a good indicator of the ability of banks to hedge against 
risks. On the other side, capitalization increases both risk and credit measures, as large banks 
have a big loan portfolio that translates into higher levels of provision. Tables 4.20 and 4.21 
shows that diversification adversely affect the banks’ profitability measures similar to the 
competition results. Jordanian commercial banks that relied heavily on non-interest income 
(higher diversification) tend to be less profitable. A similar result was confirmed by 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) in their study of 80 countries Non-interest income in 
banks is generated via fees and commissions income or trading activities. The risk measures 
– total capital ratio and credit risk have negative and statically significant associations with 
the profitability measures.  In line with (Bikker and Hu, 2002) and (Bolt et al., 2012) higher 
credit risk exposure via loans is associated with lower profit margins.  
The statistics suggests that short-term interest rate has no significant impact on 
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profitability and risk measures (Table 4.20, 4.21and 4.22). The result could be explained by 
the fact that the CBJ adopted low-interest-rate schemes during the reform phases, adversely 
affecting the banks’ lending behavior and the volume of their interest yields. As a result, 
Jordanian banks started to use a wide range of products and services to improve banks’ 
profitability and become less reliant on interest income. Table 4.21 also shows that lending 
had a positive influence on two profitability measures (NIM and Profit). A similar result was 
found by (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). As the relative size of lending increases, banks 
become better able at boosting their revenue from the interest income. 
GDP has a significant negative impact on profitability measures as shown in Table 4.21, 
contrary to the results of model reported in Table 4.25. One explanation for this could be that 
high economic growth aligned with the CBJ reforms improved the business environment, 
lowered bank entry barriers, and enhanced the competitiveness of banks. The subsequent 
increased competition could also have dampened banks’ overall profitability as (Tan and 
Floros, 2012) found in their study a negative relationship between bank competition and 
profitability. The results in Table 4.26 show that Inflation reduces profitability measures 
(ROA, ROE, and Profit Margin). The negative profitability effect of inflation reflects the 
inability of Jordanian banks to anticipate inflation and so benefit from the inflationary 













Table 4. 20Empirical Results of the Pooled OLS for the impact of interest rate on Jordanian Commercial 
Banks Profitability and Risk-taking taking (2003- 2015). 
Where the dependent variables are: NIM is the Net Interest Margin, ROA and the ROE measured the 
profitability, Profit is the Total Profit, PM: is the Profit Margin, TCR is the Total Capital Ratio, PCL is the 
Credit Risk. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, CAP is the Capitalization, DIV is the 
Diversification, LEN is the Lending, GDP is the Real GDP Growth, INF is the Inflation rate, SHTI is the Short-






 (NIM) (ROA) (ROE) (Profit) (PM) (TCR) (PCL) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
SIZE .1449* -.1048 1.744**- 1.277*** -.1014 -1.069 ** -.7603*** 
 (.0886) (0.0943) (.8210) (.0508) (.1232) (.4476) (.2761) 
CAP   -.0221 .0798** -.2226 .0364* .0917* 1.206*** .3703*** 
 (.0351) (0.0374) (.3257) (.0201) (.0488) (.1204) (0 .1066) 
DIV -.0405*** -.0428*** -.2756*** -.0184*** -.0648*** -.1676*** -.0403 
 (.0109) (.0116) (.1013) (.0062) (.0152) (.0539) (0 .0354) 
lEN .0178* -.0083 -.0132 .0104* -.0090 -.2284*** -.2136*** 
 (.0102) (.0109) (.0952) (.0059) (.0142) (.0469) (0 .0228) 
PCL -.0071 -.0922** -.9101*** -.0112 -.1146** -.6401***  
 (.0353) (0.0375) (.3271) (.0202) (0 .0490) (.1696)  
TCR .0026 -.0439* -.3697* -.0255** -.0507*  -.2492*** 
 (.0220) (.0234)  (.2041) (.0126) (0. .0306)  (0.0660) 
INF .0387 -.0065 0.0156 .0036 -.0076 .1595 .0944 
 (.0218) (0 .0232) (.2026) (.0098) (0.0304) (.1595) (0.0706) 
GDP -.0403 0.0717 .5358 .0387* .098* .2875 -.1072 
 (.0416) (0.0442) (.3853) (.0238) (0.0578) (.2154) (0 .1354) 
SHTI -.0410 -0.5719 -2.596 -.0814 -.7712 -2.738 -2.029* 
 (.3690) (0.3925) (3.416) (.2116) (0 .5126) (1.906) (1.182) 
SHTI2 .0021 0.0750* .3231  .0028 .1010 .2252 .1797 
 (.0388) (0.0413) (.3597) (.0222) (0.0539) (.2018) (0.1252) 
Number of 
Obs 
85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
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Table 4. 21Empirical Static Results of Instrumental Variable Estimation of the impact of interest rate on 
Jordanian Commercial banks Profitability and Risk-taking (2003 -2015). 
Where the dependent variables are: NIM is the Net Interest Margin, ROA and the ROE measured the 
profitability, Profit is the Total Profit, PM: is the Profit Margin, TCR is the Total Capital Ratio, PCL is the 
Credit Risk. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, CAP is the Capitalization, DIV is the 
Diversification, LEN is the Lending, GDP is the Real GDP Growth, INF is the Inflation rate, SHTI is the Short-








 (NIM) (ROA) (ROE) (Profit) (PM) (TCR) (PCL) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
SIZE -0.1755 -0.1048 -3.164 1.277*** -0.7682 -.6659 0.3663 
 (0.2215) (0.0943) (5.720) (0.0474) (1.0426) (.8961) (1.249) 
CAP 0.1343*** 0.0798** -.1693 0.0364* 0.1326** .8632*** 0.1563 
 (0.0401) (0.0374) (0.5119) (0.0188) (0.0505) (0.2544) (0.1432) 
DIV -0.0028 -0.0428*** -0.2726 -0.0184*** -0.0399 0.0680 -0.1048 
 (0.0102) (0.0116) (0.2146) (0.0058) (0.0300) (0.0460) (0.0635) 
lEN 0.0169* -0.0083*** -0.3452 0.0104* -0.0417 -0.0945 -0.2842*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0109) (0.2624) (0.0055) (0.0368) (0.0717) (0.0266) 
PCL 0.0305 -0.0922** -1.648** -0.0112 -0.1666 -0.1857  
 (0.0355) (0.0375) (0.7413) (0.0189) (0.1124) (0.2772)  
TCR -0.0280 -0.0439 -0.1684 -0.0255** -0.0459  -0.0786 
 (0.0241) (0.0234) * (0.2268) (0.0118) (0.0322)  (0.0889) 
INF    0.0239** -0.0065** .0442 .0035 -0.0172 0.0409 0.0917 
 (0.0105) (0.0232) (0.1582) (0.0117) (0.00248) (0.0883) (0.0544) 
GDP -0.0342 0.0717 -.1444 .0387* -0.0491 0.2825 -0.2092 
 (0.0361) (0.0442) (5064) (0.0222) (0.1109) (0.2451) (0.1703) 
SHTI 0.0558 -0.5719 0.3882 -.0814 -0.0807 -2.966 -0.0625 
 (0.2156) (0.3925) (3.459) (0.1975) (0.6773) (2.004) (0.5683) 
SHTI2 -0.0083 0.0750* 0.1688 .0028 0.0372 0.3080 -0.0262 
 (0.0216) (0.0413) (0.3404) (0.0208) (0.0612) (0.1939) (0.0455) 
Number of 
Obs 
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Table 4. 22Empirical Dynamic Results of GMM Estimation of the impact of interest rate on Jordanian 
Commercial banks Profitability and Risk-taking (2003 -2015). 
 (NIM) (ROA) (ROE) (Profit) (PM) (TCR) (PCL) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
L.NIM -0.124       
 (0.264)       
SIZE -1.507** -2.277* -6.154 0.302 -2.901** 1.079 -1.521 
 (0.562) (1.122) (10.98) (0.366) (1.222) (3.502) (2.328) 
CAP 0.0623* 0.238*** 1.068** 0.0120 0.279*** 1.206*** 0.329** 
 (0.0325) (0.0519) (0.428) (0.0284) (0.0563) (0.268) (0.119) 
DIV -0.0137 0.0598** 0.159 0.0045 0.0689** 0.0446 -0.110** 
 (0.0100) (0.0253) (0.265) (0.00490) (0.0314) (0.106) (0.0389) 
LEN 0.0086 -0.0405 -0.483 0.0062 -0.0482 -0.187 -0.304*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0364) (0.365) (0.0142) (0.0400) (0.147) (0.0205) 
PCL 0.0320 -0.126 -1.718 0.0134 -0.141 -0.560  
 (0.0534) (0.116) (1.101) (0.0410) (0.127) (0.436)  
TCR -0.0097 -0.0515* -0.372 -0.0001 -0.0545  -0.191** 
 (0.0157) (0.0271) (0.241) (0.0152) (0.0309)  (0.0853) 
INF 0.182** -0.197* -2.611** -0.0277 -0.267** 0.473 0.387 
 (0.0607) (0.0929) (0.994) (0.0660) (0.114) (0.397) (0.260) 
GDP 0.199 -0.482** -5.347*** -0.126 -0.639** 1.058 0.576 
 (0.116) (0.189) (1.765) (0.109) (0.244) (0.726) (0.445) 
SHTI 0.140 -0.430* -1.302 0.226 -0.693* -1.779 0.793 
 (0.214) (0.230) (3.220) (0.133) (0.360) (1.487) (0.567) 
SHTI2 -0.0021 0.0948*** 0.249 -0.0195 0.140*** 0.149 -0.0924 
 (0.0230) (0.0281) (0.431) (0.0163) (0.0412) (0.169) (0.0700) 
L.ROA  -0.361***      
  (0.0526)      
L.ROE   -0.131     
   (0.116)     
L.PROFIT    0.146    
    (0.187)    
L.PM     -0.311***   
     (0.0650)   
L.TCR      -0.0182  
      (0.145)  
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L.PCL       -0.0611 
       (0.0625) 
        
Observations 49 49 49 49 49 44 47 
Number of bank 13 13 13 13 13 11 12 
Where the dependent variables are: NIM is the Net Interest Margin, ROA and the ROE measured the 
profitability, Profit is the Total Profit, PM: is the Profit Margin, TCR is the Total Capital Ratio, PCL is the 
Credit Risk. The independent variables are: SIZE is the Bank size, CAP is the Capitalization, DIV is the 
Diversification, LEN is the Lending, GDP is the Real GDP Growth, INF is the Inflation rate, SHTI is the Short-
term interest rate. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.5 Summary and conclusion  
This chapter investigate the impact of competition, liquidity risk and market interest rate 
environment on the profitability of Jordanian banks’ using data for 13 commercial banks for 
the period 2003-2015. The chapter attempts to answer the following four questions: (1) do 
competitive conditions affect the profitability of Jordanian banks? (2) does liquidity risk 
affect the profitability of Jordanian banks? (3) do interest rates affect the profitability of the 
Jordanian banks? And (4) which market type monopoly, monopolistic competition or perfect 
competition, best represents the Jordanian banking sector? 
The analysis employed several econometric approaches to address the study questions 
and to ensure the robustness of the results. These methods include Pooled OLS, FE, RE, and 
GMM. We start our analysis by developing a Panzar-Rosse model for assessing the state of 
competition in the Jordanian banking sector (research question four). The results found that 
Jordanian commercial banks operate under monopolistic competition conditions. However, 
from 2004 onwards the concentration of the banking sector reduced slightly due to the entry 
of six new banks in 2004 and 2009 (Bank Audi, National Bank of Kuwait, Blom Bank, Jordan 
Dubai Islamic Bank, National Bank of Abu Dhabi and Al Rajhi Bank). 
This chapter fills a gap in the empirical literature about the Jordanian banking sector by 
investigating the impact of competition, risk and interest rate on Jordanian commercial banks 
profitability. For assessing the reform policies implemented since the 1990s that were 
designed to improve banking sector profitability, competition, and stability, the second and 
third parts of the empirical analysis investigate the impact of competition, liquidity risk and 
the interest rate on a set of profitability and risk measures (How, and in what ways have the 
competitive conditions in affected the profitability of Jordanian banks?, Does liquidity risk 
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have an effect on the profitability of Jordanian banks?, To what extent have changes in 
interest rates affected the profitability of Jordanian banks?) utilizing a broad list of control 
variables that capture bank-specific, market structure and macroeconomic characteristics. 
Liquidity risk was found to have a significant positive impact on profitability, while bank’s 
size, capital adequacy ratio, and equity to assets all reduced profitability measures. Interest 
yield is the main source of income for Jordanian banks and this corresponds to the positive 
relationship between net interest margin and profitability measures. The cost of funds and 
market concentration both have a significant negative impact on profitability measures. The 
negative effects of inflation on profitability reflect the inability of the banks to fully anticipate 
inflation and enhance their profits. Capitalization and size are the main risk determinants, 
wherein the former reduces risk while the latter encourages the risk-taking behaviour of the 
banks. The results support the favourable spillovers of the reform policies on the overall 
profitability and efficiency of the Jordanian banking sector which is clearly shown by the 
increasing number of banks which improving the competitiveness and it impacts on the bank 
performance, minimizing the concentration, decreasing the interest rate which encouraging 
lending that affecting investment activities positively. However, there is still a need to 
enhance market competition. The result also suggests that higher total banks’ assets may not 
necessarily lead to higher profits. Careful management is required for the larger number of 
deposits and the acquired capital by Jordanian banks due to the inward migration of Iraqi and 
Syrian refugees to Jordan.  
The positive change in the competitiveness state of the Jordanian banking sector 
corresponds to the entry of six new banks. The reported results are similar to the findings of 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Peria, 2010) who found a positive impact of competition on bank 
profitability. Our results confirm our hypothesis wherein liquidity risk has a significant 
positive impact. Our results are in line with (Bourke, 1989) who found evidence of a positive 
relationship between liquidity risk and bank profitability for 90 banks. The results suggest 
that short-term interest rate has no significant impact on profitability and risk measures. The 
result could be explained by the fact that the CBJ adopted low-interest-rate schemes during 
the reform phases, adversely affecting the banks’ lending behavior and the volume of their 
interest yields. As a result, Jordanian banks started to use a wide range of products and 
services to improve banks’ profitability and become less reliant on interest income. Interest 
yield is the main source of income for Jordanian banks and this corresponds to the positive 































The Relationship between Bank Efficiency, Capital and 
Risk: Evidence from Jordan’s Banking System 
5.1   Introduction 
 
The Jordanian economy is one of the smallest in the Middle East region, yet possessing one of 
the most developed and stable banking systems in the region. The Jordanian financial system 
may be  described as bank-based financial system in which banks play a vital role in financial 
intermediation, transformation of savings into investments, allocation of scarce capital 
resources, risk sharing and risk diversification. Over time, the central bank of Jordan (CBJ) has 
initiated many reform measures that have been primarily focused on making the banking 
system more stable and competitive. As a direct consequence, banks in Jordan had no other 
option than to increase their capitalization which culminated in the growth of related banking 
activities and increased asset growth demand which, in turn, demanded more bank specific 
capital. Many studies in the literature have argued that growing competition only serves to 
force banks to engage in more risky activities in order to position themselves at the ahead of 
the market (Hellmann et al., 2000, Salas and Saurina 2003, and Goddard and Wilson 2009). 
While it has also been argued that capital adequacy requirements, despite its advantage, creates 
conditions whereby banks are induced to undertake more risk-taking behavior.  In light of these 
issues, the purpose of this chapter is to examine whether there exists any relationship between 
bank efficiency/productivity, capital, and risk in the Jordanian banking system. The empirical 
analysis is based on the Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) method which we use to estimate a 
system of equations that employ different risk indicators for a sample of 13 banks covering the 
period 2003-2015. In so doing, this chapter seeks to answer three main related questions. First, 
whether efficiency, production, and capital are affected by variation in banks’ risk? Second, 
whether efficiency, productivity, and risk are affected by variations in bank capital? Third, 
whether capital levels combined with bank risk cause changes in bank efficiency and/or 
production? The importance of this study lies in evaluating the policy measures that have been 
enforced by the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) to liberalize the banking sector in the banks 
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attempts to improve bank efficiency1 and, on the basis of the issues will be examined, fills an 
important gap in the literature on banking efficiency in developing countries by using the 
Jordanian data. In the literature, only a few studies have looked at the efficiency of the banking 
sector in developing countries using Middle East region data (Olson and Zoubi, 2003);  
(Hussain and Hassan, 2005); (Caporale et al., 2017). The majority of studies have shown a 
preference to investigate these dynamic relations using data for a selection of developed 
countries using various approaches. Examples include (Rime, 2001), (Konishi and Yasuda, 
2004), (Stolz et al., 2004), and (Tan and Floros, 2013). Thus, the present study is an important 
addition to the existing body of studies reported in the literature since 2000. The rest of the 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides a brief review of the literature. Section 
5.3 presents a historical overview of the impact of regulatory measures on the risk analysis of 
the Jordanian banking system. Section 5.4 presents the data and methodology. Section 5.5 
presents the empirical results, and Section 5.6 provides the summary and conclusion. 
5.2 Literature review 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, more focus has been directed towards analyzing and improving 
the financial soundness of banking systems. The principal task of bank regulators has been on 
ensuring that banks are compliant with capital adequacy requirements. Capital adequacy 
measures the ratio of a bank’s capital to bank risk-weighted credit exposures. This ratio reflects 
the level of capital buffer at the bank that can support lending policies and mitigate potential 
losses. Creating a sound balance between bank capital and risk has become one of the main 
objectives of banks globally post the 2008 financial crisis. This was given added emphasis by 
the Basel III requirements, which concentrated the minds of banks to maintain the quality of 
bank capital base and increase the capital requirements of bank risk-weighted assets.  
In our review of the literature in Chapter five, several hypotheses were developed to 
                                                          
1 CBJ has applied several reforms to enhance the banking sector, such as the new banking, 
securities, and auditing profession law. As a result, total deposits and credit facilities of licensed 
banks has increased, contributing to the growth of commercial banks in Jordan. the CBJ has also 
increased loan guarantees for small and medium and entrepreneurs through the restructuring of 
the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation, and has increased funds available to them through the 
provision of CBJ funding programmes in certain industries primarily in technology, media, 
telecommunications and the service sector, with other ventures in agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, 




explain the relationship between bank risk, capital, and efficiency including the “bad 
management” hypothesis as stated by (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) and (Williams, 2004). 
According to their view, in-adequate monitoring and managing of credit and operations 
adversely affect efficiency and thus increase banks’ risk. The second theory is the “bad luck” 
hypothesis. External exogenous shocks increase loan-related problems and do not directly 
affect operations’ management and/or the bank risk-taking behavior (Berger and DeYoung, 
1997). However, risk increases do require additional managerial efforts and costs. And so, we 
would expect bank efficiency to have a negative relationship with risk. The third theory is the 
“moral hazard” hypothesis, which suggests that managers of less-capitalized and low-efficient 
banks tend to engage in riskier investment decisions than usual (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005). 
Based on this theory, we expect a negative relationship between bank risk and capital.  The 
theory of capital structure states that a higher use of debt (equity) financing within a certain 
range, might actually reduce (increase) firms' cost of capital. Thus, a positive (negative) 
coefficient estimate for equity-to-assets indicates an efficient (inefficient) management of 
banks’ capital structure. Besides, efficiency and competition between banks can influence the 
stability of the sector (Carletti and Hartmann, 2002). The link between competition and 
financial stability has been recognized in theoretical and empirical research. Indeed, 
competition affects the stability of the sector in the sense of either fragility or excessive risk-
taking (Geraldine and Weill (2008). Balanced portfolio theory also plays a vital role in the 
study of the performance of the banks. (Nzongang and Atemnkeng,2006). This theory states 
that decisions regarding the policy affect the optimal presence of each asset in the investment 
of shareholder which affected by factors such as rate of return, size of the portfolio and risks 
associated with the holding of each asset. High profits can be achieved by a possible set of 
liabilities and assets which are recognized by management and expenses incurred by banks. 
Bank performance affected by risk-return trade-off and the equity to asset ratio. According to 
financing theory, high levels of debt and low value of equity to asset ratio results in high risk 
which results in high rates of return which also explains the risk-return trade-off theory (Van 
Ommeren, 2011). Some studies explained that higher profits can be fetched by high equity to 
asset ratio. The market value of the bank increases with high equity ratio according to the 
signalling hypothesis (Berger, 1995). On the other hand, bankruptcy cost hypothesis states that 
banks hold high equity as a result of unexpectedly high bankruptcy costs to avoid financial debt 
(Berger, 1995). 
Many empirical studies have investigated the effects of regulation on banks’ efficiency, 
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capital, and risk. In these respects, (Kwan et al., 1997) found that operational efficiency is 
affected by bank risk-taking behavior and they argued that banks with more capital operate 
more efficiently than banks with less capital. Several studies found that the incorrect design of 
capital requirements leads to excessive risk-taking behavior by banks (Yehuda and Kahane, 
1977, Kim and Santomero, 1988, and Koehn and Santomero, 1980). While (Shrieves and Dahl, 
1992) and (Jacques and Nigro, 1997) found that having the desired balance between level of 
capital and risk depends on exogenous factors such as regulation, level of liquid assets, 
economic cycle, size, and profitability. In addition, (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992), (Jacques and 
Nigro, 1997), and  (Matejašák et al., 2009) all share the view that when the regulatory pressure 
increase, banks tend to adjust their capital ratio by increasing capital and decreasing their risk. 
However, (Stolz et al., 2004) and (Van Roy, 2005) have argued that regulatory pressures tend 
to increase banks’ risk-taking behavior. In contrast,  (Rob et al., 1999), (Godlewski, 2004), 
(Iwatsubo, 2007), and (Distinguin et al., 2013) note that changes in bank's capital and risk 
appear to be severely affected by the banks’ ex-ante capital level. (Distinguin et al., 2013) along 
with (Hussain and Hassan, 2005) showed that when considering the quality of capital, results 
vary according to the banks’ capital ratio, total regulatory capital, Tier-1 capital, or equity.  
Using a panel of US commercial banks and BHC data between 1986 and 2008, (Jokipii 
and Milne, 2008) found a positive relationship between short term adjustments in banks’ capital 
buffers and risk. They also showed that the adjustments of the relationship between capital and 
risk depend on the level of bank capitalization. On a related issue, (Eyssell and Arshadi, 1990) 
examined the wealth effects of risk-based capital requirement based on daily data for 27 banks 
with book asset levels ranging from $3.5billion to $155billion for the period 1986-1988 and 
found that at the time of the announcement of new risk-based capital regulations, the equity 
values of the largest publicly traded banks decreased, especially in  banks with deficient capital 
ratios. (Cooper et al. 1991) examined the effects of risk-based capital requirements on the 
banking system using weekly data of large international banks in the U.S., U.K, Canada, and 
Japan for the period 1985-1989 and found mixed results for equity returns in Japanese banks 
due to uncertainty among investors regarding the new risk-adjusted capital rules that were 
imposed. But in response to news announcements, a significant decline was observed in the 
equity returns of banks in the U.S., Canada, and U.K., with the largest reported decline being 
for U.S. bank stocks.  
(Ediz et al., 1998) examined the impact of risk-based capital requirements on banks' 
risk-taking behavior for a sample of U.K banks over the period 1989-1995. They utilized a 
135 
 
dynamic, multivariate panel regression models in which changes in capital ratios depend on 
the lagged level of the ratio, in addition to a set of control variables describing the nature of 
the banks’ decision-making systems, financial efficiency, and regulatory pressures. They 
found that banks met capital requirements by raising new capital rather than by alternating 
the loan composition in assets portfolio and that capital regulation could be considered an 
effective tool in reinforcing the stability of banks without disrupting banks' choices of 
lending. They also note that capital requirements does seem to affect bank behavior in 
comparison with the influence of the banks’ own internally generated capital targets.  
Using simultaneous equation modeling developed by (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992), 
(Rime, 2001) examined the impact of regulatory capital requirements on bank risk-taking 
behavior for a sample of Swiss banks for the period 1989-1995. Instead of the multibank 
holding company and leverage ratio, the authors developed a composite index of PCAU and 
PCAA to represent the regulatory variable. They also used the ratio of capital to total assets 
(ROA), and the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA). They found that regulatory 
pressure had a significant positive impact on the ratio of the bank capital to total assets, but 
no significant impact on banks’ risk-taking behavior. They also found a significant positive 
relationship between changes in risk and changes in the ratio of capital to total assets is found. 
PCAU is also found to have a significant positive impact on RWA but no significant impact 
on risk, while PCAA has no significant impact on both RWA and risk. Their results suggest 
that banks having lower capital than the minimum regulatory capital requirements take 
actions to raise capital adequacy ratio. Their findings also show that regulatory pressure 
increases banks’ capital without levying a significant effect on bank risk. For both alternative 
measures of capital (capital to risk-weighted assets and capital to total assets), they observed 
that bank size has a significant negative impact on capital and has a significant positive impact 
on risk. 
An Example of empirical evidence from developing countries is found in the work of 
(Alkadamani, 2015) who used data covering 46 commercial banks from 4 Middle Eastern 
countries during the period  2004-2014 to explore the relationship between capital and risk 
decisions. The author found that regulatory pressures increase both banks’ capital and the 
banks’ risk-taking behavior and that there was a positive relationship between banks’ 
profitability and capital. (Hussain and Hassan, 2005) empirically examined the impact of 
capital requirements on credit risk-taking using data from 11 developing countries and found 
that regulations had no effect on bank capital ratios. 
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Since the 2008 global financial crises, the CBJ has prioritized safety over profitability 
inside the Jordanian banking sector with less attention given to studying the impact of bank 
adopted safety measures on efficiency and productivity indicators of banks. This chapter takes 
up this issue by not only studying the relationships between bank efficiency/productivity, 
capital and risk using data for a sample of 13 Jordanian banks covering the period 2003-2015, 
on account of these issues, contributes directly to the literature.  
5.3 Background on risk analysis, efficiency and bank regulations in Jordan  
Jordanian banks have served as agents for the Jordanian government since the 1970s and 1980s. 
During these decades, the extensive involvement of the government in the banking sector has 
led to serious structural imbalances in the Jordanian banking and financial systems. For 
example, the rate of uncollectible loans of Jordanian banks’ portfolios reached 30 percent by 
the end of the 1980s. During the 1990s and in response to both the (WB) and IMF economic 
adjustment programs, the Jordanian government took steps to liberalize the financial and 
banking systems which resulted in measures to minimizing government direct lending, the 
removal of interest rates restrictions, promoting bank mergers and acquisitions, reducing 
foreign exchanging transaction restrictions, and increasing capital adequacy requirements. As 
a result, total deposits and credit facilities of licensed banks increased, reflecting the growth of 
commercial banks in Jordan. This led the IMF to note that “by the sheer size of their balance 
sheet, commercial banks play the most significant role” in Jordan’s financial sector.  
Jordanian banks are also the main funding source for both public and private sectors, 
with a capital adequacy ratio of 21 percent, which is well above the prudential requirement of 
12 percent. The CBJ’s deregulation of the financial system brought with it deregulated interest 
rates and credit allocations, foreign bank entry, and modern supervisory controls  (Bdour and 
Al-khoury, 2008). At the time, the imposition of these measures was seen as important as they 
meant that banking sector regulation, in particular, were broadly consistent with international 
norms. These regulations also affected bank payments, government securities transactions, 
loans, capital adequacy, risk-based provisioning, internal controls, liquidity management, and 
deposit insurance. More recently, CBJ supervision over Jordanian banks has intensified, as a 
result of the financial crisis, and has shifted from a risk-based approach to a rule-based 
approach. Within this new regulatory environment, banks have become subject to frequent 
inspections by the CBJ. And although this would seem to mark a turning point in the history 
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of the Jordanian banking system, only a few studies, such as (Maghyereh, 2008), have 
examined the impact of the recent reforms on Jordanian bank efficiency.  
5.4 Empirical Approach 
5.4.1 Data 
This chapter examines the magnitude and direction of the dynamic relationships between bank 
efficiency/productivity, capital and risk for 13 Jordanian commercial banks in response to the 
imposed capital requirements during the period 2003-2015. Data are sourced from ASE, ABJ, 
and CBJ, and the commercial Jordanian bank’s annual reports. Tables 5.1 present variables 
definitions and notations.  
Table 5 1 Variables’ definitions and sources 
Variable Notation Measurement Type  Source 





Loan-loss provision as a fraction to total loans 
Standard deviation of ROA 
Standard deviation of ROE 
Ratio between a bank’s return on assets plus equity capital/total assets 
and the standard deviation of the return on assets 
Bank-specific  Annual Reports 







pure technical efficiency 
scale efficiency 
productivity 
Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Capital CAP Book value of capital to total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Independent variables      
Profitability ROA Return on Assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Liquidity Liquidity Ratio of loan to total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Tax to pre-tax profit Taxation Ratio of tax to pre-tax profit Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Non-traditional activity OBSOTA Ratio of off-balance-sheet items to total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Labor Productivity LP Ratio of gross total revenue to number of employees Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Concentration CO3 The ratio of large three banks in terms of total assets to the total assets 
of the banking industry 
Industry CBJ 
Stock market development SMD Ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP  Industry CBJ 
138 
 
Inflation Rate INF Annual inflation rate Macro CBJ 
GDP Growth Rate GDP Annual GDP growth rate Macro CBJ 
 
5.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 5.2 report the variables’ descriptive statistics. Risk measures (LLPTL, VROA, VROE, 
and Z-score) have mean values of 0.70, 0.61, 2.70, and 6.71 and standard deviations of 6.96, 
1.34, 1.93 and 6.20 respectively. The mean value of bank TE1, TE2, TE3, TE4, and TE5 are 
100.42, 102.33, 100.31, 100.15, and 102.75 with the standard deviation approaching 6.99, 9, 
6.35, 4.62, and 10.74 respectively. Capital is, on average, 14.21 with a standard variation of 
6.35.  ROA is, on average, 1.43 with a standard variation of 0.71. Size is, on average, 9.14 with 
a standard variation of 0.49. The Liquidity mean is 43.83 with a standard deviation of 10.51. 
The taxation mean is 33.37 with a standard deviation of 45.33. The OBSOTA mean is 26.876 
with a standard deviation of 27.09. The LP mean is 4.93 with a standard deviation of 0.28. The 
C3 mean is 68.81 with a standard deviation of 3.70. The SMD mean is 8.51 with a standard 
deviation of 20.12. The GDP mean is 4.74 with a standard variation of 2.47. The Inflation mean 
is 4.14 with a standard variation of 3.44.  
 
Table 5 2Summary statistics (efficiency model) 
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TE1 169 100.429 6.9908 82 147.6 
TE2 169 102.337 9.0058 75.6 128.5 
TE3 169 100.313 6.3561 74.1 144 
TE4 169 100.153 4.6224 83.3 126.5 
TE5 169 102.758 10.7452 75.6 145.5 
LLPTL 166 .7004 6.9611 -83.91133 19.3130 
VROA 169 .6111 1.3440 .0389872 12.6512 
VROE 169 2.7062 1.9373 .3301969 10.6955 
Zscor 169 6.7125 6.2032 -.3890879 30.9862 
Cap 169 14.2102 6.3536 -31.35458 37.5247 
ROA 169 1.4343 .7122 -1.01 4.97 
Size 169 9.1438 .4973 7.824972 10.4126 
Liquidity 169 43.8393 10.5195 .2785299 60.2789 
Taxation 169 33.3723 45.3375 -36.23785 401.9836 
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OBSOTA 169 26.7696 27.0937 0 143.4858 
LP 168 4.9373 .2847 3.324286 5.6586 
C3 169 68.8130 3.7012 62.60214 76.0322 
SMD 169 8.5143 20.1217 .203627 150.9594 
GDP 169 4.7430 2.4796 2.3 8.53 
INF 169 4.1469 3.4460 -.7 14 
      
Note: statistics calculated using STATA 5.1. 
 
5.4.3. Efficiency and risk models 
Our empirical strategy draws on the insights of (Tan and Floros, 2013) and use the 3SLS 
simultaneous equations modelling to estimate the following models: 
       0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it t
it
Eff
BRisk Cap Bank Ind Mac
O
      = + + + + + +                                     (5.1) 
                     0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it
it
Eff
Cap Risk Bank Ind Mac
O
      = + + + + + +                          (5.2) 
                    0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it t
it
Eff
Cap Risk Bank Ind Mac
O
      = + + + + + +                              (5.3) 
where the subscript i indicate cross-sectional dimension across banks, while t reflects the 
time dimension. RISK is the proxy for the bank’s risk, CAP is the proxy for the bank’s capital 
and measured by the equity to total assets ratio. EFF/PROD is the proxy for the bank’s 
efficiency and measured using the Malmquist productivity index. Bank, Ind, and Mac are the 
bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors that influence the 
efficiency/productivity–capital–risk relationship, ѵt is a random error term. The purpose of 
Model 5.1 is to examine whether efficiency and/or production and capital temporarily existed 
prior to any variation in banks' risk, while Model 5.2 looks at whether risk, efficiency and/or 
productivity temporarily existed before variations in bank capital and Model 5.3 assesses 
whether capital levels combined with bank risk influence changes in bank efficiency and/or 
production.  
For measuring bank risk, we use four alternative measures – loan-loss provision as a 
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fraction of total loans ratio, volatility of ROA, as measured by the standard deviation of ROA, 
volatility of ROE, as measured by the standard deviation of ROE, and Z-Score, measured by 
the ratio between a bank’s return on assets plus the equity capital/total assets and the standard 
deviation of the return on assets. Bank capital is measured as the value of capital to total assets. 
We use the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) to calculate efficiency (Eff/O). Malmquist 
productivity index uses input and output distance functions to measure changes in productivity. 
The index is calculated based on s-technology and is expressed as follows: 
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=                                                              (5.4) 
 
In this study, we use the non-parametric methods represented by the Malmquist index 
proposed by (Malmquist, 1953) and later developed by (Douglas et al., 1982). This index 
measures total factor productivity between two banks or one bank over time. We also measure 
technical efficiencies using the non-parametric method, DEA. DEA technique utilizes the 
number of variables (inputs and outputs) and not their prices and thus does not require any 
relationship between inputs and outputs. Using more than one form of inputs and outputs of 
the Decision-Making Unit (DMU) is one of the DEA advantages (Graham et al., 2005). 
Defining and selecting banks’ inputs and outputs for the DEA method is based on one of three 
approaches, production approach, intermediation approach, and value-added approach. We 
also use the intermediation approach in the selection of inputs and outputs which defines the 
bank as an intermediary that transfers assets from surplus units to deficit units (Paul and 
Kourouche, 2008), (Alkhathlan and Malik, 2010). In calculating the index we use four inputs 
(number of full-time employees, total deposits, total assets, and interest expenses) and two 
outputs (loans and interest income) following (Varesi, 2015). Loans are considered one form 
of output from deposits (inputs) as noted by (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), (Lang and Welzel, 







Table 5 3Average DEA efficiency scores using Malmquist index (2003-2015) 
Year Effch (TE1) Techch (TE2) Pech (TE3) Sech (TE4) Tfpch (TE5) 
 Technical Efficiency Technological Pure Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency Total Factor Productivity 
2003 0.972 1.148 0.985 0.987 1.116 
2004 0.984 1.089 0.967 1.017 1.071 
2005 1.066 1.002 1.062 1.004 1.068 
2006 0.972 1.015 0.985 0.987 0.987 
2007 1.035 0.985 1.012 1.023 1.02 
2008 0.988 1.088 0.987 1 1.075 
2009 1.014 0.92 1.027 0.987 0.933 
2010 0.996 1.022 0.993 1.003 1.017 
2011 1.02 0.993 1.028 0.992 1.013 
2012 0.981 1.05 0.976 1.005 1.03 
2013 1.03 0.963 1.014 1.016 0.992 
2014 0.994 0.993 1.006 0.989 0.987 
2015 0.986 1.007 0.989 0.997 0.993 
Average  1.003 1.02 1.002 1 1.022 
Note: all Malmquist index averages are geometric means 
As presented in Table 5.3 the geometric mean of the DEA test shows that the technical 
efficiency of the Jordanian commercial banks (2003-2015) is 1.003 percent, which is higher 
for Jordan than in other developing countries. For example, (Yildirim, 2010) estimated the 
technical efficiency of Turkish banks at a value of 89 percent. The index scores show that the 
deregulation and liberalization of Jordanian commercial banking contributed positively to the 
technical efficiency rates over the sample period. The improvement of average technical 
efficiency score implies that banks on average produce the same amount of outputs with fewer 
resources. The scores also highlight the negative impact of external shocks, such as the 2008 
global financial crisis and the local economic downturns following the Arab spring in 2012– 
2015. The overall scores of the Malmquist index analysis also shows that Jordanian commercial 
banks benefited from deregulation and liberalization.  
Our study utilizes a set of control variables (definitions appear in Table 5.1) that 
influence the relationship between efficiency, risk, and capital regulations. The set includes 
size, bank profitability, taxation, non-traditional banking activity (OBSOTA), labor (LP), 
industry-specific concentration (C3), market development (SMD), GDP growth, and inflation. 
Estimation results appear in Tables 5.4-5.8. 
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5.4.5 Empirical methodology 
We estimate our models using the 3SLS structural equations method, which is widely used in 
the literature for estimating similar relationships, see, for example, (Tan and Floros, 2013) and 
(Rime, 2001). Since we suspect that endogeneity is an issue regarding the relationship between 
bank efficiency, risk, and capital, 3SLS is appropriate to solve this problem. 3SLS estimates 
systems of structural equations where some equations contain endogenous variables among the 
list of explanatory variables. These endogenous variables are then defined in the system as the 
dependent variables of the other equations in the system are independent variable in other 
equations. This method also enables us to define other endogenous variables other than the 
dependent variables.  
Due to this endogeneity, the error disturbances of the equations become correlated with 
the endogenous variables, which in turn violate the assumptions of OLS. This method uses an 
instrumental-variables approach to present consistent and unbiased estimations. Also, it utilizes 
the method of generalized least squares (GLS) to account for the error terms serial correlation 
across the equations. This method incorporates three steps, in the first step instrumented values 
for all endogenous variables are developed by regressing each endogenous variable on all 
exogenous variables in the system. Then we obtain an estimate for the error covariance matrix 
of the equations during step two. The final step applies GLS-type estimation using the 
covariance matrix of stage two using the instrumented values of stage one as the right-hand 
side endogenous variables (Greene, 2012).  
5.5 Results 
This section presents the 3SLS empirical results for the Models 5.1-5.3. We use four measures 
for bank risk (Z-score, LLPTL, VROA, and VROE) and utilize Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) in Table 5.5 to employ five efficiency types (technical, pure technical, technological, 
scale and total factor productivity).  
All five efficiency measures reduce risk levels (mainly z-score and LLPTL). As 
improvement in efficiencies and reflects adequate monitoring and managing of credit and 
operations that translates into lower risk levels. Scale and technical efficiencies are the largest 
and most robust moderators of risk levels. As such, a one unit increase in scale efficiency 
reduces risk (z-score) by 1.44 units at the 95 percent confidence level as Table 5.7 shows. 
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Considering the control variables in the technical efficiency table, Table 5.6, ROA has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on banks’ risk (z-score), capital and efficiency. 
Where for example, a one percent increase in ROA, increase risk, capital, and efficiency by 
4.63 percent, 5.9 percent and 12.61 percent at the 99 percent confidence level. Similar to (Tan 
and Floros, 2013), banks with high profitability rates are better able to raise and manage their 
capital efficiently. Risk (all measures) has a negative impact on capital and efficiency, which 
supports our second sub-hypothesis that risk reduces operational efficiency. Size negatively 
affects risk in line with (Anderson and Fraser, 2000). As larger banks are better able to mobilize 
resources and mitigate potential losses of financial crises and economic downturns.  
Liquidity only modestly improves technical efficiency, where one percentage increase in 
liquidity foster bank efficiency only by 0.42 percent at the 95 percent confidence level. 
However, when using LLPTL risk measure, liquidity tends to reduce efficiency by 1.72 
percent. Liquidity has a positive impact on the level of capitalization of Jordanian banks. While 
liquidity reduces banks’ risk in line with (Rahman et al., 2015). Others like (Kochubey and 
Kowalczyk, 2014) found a similar relationship indicating that banks tend to increase their 
liquidity following a decline in the capital ratio. Also, (Altunbas et al., 2007) found a 
significantly negative relationship between liquidity and the risk level. The high level of 
liquidity ratio based on the CBJ regulations reached 150 percent, which directly contributes to 
minimizing banks’ risk and protects them from financial and macroeconomic shocks.  
Off-balance sheet activities and taxation increase both banks’ risk (LLPTL) and capital. 
Regarding the former, the results show that undertaking these activities helps to increase capital 
and profits however with the cost of higher risks. Regarding taxation, the tax ratio in Jordan is 
very high amounting to 35 percent. Higher taxation paid by banks reduces bank capital and 
consequently adversely affects the managers’ incentives and efforts to control costs and this 
entails higher risk exposure levels. The results also show that capital reduces risk levels 
following our sub-hypothesis. It acts as a moderator factor for potential losses. 
Table 5.5 reports the results of the relationship between bank capital, technological 
efficiency, and risk in Jordanian banking. The results show that most of the variables are 
consistent compared with the findings in Table 5.4. But unlike the technical efficiency results, 
capital tends to increase risk and reduce efficiency when using VROA as a risk measure. Since 
the Jordanian banking market, according to (AL-Qaisi, 2018), is highly concentrated and 
operates under monopolistic competition, high levels of capital in such markets lead to a 
144 
 
decline in bank efficiency (Tan and Floros, 2013). Stock Market Development (SMD) has a 
positive impact on bank capital and pure technical efficiency, as it reduces risk (VROA and 
VROE) as shown in Table 5.6. The improvement in the Jordanian stock market, especially in 
stock pricing, trade size transparency, and volume, provides reliable information for the 
investors that help in decreasing wrong investment choices.  
Similar results are observed for pure technical, scale, and total factor productivity 
efficiency tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8. However, the negative impact of the concentration ratio (C3) 
on risk, capital, pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiencies become statistically significant 
as shown in Tables 5.6-5.7. Less competitive and concentrated bank markets lead to a decline 
in banks' operational efficiencies. Additionally, labor (LP) has a positive and statistically 
significant robust impact on risk and capital in Tables 5.6-5.8. A one percentage increase in 
labor increases risk and capital with 2.99 percent, and 19.24 percent respectively. The argument 
is that hiring highly productive labors require higher salaries, which in turn raise the need for 
a larger capital buffer to cover their expenses. This, in turn, increases the cost of input and the 
banks’ risk exposure in times of financial shocks. Regarding the macroeconomic indicators, 
inflation has a positive and robust effect on all efficiency measures. During inflationary periods 
in 2008, the number of depositors decreases because of the erosion on the value of money, 














Table 5 4Three-stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, technical 
efficiency and risk-taking in the Jordanian banking system. 
 Model where risk = Z-score Model where risk = LLPTL 
 Eq. (1) Y = Z-score Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = LLPTL Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  -1.103*** (0.0554) -2.719***  (0.111)  -5.078***   (0.863) -13.18***  (2.072) 
CAP -0.906***  (0.0455)  -2.464***(0.0911) -0.197***  (0.0326)  -2.595***  (0.275) 
TE1 -0.368***  (0.0150) -0.406***  (0.0150)  -0.0759***  (0.0114) -0.385***  (0.0399)  
SIZE -7.204**  (2.966) -7.949**  (3.240) -19.59**  (8.026) -2.486***  (0.733) -12.62***  (3.424) -32.75***  (9.332) 
Liquidity 0.158**  (0.0800) 0.174**  (0.0883) 0.429**  (0.218) -0.131***  (0.0185) -0.664***  (0.158) -1.723***  (0.388) 
Taxation 0.0194  (0.0138) 0.0214  (0.0152) 0.0527  (0.0375) 0.0113***   (0.00318) 0.0573***  
(0.0171) 
0.149***  (0.0450) 
OBSOTA -0.0312   (0.0447) -0.0344  (0.0494) -0.0848  (0.122) 0.0220**  (0.0105) 0.112**   (0.0535) 0.289**  (0.140) 
SMD 0.198**  (0.0911) 0.218** (0.101) 0.538**  (0.248) -0.0119  (0.0209) -0.0606  (0.108) -0.157   (0.279) 
LP -0.394  (5.230) -0.435  (5.772) -1.072  (14.22) 3.167***  (1.213) 16.08**  (6.402) 41.73**  (16.55) 
ROA 4.637***  (1.261) 5.116***  (1.404) 12.61***  (3.450) -0.258   (0.290) -1.309   (1.521) -3.397  (3.922) 
CO3 -0.770**  (0.363) -0.850**  (0.402) -2.094**  (0.989) 0.0310  (0.0832) 0.157  (0.427) 0.408  (1.104) 
GDP -1.104**  (0.505) -1.218**  (0.558) -3.001**  (1.376) -0.204*  (0.116) -1.034*   (0.596) -2.683*  (1.555) 
INF 0.0933  (0.204) 0.103  (0.225) 0.254  (0.554) 0.0331   (0.0475) 0.168   (0.242) 0.436 (0.629) 
Const. 167.5***  (41.57) 184.8***  (45.64) 455.4***  (112.7) 22.98**   (10.22) 116.7**   (47.95) 302.8**  (127.0) 
Obs. 131 131 131 129 129 129 
chi2 644.40*** 774.07*** 1133.22*** 142.59*** 113.36*** 109.51*** 
 Model where risk = VROA Model where risk = VROE 
 Eq. (1) Y = VOA Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = VOE Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  73.67** (36.08) 129.1***  (23.53)  5.272***  (2.004) 6.972  (9.434) 
CAP 0.0136***  (0.0051)  -1.752***  (0.484) 0.169***  (0.0639)  -1.802  (1.255) 
TE1 0.00775***(0.0013) -0.571***  (0.190)  0.0693  (0.0477) -0.461**  (0.201)  
SIZE -0.257**  (0.120) 18.89  (15.99) 33.11* (18.32) 0.833  (0.772) -5.348*  (2.950) -11.36 (9.079) 
Liquidity -0.0114***(0.0030) 0.842*  (0.432) 1.475***  (0.446) -0.0600***  (0.0144) 0.327***  (0.115) 0.478  (0.517) 
Taxation -0.000625(0.0005) 0.0460  (0.0398) 0.0807 (0.0669) -0.00390   (0.0026) 0.0220*  (0.0124) 0.0356  (0.0396) 
OBSOTA 0.00216 (0.0016) -0.159  (0.158) -0.279  (0.228) -0.00502  (0.0080) 0.0315  (0.0395) 0.0641 (0.0760) 
SMD -0.00671*  (0.0034) 0.494   (0.316) 0.866*  (0.453) -0.0349**  (0.0165) 0.191**  (0.0905) 0.286  (0.331) 
LP 0.775***  (0.196) -57.10*  (33.64) -100.0***  (32.85) 2.313**  (0.946) -11.43  (8.098) -11.82 (27.91) 
ROA -0.0896*  (0.0474) 6.602  (4.336) 11.57*  (6.230) 0.134  (0.228) -0.524 (1.343) 0.0915 (3.135) 
CO3 0.0181  (0.0136) -1.332  (1.107) -2.334  (1.766) 0.246***  (0.0645) -1.338***  (0.491) -1.948  (2.153) 
GDP 0.0798***  (0.0189) -5.882*  (3.047) -10.31***  (2.980) 0.175**  (0.0891) -0.925*  (0.530) -1.259  (1.846) 
INF -0.0154**  (0.0076) 1.133  (0.777) 1.984*  (1.044) -0.0431  (0.0358) 0.213   (0.210) 0.227  (0.594) 
Const. -2.913*  (1.638) 214.7*  (123.1) 376.0*  (202.3) -40.42***  (10.84) 231.2***  (52.41) 383.5  (284.1) 
Obs. 131 131 131 131 131 131 
chi2 146.65*** 13.06 75.16*** 101.09*** 40.27*** 4.77 
Where the dependent variables are: LLPTL, VROA, VROE and Z-score are the Risk measurements, TE1, TE2, TE3, TE4, TE5 are 
the Efficiency measurments, CAP is the Capital. The independent variables are: ROA is the Profitability, SIZE is the Bank Size, Liquidity is 
the Loan to total assets, Taxation is the Tax to pre-tax profit, OBSOTA is the Non-traditional activity, LP is the Labor Productivity, CO3 is 
the Concentration, SMD is the Stock market development, INF is the Inflation, GDP is the GDP growth. Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 5 5Three-stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, technological 
efficiency and risk-taking in the Jordanian banking system. 
 Model where risk = Z-score Model where risk = LLPTL 
 Eq. (1) Y = Z-score Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = 
LLPTL 
Eq. (2) Y = 
capital 
Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  -0.601  (1.579) 3.308***  (0.498)  -3.430   (3.185) 11.23**  (4.876) 
CAP -0.380  (0.523)  1.038  (1.813) -0.153  (0.117)  1.028  (1.822) 
TE2 0.291***  (0.041) 0.0409  (0.453)  0.0709***(0.0212) 0.0925  (0.217)  
SIZE -2.288  (5.402) -8.773***  (2.898) 5.475  (18.54) -2.076  (1.274) -11.76***  (3.016) 16.57  (20.28) 
Liquidity 0.106  (0.0694) 0.122  (0.136) -0.335  (0.241) -0.137***(0.0192) -0.430  (0.479) 1.598**  (0.713) 
Taxation 0.0131 (0.0151) 0.0240**  (0.0121) -0.0388  (0.0518) 0.0115***(0.0037) 0.0488*  (0.0277) -0.115  (0.0729) 
OBSOTA -0.0462  (0.0400) 0.00283  (0.106) 0.162  (0.137) 0.0218*  (0.0112) 0.0952*  (0.0548) -0.215  (0.173) 
SMD 0.123  (0.0868) 0.173  (0.149) -0.378  (0.305) -0.0216  (0.0226) -0.00679  (0.131) 0.339  (0.299) 
LP -4.457  (4.417) 0.986  (10.25) 15.78  (14.94) 2.621**  (1.180) 11.02  (7.827) -26.50  (19.86) 
ROA 3.283***  (1.073) 3.040  (4.701) 10.56**  (4.107) -0.490*  (0.296) -0.862  (2.199) 6.668  (4.156) 
CO3 -0.738**  (0.310) -0.614  (0.992) 2.392**  (1.091) 0.0106  (0.0840) -0.0332  (0.376) -0.228  (1.102) 
GDP -0.800*  (0.434) -0.930  (1.093) 2.519  (1.553) -0.158  (0.119) -0.880  (0.543) 1.301  (1.815) 
INF -0.115  (0.158) 0.112  (0.282) 0.432  (0.520) -0.0164  (0.0491) 0.128  (0.219) 0.439  (0.604) 
Const. 71.11  (58.63) 124.2*  (63.99) -212.2  (205.4) 8.574  (14.59) 85.37**  (37.10) -15.84  (206.2) 
Obs. 131 131 131 129 129 129 
chi2 101.25*** 41.61*** 49.48*** 128.99*** 35.46*** 10.03 
 Model where risk = VROA Model where risk = VROE 
 Eq. (1) Y = VOA Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = VOE Eq. (2) Y = 
capital 
Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  20.93***  (2.995) 138.7***  (50.37)  6.385**  (3.162) -19.30**  (8.181) 
CAP 0.0478***(0.0067)  -6.631***  (1.855) 0.144**  (0.0596)  2.544  (2.047) 
TE2 0.00720***(0.0016) -0.151***(0.0272)  -0.0475***(0.0137) 0.266  (0.183)  
SIZE 0.278*  (0.151) -5.828**  (2.928) -38.66*  (21.69) 0.608  (0.749) -4.691  (3.901) 9.529  (18.73) 
Liquidity -0.00941**(0.0040) 0.197**  (0.0858) 1.306*  (0.695) -0.0557***(0.0140) 0.362**  (0.166) 1.058*  (0.558) 
Taxation -0.0009(0.0007) 0.0201  (0.0146) 0.133  (0.104) -0.00429  (0.0026) 0.0290*  (0.0150) -0.0782  (0.0681) 
OBSOTA 0.0018  (0.0021) -0.0388  (0.0468) -0.257  (0.327) -0.00528  (0.0078) 0.0363  (0.0476) -0.0944  (0.169) 
SMD -0.0115**  (0.0045) 0.241**  (0.0947) 1.596**  (0.767) -0.0296*  (0.0167) 0.202*  (0.109) -0.536  (0.467) 
LP    2.741***  (0.910) -17.06  (11.94) 54.07*  (27.81) 
ROA -0.0649  (0.0598) 1.360  (1.226) 9.019  (8.290) 0.297  (0.222) -1.741  (1.923) 6.130  (4.750) 
CO3 0.0158  (0.0201) -0.331  (0.421) -2.194  (2.879) 0.259***  (0.0633) -1.661**  (0.765) 4.976**  (2.374) 
GDP 0.0999***  (0.0250) -2.090***  (0.551) -13.85**  (5.508) 0.156*  (0.0894) -1.061*  (0.631) 2.837  (2.483) 
INF -0.0253**  (0.0104) 0.529**  (0.220) 3.506**  (1.680) -0.0164  (0.0367) 0.144  (0.251) -0.225  (0.852) 
Const. -4.411**  (2.108) 92.34**  (41.35) 612.4**  (306.4) -29.73***  (9.071) 199.8***  (68.36) -547.2  (349.1) 
Obs. 125 125 125 131 131 131 
chi2 88.24*** 122.40*** 14.34 117.17*** 21.77** 8.55 
Where the dependent variables are: LLPTL, VROA, VROE and Z-score are the Risk measurements, TE1, TE2, TE3, TE4, TE5 are 
the Efficiency measurments, CAP is the Capital. The independent variables are: ROA is the Profitability, SIZE is the Bank Size, Liquidity is 
the Loan to total assets, Taxation is the Tax to pre-tax profit, OBSOTA is the Non-traditional activity, LP is the Labor Productivity, CO3 is 
the Concentration, SMD is the Stock market development, INF is the Inflation, GDP is the GDP growth. Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 5 6Three-stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, pure technical 
efficiency and risk-taking in the Jordanian banking system. 
 Model where risk = Z-score Model where risk = LLPTL 
 Eq. (1) Y = Z-score Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = 
LLPTL 
Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  -1.461***  (0.135) -2.917***  (0.144)  -6.422***  (1.050) -14.37*** (1.502) 
CAP -0.684***  (0.0627)  -1.996***  (0.175) -0.156*** (0.0244)  -2.237*** (0.315) 
TE3 -0.343***  (0.0167) -0.501*** (0.0439)  -
0.0696***(0.00691) 
-0.447*** (0.0624)  
SIZE -5.436**  (2.664) -7.943**  (3.796) -15.86**  (7.747) -2.164***   (0.661) -13.90***  (4.029) -31.09*** (9.480) 
Liquidity 0.119*  (0.0708) 0.173*  (0.104) 0.346*   (0.207) -0.138*** (0.0171) -0.889***  (0.192) -1.989*** (0.328) 
Taxation 0.0156  (0.0122) 0.0227  (0.0178) 0.0454  (0.0357) 0.0106***(0.00294) 0.0680***  
(0.0202) 
0.152***(0.0440) 
OBSOTA -0.0436  (0.0396) -0.0637  (0.0586) -0.127  (0.116) 0.0197**  (0.00969) 0.126**  (0.0628) 0.282**  (0.140) 
SMD 0.184**  (0.0807) 0.269**  (0.119) 0.538**  (0.236) -0.0142  (0.0193) -0.0913  (0.127) -0.204  (0.280) 
LP -1.285  (4.631) -1.877  (6.780) -3.747  (13.51) 2.997***  (1.122) 19.24**  (7.573) 43.05***  (16.45) 
ROA 4.691***  (1.117) 6.854***  (1.710) 13.68***  (3.298) -0.241  (0.268) -1.548  (1.776) -3.464  (3.906) 
CO3 -0.640**  (0.322) -0.936**  (0.473) -1.868**  (0.941) 0.0547  (0.0770) 0.351  (0.503) 0.785  (1.112) 
GDP -1.182***  (0.447) -1.726***  (0.662) -3.446***   
(1.311) 
-0.218**  (0.107) -1.399**  (0.703) -3.130**  (1.560) 
INF 0.0667  (0.180) 0.0974  (0.263) 0.194  (0.526) 0.0258  (0.0441) 0.166  (0.283) 0.371  (0.635) 
Const. 143.8***  (37.06) 210.0***  (54.20) 419.3***   (108.2) 18.53**   (9.170) 119.0**  (56.31) 266.2**   (129.5) 
chi2 131 131 131 129 129 129 
chi2 471.64*** 147.23*** 469.45*** 216.96*** 64.11*** 122.52*** 
 Model where risk = VROA Model where risk = VROE 
 Eq. (1) Y = VOA Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = VOE Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  56.90   (55.87) 135.0***   (20.28)  5.668***   (1.834) 4.872  (7.219) 
CAP 0.0174**   (0.0080)  -2.356**  (1.012) 0.167***  (0.0522)  -1.176  (1.047) 
TE3 0.00741***(0.0010) -0.422  (0.348)  0.0803  (0.0497) -0.543**  (0.255)  
SIZE -0.213  (0.131) 12.02 (21.98) 28.68 (19.49) 0.882   (0.696) -5.514*  (3.010) -7.896   (7.309) 
Liquidity -0.0112***(0.0029) 0.639 (0.582) 1.515*** (0.444) -0.0549***(0.0139) 0.312*** (0.112) 0.271   (0.400) 
Taxation -0.0007(0.0005) 0.0416 (0.0345) 0.0985 (0.0710) -0.00393 (0.0025) 0.0227* (0.0129) 0.0223  (0.0312) 
OBSOTA 0.0020  (0.0016) -0.115 (0.181) -0.275     (0.232) -0.00441  (0.0077) 0.0269  (0.0413) 0.0348  (0.0554) 
SMD -0.0073**(0.0034) 0.418 (0.359) 0.991** (0.469) -0.0363** (0.0161) 0.210**  (0.0915) 0.203   (0.258) 
LP 0.756***  (0.194) -42.97 (48.05) -102.0*** (31.62) 2.251**  (0.920) -12.22 (7.773) -7.232   (20.86) 
ROA -0.100** (0.0467) 5.708 (5.080) 13.52** (6.386) 0.0561 (0.233) -0.123   (1.408) 1.086  (2.253) 
CO3 0.0180 (0.0135) -1.029 (1.022) -2.437 (1.820) 0.233***  (0.0625) -1.327***   (0.481) -1.187   (1.664) 
GDP 0.0853*** (0.0187) -4.854  (4.450) -11.51***  (2.924) 0.207**    (0.0869) -1.200**  (0.522) -1.187  (1.426) 
INF -0.0155**  (0.00745) 0.881 (0.914) 2.089** (1.050) -0.0370  (0.0367) 0.189   (0.219) 0.0377  (0.449) 
Const. -3.249*  (1.698) 185.6 (115.9) 438.8** (223.7) -41.03***  (9.661) 244.5***  (53.98) 283.3   (224.9) 
Obs. 131 131 131 131 131 131 
chi2 169.73*** 6.28 55.75*** 107.06*** 38.35*** 7.98 
Where the dependent variables are: LLPTL, VROA, VROE and Z-score are the Risk measurements, TE1, TE2, TE3, TE4, TE5 are 
the Efficiency measurments, CAP is the Capital. The independent variables are: ROA is the Profitability, SIZE is the Bank Size, Liquidity is 
the Loan to total assets, Taxation is the Tax to pre-tax profit, OBSOTA is the Non-traditional activity, LP is the Labor Productivity, CO3 is 
the Concentration, SMD is the Stock market development, INF is the Inflation, GDP is the GDP growth. Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 5 7Three-stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, scale efficiency 
and risk-taking in Jordanian banking system. 
 Model where risk = Z-score Model where risk = LLPTL 
 Eq. (1) Y = Z-score Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = LLPTL Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  -0.717***   (0.224) -0.688**  (0.284)  -3.393   (2.674) -2.620   (2.943) 
CAP -1.390*** (0.480)  -0.961***  (0.173) -0.237  (0.208)  -0.843*** (0.276) 
TE4 -1.442**   (0.645) -1.040***   (0.183)  -0.233  (0.294) -1.138***  (0.350)  
SIZE -10.98*  (5.726) -7.902***  (2.846) -7.594**  (3.105) -2.736   (1.925) -10.88***  (3.268) -8.985*  (4.598) 
Liquidity 0.249** (0.124) 0.179**   (0.0791) 0.172**  (0.0812) -0.120***(0.0329) -0.378  (0.408) -0.282   (0.432) 
Taxation 0.0306 (0.0207) 0.0220*  (0.0133) 0.0211   (0.0135) 0.0125**(0.0051) 0.0459*  (0.0245) 0.0367  (0.0285) 
OBSOTA -0.0123  (0.0634) -0.00872   (0.0461) -0.00830 (0.0450) 0.0224  (0.0138) 0.0836   (0.0532) 0.0673  (0.0573) 
SMD 0.229*    (0.128) 0.165*   (0.0923) 0.158  (0.0969) -0.00967  (0.0267) -0.0204   (0.113) -0.0112  (0.106) 
LP 2.746  (7.606) 1.991  (5.224) 1.920  (5.029) 3.537**  (1.803) 13.45*   (7.467) 10.90  (8.163) 
ROA 3.575**  (1.716) 2.563*  (1.476) 2.458  (1.602) -0.495  (0.335) -1.805   (1.791) -1.436   (1.764) 
CO3 -0.972*  (0.519) -0.698*   (0.365) -0.670*  (0.378) 0.0156   (0.111) -0.0191   (0.426) -0.0407  (0.392) 
GDP -1.056    (0.685) -0.757  (0.534) -0.726  (0.557) -0.195  (0.129) -0.663   (0.629) -0.513   (0.649) 
INF 0.249  (0.278) 0.179   (0.198) 0.172   (0.194) 0.0626  (0.0576) 0.246  (0.206) 0.201   (0.198) 
Const. 310.2***  (113.3) 223.3***   (43.02) 214.6***   (47.37) 40.41  (44.20) 185.4***  (49.56) 160.3***  (41.87) 
Obs. 131 131 131 129 129 129 
chi2 23.03** 82.53*** 33.27*** 93.30*** 39.39*** 11.36 
 Model where risk = VOA Model where risk = VROE 
 Eq. (1) Y = VROA Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = VOE Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Risk  42.45*  (21.83) 31.14**   (13.53)  4.137***  (1.087) 5.180**  (2.284) 
CAP 0.0235**(0.0113)  -0.734***  (0.0965) 0.242***  (0.0648)  -1.253*** (0.259) 
TE4 0.0321** (0.0135) -1.363***  (0.186)  0.193** (0.0836) -0.798***  (0.159)  
SIZE -0.180  (0.161) 7.646  (9.975) 5.611  (6.836) 1.423  (0.870) -5.894**  (2.847) -7.384**   (3.683) 
Liquidity -0.0134***(0.0037) 0.569**  (0.272) 0.418**  (0.173) -0.0722***(0.0200) 0.299***  (0.0874) 0.374**  (0.153) 
Taxation -0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0362  (0.0268) 0.0265  (0.0193) -0.00576*(0.0033) 0.0239*  (0.0130) 0.0299*  (0.0179) 
OBSOTA 0.0017  (0.0020) -0.0754  (0.102) -0.0553   (0.0722) -0.00785  (0.0105) 0.0325  (0.0420) 0.0407  (0.0530) 
SMD -0.0073*(0.0040) 0.310  (0.206) 0.227 (0.143) -0.0409*  (0.0212) 0.169*  (0.0889) 0.212*  (0.129) 
LP 0.707***  (0.237) -30.02  (20.92) -22.03 (13.74) 1.922  (1.251) -7.949  (6.152) -9.947  (8.942) 
ROA -0.0654   (0.0550) 2.778  (2.726) 2.038  (1.930) 0.282  (0.288) -1.166  (1.224) -1.460  (1.600) 
CO3 0.0223   (0.0163) -0.949  (0.731) -0.696  (0.519) 0.274***  (0.0859) -1.134***  (0.394) -1.420**  (0.659) 
GDP 0.0782*** (0.0220) -3.321*  (1.900) -2.436**  (1.236) 0.181  (0.115) -0.748  (0.506) -0.936  (0.718) 
INF -0.0187**(0.0089) 0.792  (0.516) 0.581*  (0.349) -0.0694  (0.0467) 0.287   (0.197) 0.360   (0.270) 
Const. -6.049**   (2.857) 256.9***  (83.12) 188.5***  (57.20) -58.59***  (16.19) 242.6***   (41.43) 303.8***  (81.33) 
Obs. 131 131 131 131 131 131 
chi2 86.30*** 68.78*** 91.05*** 71.63*** 143.98*** 41.06*** 
Where the dependent variables are: LLPTL, VROA, VROE and Z-score are the Risk measurements, TE1, TE2, TE3, TE4, TE5 are 
the Efficiency measurments, CAP is the Capital. The independent variables are: ROA is the Profitability, SIZE is the Bank Size, Liquidity is 
the Loan to total assets, Taxation is the Tax to pre-tax profit, OBSOTA is the Non-traditional activity, LP is the Labor Productivity, CO3 is 
the Concentration, SMD is the Stock market development, INF is the Inflation, GDP is the GDP growth. Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 5 8Three-stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, total factor 
productivity and risk-taking in Jordanian banking system. 
 Model where risk = Z-score Model where risk = LLPTL 
 Eq. (1) Y = Z-score Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = 
LLPTL 
Eq. (2) Y = 
capital 
Eq. (3) Y = efficiency 
Risk  -0.0435 (0.624) 0.407 (1.724)  -2.593  (2.300) -6.299  (8.017) 
CAP -0.103  (1.247)  -2.713***  (0.714) -0.261  (0.246)  -2.788*** (0.742) 
TE5 0.135  (0.414) -0.335***  (0.0861)  -0.0745  (0.0962) -0.344*** 
(0.0826) 
 
SIZE 0.160  (11.99) -9.407***  (2.187) -26.12***  (8.718) -3.143  (2.435) -11.24***  
(2.567) 
-30.72**  (12.19) 
Liquidity 0.0838  (0.120) 0.0890  (0.0752) 0.202  (0.222) -0.125***(0.0290) -0.291 (0.347) -0.673  (1.176) 
Taxation 0.00767(0.0238) 0.0167*  (0.0100) 0.0422  (0.0320) 0.0122**(0.0050) 0.0364*  (0.0207) 0.0936  (0.0766) 
OBSOTA -0.0637(0.0552) 0.0309  (0.0548) 0.119  (0.150) 0.0230  (0.0141) 0.0714*  (0.0430) 0.187  (0.151) 
SMD 0.119  (0.174) 0.137  (0.0967) 0.317  (0.292) 0.00356  (0.0375) 0.0539  (0.0940) 0.180  (0.280) 
LP -5.813  (8.518) 6.053  (5.124) 19.82  (13.71) 3.565*  (1.826) 11.31*  (6.154) 29.74  (21.76) 
ROA 3.162  (2.534) 2.110  (2.272) 4.172  (6.569) -0.0362   (0.585) 0.674  (1.575) 2.480  (4.705) 
CO3 -0.566*  (0.342) -0.151  (0.394) -0.120  (1.117) 0.0564  (0.0888) 0.128  (0.336) 0.289  (1.027) 
GDP -0.856  (0.805) -0.627  (0.643) -1.284  (1.874) -0.299  (0.187) -0.991**  (0.486) -2.645  (1.713) 
INF 0.0356  (0.370) 0.286*  (0.161) 0.772*  (0.444) 0.103  (0.0944) 0.393**  (0.164) 1.093**  (0.512) 
Const. 56.59  (133.9) 108.0**  (42.56) 269.2*   (146.2) 25.55  (28.44) 102.9***  (30.25) 290.4***  (108.6) 
Obs. 131 131 131 129 129 129 
chi2 50.11** 55.82*** 24.03** 105.54*** 63.60*** 22.59** 
 Model where risk = VOA Model where risk = VROE 
 Eq. (1) Y = VROA Eq. (2) Y = capital Eq. (3) Y = 
efficiency 
Eq. (1) Y = VOE Eq. (2) Y = 
capital 
Eq. (3) Y = efficiency 
Risk  -21.36  (30.20) -65.33  (83.51)  8.597  (7.054) -22.25***  (6.645) 
CAP -0.0384 (0.0479)  -3.004***  (0.422) 0.112   (0.0749)  2.466  (2.267) 
TE5 -0.0129 (0.0149) -0.333***  (0.0475)  -0.0445***(0.0128) 0.373   (0.410)  
SIZE -0.743  (0.466) -17.58  (11.72) -53.25*  (31.85) 1.196  (0.832) -10.59**  (4.438) 26.32  (23.98) 
Liquidity -0.0069(0.00496) -0.133  (0.315) -0.411 (0.882) -0.0366**(0.0159) 0.318  (0.225) -0.811*  (0.485) 
Taxation 0.0002(0.000978) 0.0079  (0.0167) 0.0234  (0.0496) -0.0021(0.0030) 0.0196  (0.0217) -0.0482  (0.0759) 
OBSOTA 0.00410*  (0.00238) 0.0938  (0.0911) 0.285  (0.253) 0.0009(0.0087) -0.0059 (0.0831) 0.0218  (0.198) 
SMD -0.0005(0.00699) 0.0118  (0.184) 0.0291  (0.528) -0.0267  (0.0183) 0.234  (0.167) -0.589 (0.504) 
LP 1.100***  (0.346) 24.61  (26.33) 74.93  (72.35)    
ROA 0.0056  (0.0998) 0.464  (2.306) 1.316  (6.662) 0.690***  (0.260) -5.841  (6.692) 15.43***  (5.583) 
CO3 0.00824  (0.0157) 0.150  (0.502) 0.468  (1.437) 0.207***  (0.0725) -1.784  (1.512) 4.612**  (2.152) 
GDP 0.0547*  (0.0329) 1.065  (2.365) 3.287  (6.616) 0.132  (0.0993) -1.158  (0.881) 2.910  (2.667) 
INF -0.00531  (0.0145) -0.0649 (0.507) -0.213  (1.439) -0.0222  (0.0380) 0.199  (0.334) -0.488  (0.904) 
Const. 3.080  (5.218) 84.78*  (44.15) 253.6*   (140.0) -19.38*   (10.67) 170.7**   (80.34) -427.2  (328.9) 
Obs. 131 131 131 125 125 125 
chi2 115.23*** 81.38*** 62.34*** 84.81*** 10.69 19.28* 
Where the dependent variables are: LLPTL, VROA, VROE and Z-score are the Risk measurements, TE1, TE2, TE3, TE4, TE5 are 
the Efficiency measurments, CAP is the Capital. The independent variables are: ROA is the Profitability, SIZE is the Bank Size, Liquidity is 
the Loan to total assets, Taxation is the Tax to pre-tax profit, OBSOTA is the Non-traditional activity, LP is the Labor Productivity, CO3 is 
the Concentration, SMD is the Stock market development, INF is the Inflation, GDP is the GDP growth. Standard errors in parentheses 









5.6 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between bank efficiency/productivity, capital, 
and risk using data for 13 Jordanian commercial banks during the period 2003-2015. Our goal 
was to empirically address four hypotheses. And to that task, we applied four risk and 
efficiency measures in our three-stage least square structural equation modelling. And in the 
measurement of efficiency, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method.  
According to financing theory, high levels of debt and low value of equity to asset ratio 
results in high risk which results in high rates of return which also explains the risk-return 
trade-off theory (Van Ommeren, 2011). Some studies explained that higher profits can be 
fetched by high equity to asset ratio which suggested by the study empirical evidence that ROA 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on banks’ risk, while risk (all measures) has 
a negative impact on capital and efficiency. As suggested by the moral hazard hypothesis, 
managers of less-capitalized and low-efficient banks tend to engage in riskier investment 
decisions than usual (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005) and in line with Empirical studies of (Demsetz 
et al, 1997) and (Salas and Saurina, 2003) report a negative effect of capital on the levels of 
credit risk taken by banks. The empirical results show that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between risk (Z-score) and capitalization as found by (Tan and Floros, 2013) in 
the context of the Chinese banking industry and suggested the financing theory, high levels of 
debt and low value of equity to asset ratio results in high risk. The results also indicate that 
bank size tends to reduce both risk and capital. While both off-balance-sheet activities and 
taxation are found to increase both banks’ risk (LLPTL) and capital. (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 
1997) provide evidence that efficiency and capital are relevant determinants of bank risk. 
(Jokipii and Milne, 2008) found a positive relationship between short term adjustments in 
banks’ capital buffers and risk. This can be explained by the high concentration rate and the 
monopolistic nature of the banking market in Jordan. Stock Market Development (SMD) has 
a positive impact on bank capital and efficiency, while concentration ratio negatively affects 
risk, capital, pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiencies. Moreover, inflation is found to 
have a positive and robust effect on all efficiency measures.  
This chapter was one of the first attempts to assess the effects of the CBJ reforms and 
deregulation policies on the productivity of the banking system in Jordan. Our analysis 
provides robust evidence in favor of the positive effects of these reforms. Policies adopted by 
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the Jordanian banks such as the increase in their dependence on interbank funding and the 
capital reserve, as well as their enhanced access to the deposit market, all contributed to 
improvements in profitability, cost-efficiency, and the overall operational efficiency of 
Jordanian banks. Another important factor that contributed to enhancing the Jordanian banking 
system efficiency during the study period is the decline in total provisions, which reduced 
banks’ total expenses. The decrease in the NPLs have further improved banks’ overall 
operational efficiency. The themes of this chapter carry important implications for Jordanian 
policymakers, banks’ managers, ASE, and CBJ regulators. Mainly due to the major role of the 
banking system in economic development and growth, which also highlight the efficiency 
indicators as critical not only for decision-makers but also to bank managers who need to 
choose the right and appropriate regulatory environment. Improving the competitiveness of the 
banking sector is one dimension that requires the attention of bank regulators as it was found 
to be a significant factor in improving capital and efficiency measures and reducing risks in the 
Jordanian banking sector, in addition to contributing significantly to better access to credit by 
lowering financing obstacles for firms. Also, close attention should be given towards the 
development of the Amman stock market as it provides reliable information for investors that 
could help in decreasing wrong investment decisions and risk exposure. Jordanian banks are 
also suggested to further engage –cautiously- in the unconventional banks’ off-balance-sheet 
















The Impact of Bank Efficiency and Competition on Cost of 
Credit: Evidence from Jordan’s Banking System 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
The Jordanian economy is a mix of different sectors. The services, industrial and banking 
sectors are the most important and profitable sectors in Jordan and have a huge contribution to 
the economic development. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP) generated, the 
mentioned sectors greatly value the Jordanian economy.   
Despite its size, the country has one of the most developed and stable banking systems in the 
region. Looking at the development of the financial system, the Jordanian financial system may 
be categorized as a bank-based financial system in which banks play a pivotal role in financial 
intermediation, the transformation of savings into investments, allocation of scarce capital 
resources, risk sharing and risk diversification. One of the main roles of the country banking 
system is to provide households and business with the needed fund. the relationship between 
efficiency and competition on the cost of credit is one of the main subjects that have an impact 
on profitability and economic growth.  
The objective of this chapter is to empirically test the effects of bank efficiency and 
competition on the cost of credit for borrowing firms using pooled OLS, Fixed effect (FE) and 
Random Effect (RE) methods based on data from 118 firms. In so doing, this chapter seeks to 
answer the main question. Whether competition affects the cost of credit and how changes in 
bank efficiency affect the cost of credit? The importance of this study lies in evaluating the 
policy measures that have been enforced by the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) to liberalize the 
banking sector in the banks' attempts to improve bank efficiency and, on the basis of the issues 
examined, fills an important gap in the literature on banking efficiency in developing countries 
using Jordanian data. In the literature, only a few studies have looked at the efficiency and 
competition of the banking sector in developing countries using Middle East region data on the 
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cost of credit. To check for the robustness of the generated results, we use different proxies for 
efficiency measures. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 provides a 
brief review of the literature. Section 6.3 presents the empirical approach. Section 6.4 presents 
the empirical results, and Section 6.5 provides the summary and conclusion. 
6.2 Literature review 
After the financial crisis of 2008, the Central Bank of Jordan prioritized safety over profitability 
inside the Jordanian banking sector with less attention is given to studying the impact of bank 
adopted safety measures on efficiency and productivity indicators of banks.  A large body of 
empirical literature considers the influence of bank competition and efficiency on access to 
credit. Several studies have investigated how bank competition and efficiency influence access 
to credit (Beck et al., 2004); our work departs significantly from the existing empirical 
literature by focusing on the role of bank efficiency. The market power hypothesis, i.e. that 
greater bank competition is associated with better access to credit. For example, Beck et al. 
(2004) found a positive impact of bank concentration on financing obstacles. (Shamshur and 
Weill, 2019) found that bank efficiency reduces the cost of credit, where improvements in bank 
efficiency tend to be strongly associated with a lower cost of credit. (Sapienza, 2002) note that 
efficient banks are more able to offer borrowing firms’ loans at lower costs than their less 
efficient competitors. Using a sample of Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009) analyze the relationship between bank competition and credit 
availability, they found that greater bank competition is associated with lower credit 
constraints. For a sample of firms from 20 European countries, Ryan et al. (2014) examine the 
impact of bank competition measured by the Lerner index on credit. They found that bank 
competition diminishes credit constraints. 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995) found that lower loan rates are placed in the concentrated 
banking markets which supports the information hypothesis. In contrast, (Sapienza, 2002, for 
Italy; Kim et al., 2005, for Norway; and Degryse and Ongena, 2005, for Belgium) supports the 
market power hypothesis, and found a positive influence of bank concentration on loan rates. 
(Berger et al. 2005) and (Berger et al., 2017) found that large banks grant fewer loans to small 
businesses.  (Laeven et al. 2014) found that large banks can consequently focus on a different 
set of activities to small banks.  
 
Over the last two decades, the cost-efficiency of banks is a broad measure of bank 
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performance that has frequently been utilized in empirical banking literature. It measures the 
ability of a bank to operate at a lower cost by comparing its cost structure to that of a best-
practice bank. The goal of improving the performance of financial institutions links to bank 
efficiency. One the other hand, recently the effects of bank competition on economic welfare 
and growth have huge attention. Increased competition in the banking industry has dubious 
benefits due to the peculiar features of the industry. Bank competition can be detrimental to 
financial stability, and the information asymmetries influence the relationship between bank 
competition and access to credit ( Beck et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2009; Schaeck et al., 2009; 
Beck et al., 2013; Ryan et al., 2014 ).  
A conflicting prediction of the impact of competition on access to credit has been shown 
in the literature. Greater bank competition relaxes financing constraints and leads to lower 
lending rates suggested by the market power hypothesis which is in line with the general 
economic theory that suggests that greater competition is associated with lower prices. The 
information hypothesis arguing that increased bank competition bolsters financing obstacles 
and drives up lending rates it is assumed that lower competition increases the incentive for 
banks to invest in relationship lending. Thus, a higher level of bank competition lowers 
investment in banking relationships and impairs access to credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). 
The majority of studies have shown a preference to investigate these dynamic relations 
using data for a selection of developed countries using various approaches. Examples include 
(Shamshur and Weill, 2019); (Sapienza, 2002). Thus, the present study is an important addition 
to the existing body of studies reported in the literature since 2000. Therefore, this chapter 
focuses on determining whether variables such as size, tangible assets, competition, efficiency, 
and growth are affecting the cost of credit. Furthermore, it is hoped that investors can use the 
results to make better funding decisions and thereby in profitable listed industrial and services 
companies in Jordan. This chapter examines how bank efficiency and competition influence 
the borrowing cost of 118 Jordanian firms in the industrial and services sector and using data 
for a sample of 13 Jordanian banks covering the period 2003-2015, contributes directly to the 
literature due to the shortage of studies that address the relationship between Jordanian bank 






6.3 Empirical Approach 
6.3.1 Data 
This chapter examines the magnitude and direction of the dynamic relationships between bank 
efficiency/productivity and competition on the cost of credit for 13 Jordanian commercial 
banks in response to the imposed capital requirements during the period 2003-2015. For the 
cost of credit models, we have a sample of 1521 firm observations for 118 firms in the industrial 
and services sector of the Jordanian market. Data are sourced from ASE, ABJ, and CBJ, and 
the commercial Jordanian bank’s annual reports. Tables 6.1 present variables definitions and 
notations.  
 
Table 6 1Variables’ definitions and sources (cost of credit model). 
Variables  Measurement Type   Sources 
Dependent Variables      
Cost of Credit CostofCredit (financial expenses /total debt) –interbank 
interest rate. 
Bank-specific   Annual Reports 
Independent Variables      
Firm size Size Natural logarithm of total assets Firm-specific   Annual Reports 
Tangibility Tangibility tangible fixed assets /total assets Firm-specific   Annual Reports 
Competition Lerner Measure of market power in the banking 
market that compares output pricing and 
marginal costs.   
Bank-specific   World Bank. 
Concentration CO3 Assets of three largest banks as a share of 
total commercial banking assets 
Bank-specific   Annual Reports 
Efficiency TE1 Technical efficiency Bank-specific   Annual Reports 
 TE2 Technological Bank-specific   Annual Reports 
 TE3 pure technical efficiency Bank-specific   Annual Reports 
 TE4 scale efficiency Bank-specific   Annual Reports 
 TE5 productivity Bank-specific   Annual Reports 
Inflation Rate INF Annual inflation rate Macro  CBJ 








6.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 6.2 report the variables’ descriptive statistics. The mean value of bank TE1, TE2, TE3, 
TE4, and TE5 are 100.42, 102.33, 100.31, 100.15, and 102.75 with the standard deviation 
approaching 6.99, 9, 6.35, 4.62, and 10.74 respectively. Regarding the cost of credit models, 
firm size, cost of credit, and tangibility have mean values of 7.50, 4.05, and 36.07 and standard 
deviations of values 0.61, 7.24, and 27.52 respectively. Lerner and CO3 have mean values of 
37.21, 68.81301 and standard deviation values of 5.44 and 3.70 respectively. The five 
efficiency measures have mean values of 100.42, 102.33, 100.31, 100.15, 102.75 and standard 
deviation values of 6.99, 9.00, 6.35, 4.62, and 10.74 respectively. Inflation and GDP have mean 
values of 4.74, 4.14 and standard deviation values of 2.47, and 3.44 respectively.  
 
Table 6 2Summary statistics (cost of credit model) 
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cost of Credit 1,164 4.0596     7.2462     -6.495      101.93 
Firm Size 1,253     7.5044     .6147    5.7355   9.2513 
Tangibility 1,250        36.0709      27.5217     .0033   97.9373 
Lerner 1,521     37.2153  5.4468                 22     43.6557 
C3 1,521     68.8130 3.7012 62.6021 76.0322 
TE1 1,521     100.429 6.9908 82 147.6 
TE2 1,521     102.337 9.0058 75.6 128.5 
TE3 1,521     100.313 6.3561 74.1 144 
TE4 1,521     100.153 4.6224 83.3 126.5 
TE5 1,521     102.758 10.7452 75.6 145.5 
GDP  1,521     4.7430 2.4796 2.3 8.53 
 INF  1,521     4.1469 3.4460 -.7 14 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the main firm-level variables used in the econometric analysis.  
Note: statistics calculated using STATA 5.1. 
6.3.3. Efficiency and cost of credit models 
Our empirical strategy draws on the insights of  (Shamshur and Weill, 2019)  and use the 
pooled, FE, and RE modelling  used to estimate the models. TE, TE2, TE3, TE4, and TE5 is 
the proxy for the bank’s efficiency and measured using the Malmquist productivity index. 
Bank, Ind, and Mac are the bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors that 
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influence the efficiency/productivity and cost of credit relationship. We use the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI) to calculate efficiency (TE). Malmquist productivity index uses input 
and output distance functions to measure changes in productivity. The index is calculated based 
on s-technology and is expressed as follows: 
                          00
0
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In this study, we use the non-parametric methods represented by the Malmquist index 
proposed by (Malmquist, 1953) and later developed by (Douglas et al., 1982). This index 
measures total factor productivity between two banks or one bank over time. We also measure 
technical efficiencies using the non-parametric method, DEA. DEA technique utilizes the 
number of variables (inputs and outputs) and not their prices and thus does not require any 
relationship between inputs and outputs. Using more than one form of inputs and outputs of 
the Decision-Making Unit (DMU) is one of the DEA advantages (Graham et al., 2005). 
Defining and selecting banks’ inputs and outputs for the DEA method is based on one of three 
approaches, production approach, intermediation approach, and value-added approach. We 
also use the intermediation approach in the selection of inputs and outputs which defines the 
bank as an intermediary that transfers assets from surplus units to deficit units (Paul and 
Kourouche, 2008), (Alkhathlan and Malik, 2010). In calculating the index we use four inputs 
(number of full-time employees, total deposits, total assets, and interest expenses) and two 
outputs (loans and interest income) following (Varesi, 2015). Loans are considered one form 
of output from deposits (inputs) as noted by (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), (Lang and Welzel, 
1996), and (Ashton and Pham, 2011). 
The key firm-level variable is the cost of credit which measures the difference between 
the ratio of financial expenses divided by bank debt and the interbank interest rate. Bank debt 
is the sum of short-term and long-term debts (Altunbas et al. 2007). Using the implicit interest 
rate component as part of the variable is consistent with the fact that the majority of our sample 
consists of micro and small enterprises. These firms in general lack access to non-bank funding 
sources, thus loan expenses are their main funding costs. Following  (Shamshur and Weill, 
2019)  we use two firm-level control variables. The first is firm size (natural logarithm of total 
assets), since firms of different sizes have different financing needs and patterns. The second 
is tangibility (ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets). A greater share of tangible fixed 
assets facilitates credit accesses. We also consider two macro-specific control variables, GDP 
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and Inflation.  
Since our main goal is to analyse the impact of bank efficiency and competition on the 
cost of credit, we regress the cost of credit on the five efficiency scores and a set of control 
variables as shown in Models 6.2 and 6.3 below:  
                                        (6.2) 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑓𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝐶𝑂3𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡                                                                               (6.3) 
where y it is the cost of bank credit for firm i in year t; X is a set of firm-specific variables (firm 
size, tangibility); Z is a set of macro-specific variables (GDP, Inflation) and εit is a random error 
term. Our main independent variables are efficiency (TE1, TE1, TE3, TE4, TE5) and 
competition (Lerner Index) measures. The endogeneity problem is greatly reduced since bank 
efficiency is computed at the bank level, while the cost of credit is firm-level information 
obtained from a different data source. All models are estimated with Pooled OLS, FE and RE 
methods. Estimation results appear in Table 6.3 and 6.4. 
6.3.4 Empirical methodology 
We estimate our cost of credit models using Pooled OLS, FE and RE methods. We 
estimate five models incorporating each one of the efficiency measures as the main independent 
variables while controlling for a set of firm, industry and macroeconomic variables. We start 
our analysis by pooling the panel data and estimating it using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. This method ignores the firms' heterogeneities and un order to correct for this bias, 
we use both FE and RE approaches to account for the distinct nature of each firm and control 
for the unobserved fixed effects that are constant over time and correlated with the dependent 
variables, such as Jordan's geographical location and cultural norms. These methods capture 
the within-variation across firms and time-related shocks that affect all firms such as global 
financial crises (Bjorvatn and Farzanegan, 2013). We also use RE method, wherein the main 
difference between RE and FE is that RE uses GLS to produce the estimates while assuming 
that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors. As we using panel data, 
the FE and RE methods are the more appropriate way to estimate the coefficients of the 
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parameter and explain the relationship between variables. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Efficiency, Competition and cost of credit results  
Table 6.3 and 6.4, reports the OLS, FE and RE estimations results of Model 6.2 and 6.3. We 
divided the sample into to sub-sample; large and small firm size. The result show that firm size 
and GDP are the main moderators of the cost of credit in all models. Our results are in line with  
(Fungáčová et al., 2014). Small firms have limited access to credit facilities and they tend to 
incur larger loan costs when borrowing from banks relative to bigger firms. The negative 
coefficient of GDP implies that during periods of economic development the cost of credit 
tends to be smaller due to lower information asymmetries (Godlewski, 2004). A high Lerner 
index, which measures the extent of competition between banks, reduces cost of credit. 
According to the market power and information hypotheses which suggest that greater bank 
competition reduce loan rates. As competition intensifies the operational efficiency of the 
banks tends to improve. Efficient banks are more able to offer borrowing firms’ loans at lower 
costs than their less efficient competitors as (Sapienza, 2002) notes. Thus, bank efficiency has 
no significant impact on the cost of credit. Finally, inflation increases the cost of credit. During 
inflationary periods the value of money diminishes and this, in turn, forces firms to borrow 
more to sustain their operations. A large demand for loans prompts banks to levy higher charges 
for that credit, so borrowing costs rise. greater economic development tends to reduce the cost 
of credit. This might be explained by the fact that access to credit is easier in developing 
countries, so young, riskier firms are also able to obtain credit. 
The results show that no differences in findings in regards to the impact of variables on 
the cost of credit for both large and small banks. Th e only difference found with the Tangibility 
as the variable show a positive significant impact on the cost of credit in the large size firms 
while it is insignificant for the small size firms. The positive relation explained as the 
Tangibility defined as the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. A greater share of tangible 
fixed assets that could serve as collateral can contribute to easier access to credit and may 




Table 6 3OLS, Fixed and random estimations for the relationship between cost of credit, bank efficiency and competition. 
 Model where Efficiency = 
TE1 
Model where Efficiency = 
TE2 
Model where Efficiency = 
TE3 
Model where Efficiency = 
TE4 
Model where Efficiency = 
TE5 
 Pooled OLS RE Pooled OLS FE Pooled OLS FE Pooled 
OLS 
RE Pooled OLS RE 
Size -1.088*** -1.082** -1.082*** -1.858 -1.080*** -1.076** -1.099*** -1.088** -1.096*** -1.097** 
 (0.347) (0.525) (0.348) (1.410) (0.348) (0.525) (0.347) (0.528) (0.347) (0.512) 
Tangibility 0.0090 0.0084 0.0089 0.0085 0.0089 0.0083 0.0090 0.0084 0.0090 0.0083 
 (0.0075) (0.0103) (0.0075) (0.0169) (0.0075) (0.0103) (0.0075) (0.0103) (0.0075) (0.0101) 
TE1 0.0844 0.0706 -0.0784 -0.0886 0.112 0.0936 -0.0129 -0.0100 -0.0348 -0.0440 
 (0.0932) (0.0856) (0.0702) (0.0665) (0.105) (0.0968) (0.197) (0.180) (0.0760) (0.0704) 
Lerner -0.0794* -0.0852** -0.0867* -0.101** -0.0829* -0.0880** -0.0655 -0.0737** -0.0694* -0.0780** 
 (0.0428) (0.0393) (0.0443) (0.0407) (0.0432) (0.0397) (0.0401) (0.0368) (0.0409) (0.0377) 
CO3 0.150 0.150 0.197* 0.191* 0.146 0.146 0.141 0.143 0.162 0.169 
 (0.105) (0.0977) (0.116) (0.108) (0.105) (0.0975) (0.106) (0.0983) (0.114) (0.106) 
GDP -0.769*** -0.768*** -0.775*** -0.796*** -0.762*** -0.762*** -0.726*** -0.733*** -0.732*** -0.738*** 
 (0.133) (0.122) (0.132) (0.123) (0.129) (0.119) (0.131) (0.120) (0.125) (0.116) 
INF 0.167** 0.155** 0.216** 0.217** 0.179** 0.165** 0.143** 0.134** 0.165** 0.163** 
 (0.0683) (0.0627) (0.0908) (0.0869) (0.0713) (0.0655) (0.0627) (0.0575) (0.0792) (0.0733) 
Const. -1.022 0.666 12.22 20.13 -3.502 -1.412 8.853 8.789 9.698 10.61 
 (11.88) (11.46) (8.348) (14.89) (12.65) (12.14) (21.56) (20.09) (8.635) (8.850) 
Obs. 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 1,162 
R-squared 0.048 117 0.048 0.053 0.048 117 0.047 117 0.047 117 
Where the dependent variable is: CostofCredit is the Cost of Credit. The independent variables are: Size is the Firm size, Tangibility is the Tangibility, Lerner is the Competition, CO3 is the 









Table 6 4OLS, Fixed and random estimations for the relationship between cost of credit, bank efficiency (total factor productivity) and competition (Large and 
Small Companies 2003-2015). 
 Large Firm Size Small Firms Size 
 Pooled OLS RE Pooled OLS RE 
Size -.3382 -.3382 -18.939 -18.9396 
 (2.3028) (2.3028) (19.6208) (19.6208) 
Tangibility .0903*** .0903*** .0221 .0221 
 (.0230) (.0230) (.3240) (.3240) 
TE5 -.0481 -.0481 -5.5930* -5.5930 
 (.2026) (.2026) (3.3368) (3.3368) 
Lerner -.0908 -.0908 -.3265 -.3265 
 (.1142) (.1142) (1.7497) (1.7497) 
CO3 .0773 .0773 .5231 .5231 
 (.2922) (.2922) (5.1314) (5.1314) 
GDP -.4688 -.4688 6.5157 6.5157 
 (.3325) (.3325) (5.4854) (5.4854) 
INF .1417 .1417 3.4530 3.4530 
 (.2229) (.2229) (3.4414) (3.4414) 
Const. 7.1287 7.1287 650.305    650.305    
 (30.3846) (30.3846) (427.1104) (427.1104) 
Obs. 152 152 999 999 
R-squared 0.1490 0.5014 0.0058 0.3577 
Where the dependent variable is: CostofCredit is the Cost of Credit. The independent variables are: Size is the Firm size, Tangibility is the Tangibility, Lerner is the Competition, CO3 is the 







6.6 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between bank efficiency, competition on the 
cost of credit using data for 13 Jordanian commercial banks and 118 firms during the period 
2003-2015. In the measurement of efficiency, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
method. Unlike what was expected, the efficiency of the banking sector has no impact on firms’ 
cost of credit, other determinants such as firm size, bank competition, and GDP are found to 
be the main moderatos of the borrowing costs. Our results are in line with (Fungáčová et al., 
2014) 
This chapter was one of the first attempts to assess the effects of the CBJ reforms and 
deregulation policies on the productivity of the banking system in Jordan. Our analysis 
provides robust evidence in favor of the positive effects of these reforms. Another important 
factor that contributed to enhancing the Jordanian banking system efficiency during the study 
period is the decline in total provisions, which reduced banks’ total expenses. The themes of 
this chapter carry important implications for Jordanian policymakers, banks’ managers, ASE, 
and CBJ regulators. Mainly due to the major role of the banking system in economic 
development and growth, which also highlight the efficiency indicators as critical not only for 
decision-makers but also to bank managers who need to choose the right and appropriate 
regulatory environment. Improving the competitiveness of the banking sector is one dimension 
that requires the attention of bank regulators as it was found to be a significant factor in 
improving capital and efficiency measures and reducing risks in the Jordanian banking sector, 
in addition to contributing significantly to better access to credit by lowering financing 
obstacles for firms. Jordanian banks are also suggested to further engage –cautiously- in off-
balance-sheet activities as they contribute positively to banks’ capital, but at the cost of higher 
risk.  
Thus, our findings are of particular importance to policymakers who aim to design 
policies improving access to credit. Specifically, fostering bank efficiency could play an 
important role in financing the economy as a whole. The results show that minimizing the entry 
restriction of new banks improves competition the market, which will help lower the cost of 






Liquidity Funding and Risk-Taking Behavior of 
Jordanian Commercial Banks 
7.1 Introduction 
Before the global financial crisis of 2008, the banking sector in Jordan did not have a 
functioning credit risk management system and, as a result, many banks were found to be either 
ill-prepared to be well-positioned to safely manage and control the transmission of shocks to 
the financial system or inadequate. This was made more apparent by the excessive losses 
incurred by the Housing Bank (Jordan’s largest bank), due to the collapse of subsidiaries in 
neighbouring countries such as Syria. At the time of the announcement, banking officials 
announced that the financial losses incurred could have been avoided had there been in place 
internal credit risk management system capable of anticipating the occurrence of credit events 
that might threaten the financial viability of the bank. A credit event or credit risk is not the 
only risk faced by banks, since banks are exposed to various types of risk including market 
risk, and liquidity risk. While credit risk has received much attention in the literature, it was 
only at the height of the global financial crisis that researchers began to pay attention to the 
implications of liquidity risk for the financial system and the wider economy. Liquidity risk 
measures the ability of banks to cover their obligations and to expand their resources via 
acquiring new assets. This suggests that when one bank within the banking system fails to 
secure stable liquidity funding it creates a potential threat to the whole banking system.  
Banks generally face two types of liquidity risk. The first relate to liquidity funding, 
while the second relates to market liquidity. Liquidity financing refers to the sustained efforts 
of the banks to satisfy their commitments in due time. The capability of banks to manage this 
type of risk has in recent time become increasingly difficult, especially during times of financial 
market stresses and failure. For example, the collapse in the value of mortgage related assets 
has led to liquidity problems affecting entire financial systems. Such financial system failure 
has the potential to impede the ability of banks to meet immediate obligations thereby resulting 
in the failure of the banking system. It is for this reason why liquidity risk is considered one of 
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the main threats to financial system stability and, in turn, why maintaining liquidity buffer is 
touted as key strategy to mitigate these risks. Several studies, such as (Hong et al., 2014) report 
that banks’ failure in managing liquidity risk is one of the main triggers of the 2008 global 
financial crises, and (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) note that maintaining high levels of assets 
increase bank risk.  (Keeley, 1990), however, notes that deposits tend to decrease liquidity risk, 
while deposit insurance increase banks’ moral hazard. The point being that the ensued moral 
hazard can lead to a vicious cycle where banks might be tempted to make excessive risk-taking 
choices in order to fund their liquidity, thereby threating the bank’s stability. It is for this reason 
why studies such as (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) and (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) advocate 
the bank risk-mitigating effects of lowering liquidity funding risks.  
The purpose of this chapter is to first investigate the impact of liquidity funding 
measures on the risk of Jordanian commercial banks using Fixed (FE) and Random (RE) effects 
models. And the second is to analyze the impact of the deposit insurance scheme applied in 
Jordan on the liquidity creation of Jordanian commercial banks using the Difference in 
Difference (DiD) approach for the period 2003-2015. This study utilizes z-score as a measure 
of overall bank risk, liquidity creation as a measure of a bank’s default, and loan-loss provision 
and risk-weighted assets as measures of a banks’ assets quality. Our empirical analysis also 
incorporates a set of control variables to account for other factors that influence liquidity-
funding risks such as capital, size, interest rate, and selected macroeconomic variables. To 
check for the robustness of the generated results, we use different proxies for banks' risk 
measures. To the best of our knowledge, the analysis presented in this chapter is the first of its 
kind to shed light on the linkages between liquidity-funding measures and the risk-taking 
behavior of Jordanian commercial banks as well as the factors affecting their risk levels. 
Furthermore, the empirical results navigate the policies of decision-makers into the direction 
of effective risk-mitigation and management. Such careful formulation of policies will 
hopefully make the banking system less vulnerable to global and regional financial and 
economic shocks. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 summarizes the literature and the 
theoretical motivations for the aim of the study. Section 7.3 presents an overview of the 
institutional background of the Jordanian banking system. Section 7.4 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 7.5 presents the results and discussion. Finally, the conclusion is 
provided in Section 7.6. 
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7.2 Literature review 
Until recently, liquidity creation was not a focal theme in the empirical literature. Starting with 
the pioneering work of (Berger and Bouwman, 2009), who developed the first detailed liquidity 
development measure that includes all bank balance sheet items (assets, liabilities, equity, and 
off-balance sheet activities), as well as positive (both illiquid assets and liquid liabilities) and 
negative weights (liquid assets, illiquid liabilities, and equity) for measurement of liquid assets 
and liquid liabilities, which they applied to a panel of U.S. banks for the period 1993-2003. 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2009) report that in general liquidity creation increased over time and 
that in large banks the relationship between capital and liquidity creation is positive while the 
same relationship is negative for small banks. Others researchers such as (Fidrmuc et al., 2015), 
(Berger et al., 2016), and (Fungáčová et al., 2017) extend (Berger and Bouwman’s, 2009)  
approach to examine the determinants of liquidity creation and its consequences for financial 
stability. While (Lei and Song, 2013), (Fungáčová et al., 2017) have shown that size and 
deposit insurance may be among the reasons for the negative association between capital and 
liquidity creation which might explain why liquidity creation increases the probability of bank 
failure (Fidrmuc et al., 2015). On a related issue, (Berger et al., 2016) note that liquidity 
creation is sensitive to regulatory interventions and bailouts and to monetary policy depending 
on the general economic conditions, while (Hankir et al., 2011) suggests that bank size might 
be a key factor. Using data for Chinese banks, (Lei and Song, 2013) found a negative 
relationship between liquidity creation and bank capital and (Berger and Sedunov, 2017) point 
to macroeconomic variables such as economic growth as factors with the potential to foster a 
positive association between bank liquidity creation in the US.  (Fidrmuc et al., 2015) provides 
similar reasons for Russia.  
Turning to the determinants of risk, (Bluhm and Krahnen, 2014) argue that systemic risk 
increases with increase in liquidity supplies from central banks. (Cifuentes et al., 2011) and 
(Gauthier et al., 2012) note that capital adequacy, interbank assets, and illiquid assets are 
among the risk determinant factors. The risk absorption hypothesis suggests that when banks 
have higher risk tolerance, banks with more capital, are better able to absorb more risk, which 
allows them to create more liquidity (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993, Coval and Thakor, 2005, 
Repullo, 2004, and von Thadden, 2004). 
Studies such as (Peek and Rosengren, 1995) report evidence which suggest that lending 
activities decreased as a result of the reduction in bank capital ratios incurred from loan losses, 
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while (Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001) suggest that having more capital translates into larger 
liquidity creation. In contrast, (Gorton and Winton, 2005) cautions that increasing bank capital 
and deposits can cause a decrease in liquidity creation, while (Berger et al., 1994), (Hancock 
et al., 1995) and (Peek and Rosengren, 1995) report the presence of a negative association 
between bank liquidity creation and capital.  
In order to effectively manage liquidity risks, banks are required to maintain a buffer of 
liquidity as one means of protection against possible shocks. Recently, it has been shown by 
(Hong et al., 2014) that liquidity risk was one of the main contributors of the 2009-2010 bank 
failures. Based on the theoretical insights of (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) and (Wagner, 2007), 
bank risk and quality of assets were found to be  positively correlated and banks with higher 
deposits were characterized as having less funding liquidity risk, which the feeds into the bank 
risk-taking behavior. (Keeley, 1990) noted that deposit insurance can also feed into a bank’s 
risk-taking behavior.  
Following (Jensen, 1986) hypothesis, it may be argued that when bank managers have 
free cash flows, that they might be tempted to make poor investment decisions that increase 
bank risk taking behavior. In the literature, there does exists some evidence for the negative 
association between bank risk and lower funding liquidity risk. For example, (Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010) found that bank excessive lending behavior during times of access to large 
deposit funding contributed to the triggering of the 2008 global financial crises. And (Wagner, 
2007) notes that banking system instability increases with higher liquidity. However, 
(Marques-ibanez et al., 2014) have argued that low-interest rates increase banks risk behavior, 
while (Berger and Bouwman, 2012) report findings which indicate that the monetary policy 
effects on liquidity creation can be larger for small banks than for large banks. On the other 
hand. (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) found no such evidence of the impact of monetary policy on 
lending or liquidity creation. 
7.2.1 Theoretical motivation 
Our fourth empirical investigation well supported by existing theoretical frameworks 
in the literature. Starting with (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) who show theoretically the result of 
large amounts of deposit inflows, banks have lower funding liquidity risk and the bank 
managers take more risk by lowering the lending rate aggressively to increase loan volumes in 
order to enhance their own compensation. For example, if the bank's funding liquidity deficit 
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is sufficiently large, an audit should be performed to investigate managers’ decisions regarding 
the lending standard as a part of risk management. In relation to aggressive lending, banks may 
face a capital shortfall, which may trigger bank failure. The classical principal-agent theory, 
(Cheng et al. 2015) shows that risk-averse managers require higher compensation levels to 
work in riskier financial firms that put their wealth under greater uncertainty. Hence, to achieve 
the higher compensation levels required by managers to work in riskier banks, they follow 
aggressive lending strategies as a result of the large amounts of deposit inflows. We develop 
our core hypotheses in the subsequent section. 
7.3 Institutional background of the Jordanian banking system 
In 2000, Jordan deposit insurance corporation (JODIC) was established as a financially 
and administratively independent corporation to reimburse depositors with the maximum 
coverage limit of JD 50,000 per depositor. JODIC objective is maintaining the effectiveness of 
the explicit-limited deposit insurance system in Jordan as well as providing full protection to 
depositors. The ratio of insured depositors reached 97.4 percent of total eligible depositors by 
the end of 2018. All Jordanian banks and branches of foreign banks operating in Jordan are 
under the umbrella of JODIC. The ultimate objective of JODIC is managing the liquidation 
processes efficiently and forcing banks to adopt proper risk management policies. In 2015, the 
Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) informed the banks about a set of instructions for implementing 
the Basel III requirements. Starting with the regulatory capital components under the Basel III 
agreement, Jordanian banks were required to maintain the following measures as ratios of each 
bank risk-weighted assets (RWAs): minimum common equity capital (CET1) of 6.0 percent, 
maximum additional Tier-1 capital (AT1) of 1.5 percent, maximum Tier-2 (supplemental) 
capital of 2.0 percent, mandatory capital conservation buffer, equivalent to 2.5 percent, 
minimum capital adequacy ratio of 12.0 percent for banks inside Jordan and 14 percent for 
banks outside Jordan. Domestically-important systemic banks were also required to specify 
clearly the methodology for calculating the countercyclical capital buffer and the capital buffer 
required to enhance their methodologies for calculating capital levels in the event of operational 
risks by including the standardized approach, and to include a section for the calculation of 
leverage ratio (LR), and the recalculation of minority interest in regulatory capital. 
Following the implementation of the Basel III requirements, capital adequacy 
requirements has increased relative to levels that prevailed during the implementation of the 
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Basel II requirements. The high capital adequacy ratios for most of the Jordanian banks are 
attributed to the different methods of processing investments in other banks, insurance 
companies, and financial institutions. The main component of Jordanian banks' capital is CET1 
that includes high-quality capitals. According to the Basel III, there are limits to the deductions 
from regulatory capital, with only investments that are above 10.0 percent of CET1 for the 
investment bank. Whereas other investments should be included in the risk-weighted assets.  
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 show that the ratio of financial sector assets /GDP is close to 
the ratio of the banking sector assets to GDP amounting to 94.1 percent. The rate of financial 
sector assets to GDP is declined over time reflecting the economic and structural reforms 
during the study period. In 2007, the same ratio reached 160 percent in response to the global 
financial crises and correspond to the increase in insurance sector assets from 467 Million JD 
in 2006 to 546 Million JD in 2007.  
Figure 7. 1 The Jordanian Financial Sector Assets GDP (2003-2017). 
 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the declining trend of the share percentage of Jordanian bank assets to 
Jordanian GDP during the period 2003-2017. The highest value, 155.1 percent, was at the end 
of 2003 before it decreased to 110.5 percent at the end of 2016 as a result of the economic 
slowdown. Due to the 2017 modest growth rates, bank assets to GDP ratio started to increase, 
though the increase was temporary due to the political instability of neighboring countries, and 






























Figure 7. 2 The Jordanian Banking Sector Assets GDP (2003-2017). 
 
 
Table 7 1The Jordanian Financial and Banking Sector Assets to GDP (2003-2017). 
Year Financial Sector Assets FSA Banking Sector Assets BSA GDP FSA/GDP% BSA/GDP% 
2003 24600993368 24354128778 15701500000 156.6793 155.1070 
2004 27654935684 27360826500 17821100000 155.1809 153.5305 
2005 32326758291 30681845191 21086500000 153.3055 145.5047 
2006 37148152638 34819032775 24237600000 153.2666 143.6571 
2007 43039454268 40045732144 26815600000 160.5016 149.3374 
2008 47307300812 43357261576 29796600000 158.7675 145.5108 
2009 49950755209 46142487538 31956900000 156.3066 144.3897 
2010 52124970563 48477966019 34973100000 149.0430 138.6150 
2011 53618237189 50516950642 37686400000 142.2748 134.0456 
2012 53781256010 50851049780 39275400000 136.9337 129.4730 
2013 56464591349 53564754962 42802800000 131.9180 125.1431 
2014 59842710711 57154358829 44868100000 133.3747 127.3831 
2015 61992086490 54600231585 47133200000 131.5253 115.8424 
2016 61481192355 53468221280 48383500000 127.0706 110.5092 
2017 64117629063 60943120053 49102500000 130.5792 124.1141 
Source:  ABJ; CBJ (Stability Report). 
 
7.4. Methodology 
Our analysis starts with estimating our models using the constant coefficients (pooled 
regression) model. The basic results of the pooled models are problematic because they assume 
that our cross-sections are not heterogeneous and that the average values of the variables are 
constant across banks. To solve this problem, we use a fixed/random effects model (Brooks, 
2008). The fixed-effects model decomposes the error term into an entity-specific effect and a 
remainder error which varies over time and entities. The estimations results using FE, GLS and 
pooled OLS are reported in Tables 7.5 – 7.13.  
The random-effects model similar to the fixed-effects model proposes different 
intercepts for each entity and/or each time period to get rid of correlations between error terms. 





























since fewer parameters will be estimated; therefore, degrees of freedom are saved, since the 
GLS method of the random effects removes only exactly as much of the variation in the 
variables as is needed to remove the correlation in the error terms. To account for the problem 
of endogeneity of some right-hand side variables we use one-period lags of the independent 
variables. For example, reverse feedback effects can be found between bank risk measures and 
macroeconomic indicators. The argument behind using lagged values is that the current values 
of the dependent variable cannot influence the past values of the independent variables 
(Bjorvatn & Farzanegan, 2013). Time effects are separated by inducing first differences, that 
is with the assumption that time effects are varying over time. Second, the event has been 
controlled in the regression and from the sample by the dummy variable which captures the 
treatment/intervention effect. And even so, Fixed effects also controls for potential individual 
sample effects. For testing the impact of the deposit insurance scheme, we use the DiD 
approach. The estimations results appear in Tables 7.14 and 7.15. We compare changes in 
liquidity creation before and after the implementation of deposit insurance. DiD is typically 
used to estimate the effect of a specific intervention (deposit insurance scheme) by comparing 
the changes in outcomes over time between a group that is enrolled in a program and a group 
that is not. The DiD approach provides results that are robust to the potential endogeneity bias 
(Cao, Zhun et al., 2011).  
 
7.4.1 Data and empirical models 
This section empirically examines the nature of the relationship between Jordanian commercial 
banks' liquidity funding and risk-taking behavior using annual data during the period 2003-
2015. Our task is to test the four hypotheses earlier discussed in section 7.2.1. The first is that 
having low liquidity funding risk incentives banks to take risky decisions and increases the 
probabilities of banks default. The second hypothesis is that banks with high capital buffers are 
less risk-taking in response during the periods of low funding liquidity risks. The third 
hypothesis is that larger banks are less likely to face risks during lower funding liquidity times, 
and the final hypothesis is that the 2008 financial crisis caused banks to be less willing to make 
risky decisions to fund liquidity. The annual balanced panel data for 13 Jordanian commercial 
banks are sourced from ASE, ABJ, and CBJ, and the commercial Jordanian bank’s annual 
reports. The selection of the variables is based on the work of (Khan et al., 2017). Tables 7.2 and 
7.3 report the list of the variables, their definitions, and their descriptive statistics.  
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Table 7 2Variables’ description and definitions 
Variable Notation Measurement Type  Source 
Dependent Variables      
Liquidity Creation  LC Liquidity creation/total assets. Liquidity creation = 0.5 
×illiquid assets + 0.5 ×liquid liabilities −0.5 ×liquid 
assets −0.5 ×illiquid liabilities −0.5 ×equity 
Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Loan loss provision  LLP Loan loss provision/ total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Risk-weighted asset  RWA Risk-weighted asset/total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Z-scores  Z-scores Log [{return on assets + (equity/asset)}/standard 
deviation of return on assets] 
Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Independent variables      
Liquidity Funding Risk Dep Total Deposit /total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Capitalization CAP Total equity/total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Size Asset Natural logarithm of total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Profitability ROA Net income/total assets Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Profitability ROE Net income/total equity Bank-specific  Annual Reports 
Loan Loan Total Loans   
None Performing Loans NPL None Performing Loans   
Interbank Interest Rate IRB The interest rate on interbank transactions Macro CBJ 
Loan Interest Rate IRL The interest rate on loans Macro CBJ 
Monetary Policy Interest Rate MIR The repurchase rate 
  
Macro CBJ 
GDP Growth Rate GDP Growth rate of GDP Macro CBJ 
Unemployment Rate Unemploy unemployment rate Macro CBJ 
Inflation Rate INF Annual Inflation Rate  Macro CBJ 
Realized financial Crisis RFC measured by the use of a dummy variable    
Deposit Insurance Scheme JDIC measured by the use of a dummy variable    








Table 7 3Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LC 167 28.2883 9.8044 -1.4860 66.4363 
Zscor 169 6.7126 6.2033 -0.3891 30.9863 
LLP 153     0.4524 4816831 -0.3908 3.2434 
RWA 113     68.0309 10.7296 37.4421 96.2632 
Dep 169     74.2300 6.5468 54.1497 85.6735 
Loan 169 43.8407 10.5181 0.2785 60.2790 
CAP 169 13.2016 4.6503 -31.3546 21.9640 
Ass 169 9.1439 0.4973 7.8250 10.4126 
ROA 169 1.4344 0.7123 -1.01        4.97 
ROE 169 10.5228 5.5591 -2.24       39.84 
NPL 143     23.0830 84.4496 .2 650 
IRB 169     3.5822 1.3296 1.964       6.495 
IRL 169 8.7169 0.4759 7.59        9.48 
MIR 169 5.0962 1.5348 3.5         8.5 
UNM 169 13.2231 0.9244 11.9        14.8 
GDP 169 4.7431 2.4796 2.3 8.53 
INF 169 4.1469 3.4461 -.7 14 
Note: statistics calculated using STATA 5.1. 
The risk measures (LC, LLP, RWA, and Z-score) have means of 28.2, 0.45, 68, and 6.71 
and standard deviations of 9.8, 0.48, 10.72 and 6.20 respectively. The mean bank Dep is 74.2 
with standard deviation approaching 6.5. Loan is, on average, 43.8 with a standard variation of 
10.5.  CAP is, on average, 13.2 with a standard variation of 4.6. Size is, on average, 9.14 with 
a standard variation of 0.49. The ROA mean is 1.4 with a standard deviation of .71. The ROE 
mean is 10.5 with standard deviation of 5.5. The NPL mean is 23 with standard deviation of 
84.4. The IRB mean is 3.5 with standard deviation of 1.3. The IRL mean is 8.7 with standard 
deviation of .47. The MIR mean is 5.09 with standard deviation of 1.5. The UNM mean is 13.2 
with standard deviation of .92. The GDP mean is 4.74 with a standard variation of 2.47. The 
Inflation mean is 4.14 with a standard variation of 3.44.  
For calculating liquidity creation, we consider the following variables – the fixed assets, 
loan, intangible assets, investments in affiliates, other assets, cash, balances at banks and 
financial institutions, deposits at banks and financial institutions, trading investments available 
for sale, investments held to maturity investments, net deposits, loans and borrowing, other 
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liabilities, and total equity. Table 7.4 provides a summary of the list of determinants. Our 
empirical approach follows (Berger and Bouwman, 2009): 
Liquidity Creation = 0. 5 ×Illiquid Assets + 0. 5 ×Liquid Liabilities −0. 5 ×Liquid 
Assets −0. 5 ×Illiquid Liabilities −0. 5 ×Equity.                                                      (7.1) 
Table 7 4Summary of liquidity creation calculation: liquidity classification of bank activities. 
Illiquid assets *0.5 
Loans Retail Customers, Real Estate Mortgages, Corporate entities, SMEs, 
Governmental and public sector, Other loans 
Fixed Assets Land, Buildings, Equipment, furniture and fixtures, Vehicles, Computer, 
Other fixed assets 
Intangible Assets  Goodwill, Other intangible assets 
Investments in Affiliates & 
Financial assets at fair value through other 
comprehensive income 




Accrued revenues and interest, Prepaid expenses, Assets seized by the 
Bank, Assets seized by the Bank with customer right to recover, Cheques 
under collection, Other 
Liquid assets *-0.5 
Cash  
 
Cash in treasury 
Balances at central banks 
Balances at banks and Financial Institutions 
 
Current accounts and demand deposits 
Deposits maturing within or less than 3 months 
Other  
Deposits at Banks and Financial Institutions 
 




Shares listed on financial markets 
Bonds listed on financial market 





Held to maturity investments 
 
Treasury bills 
Governmental bonds or  
government guaranteed bonds 
Company bonds and debentures 
Other  
Liquid liabilities *0.5 
Deposits Banks and Financial Institutions Deposits 
Customers’ Deposits 
Other deposits 
Illiquid liabilities *-0.5 
Loan and Borrowing Borrowing from the Central Bank of Jordan 
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Other loans and Borrowing 
Other Liabilities Other liabilities  
Equity  *-0.5 
Total Shareholders’ equity   Paid-in capital 
Reserves 
Foreign Currency Translation reserve 
Revalution reserve for financial assets 
Retained Earnings and Proposed Dividends 
Other equity  
 
Our collection of dependent variables include provisioning for loan losses that capture 
the quality of bank assets  (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004, Athanasoglou et al., 2014, and Lee 
and Hsieh, 2013). Hence, the riskier banks’ assets are the higher the ratio of loan loss 
provisioning. Z-score is used to calculate bank risk, with the hypothesis that z-score value and 
bank stability are positively correlated (Athanasoglou et al., 2014, Houston et al. 2010, Laeven 
and Levine, 2009, and Ramayandi et al., 2014). To break down the cross effects amongst risk 
proxies, we multiply the values for banks’ z- scores by −1, such that a higher value indicates 
greater risk in all instances.  The following models 6.2 - 6.5 analyze the impact of the leading 
independent variable liquidity funding risk 𝐷𝑒𝑝 on Jordanian commercial banks liquidity 
creation 𝐿𝐶, bank risk-weighted assets 𝑅𝑊𝐴, loan loss provisions 𝐿𝐿𝑃, and z-score. The models 
also include a set of control variables. 𝑡 refers to the time span from 2003 to 2017, and 𝑖 denotes 
the number of banks 13, 𝐺 refers to country fixed effects and 𝑢 is the error term. 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽7 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑅𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝑀𝐼𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑈𝑁𝑀𝑡 +
 𝛽14 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑡 +  𝐺𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                        (7.2) 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽7 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑅𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝑀𝐼𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑈𝑁𝑀𝑡 +
 𝛽14 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑡 +  𝐺𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                     (7.3) 
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑅𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝑀𝐼𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 +




𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6 𝐼𝑅𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝑀𝐼𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝑈𝑁𝑀𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑡 +  𝐺𝑖 +
 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                                               (7.5) 
In order to test the impact of introducing the deposit insurance scheme on bank capital 
and liquidity creation, Model 6.7 is then developed to estimate coefficients of the ratio of 
LC/TA on a group of variables including CAP ratio and bank-specific factors. We estimate 
Model 6.7 using data before and after the introduction of deposit insurance scheme in 2000. 
Deposit insurance is assumed to decrease the liquidity creating role in influencing bank risks 
(Allen and Gale, 2004) based on the “risk absorption” hypothesis. Another hypothesis 
“financial fragility/crowding out” states that deposit insurance schemes do not reduce 
liquidity creation because insured deposits are less likely to be withdrawn. Differenced values 
are used for all independent variables to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem following 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2009). This model is estimated using the Difference in Difference 
(DiD) approach as follows: 
                                               ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  ∅∆Т𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  ∆ 𝑖𝑡                            (7.6) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable (liquidity creation), ∅ estimate the unbiased effect of the 
program, Т is the treatment dummy variable (deposit insurance scheme), when 𝑇=1 the 
individual i is participant of the treatment, and 𝑇= 0 if non-participant. δ is the coefficient of 
the independent variables and the ε is the error term. Applying the general DiD specification, 
we develop Model 6.7 as follows: 
∆𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1 ∆𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 ∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6 ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7∆ 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8 ∆𝐽𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                              (7.7) 
Our analysis also identifies the main determinants of funding liquidity risk. Deposits, in 
general, are used to measure banks’ funding liquidity risks. Higher bank deposits are 
hypothesized to reduce funding liquidity risk (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). However, in some 
instances and due to the deposit insurance, banks with larger deposits are found to be engaged 
in riskier decisions. Model 6.8 is used to analyze the impact of selected variables on the 
Jordanian commercial banks funding liquidity risk: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽7 𝐼𝑅𝐵𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑅𝐿𝑡 +  𝛽9 𝑀𝐼𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽10 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 +  𝛽12 𝑈𝑁𝑀𝑡 +  𝛽13 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝑡 +
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 𝐺𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                                     (7.8) 
Amongst the set of control variables in our models we use capital (CAP), where well-
capitalized banks are found to have low-risk assets portfolio (Altunbas et al., 2007). Bank 
Profitability is used as a performance measure, in which it is generally perceived to have a 
positive effect on bank capital via increasing the retained earnings and capital (Rime, 2001). 
Bank size is found to have a negative association with the volatility of asset returns (Boyd 
and Runkle, 1993). According to the theory, loans are found to be associated with higher rates 
of deposit funding. While high levels of non-performing loans are found to be associated with 
higher capital buffer and risk levels. Our set of control variables also includes GDP growth, 
inflation, unemployment, interest rates on interbank transactions, loans and monetary policy 





Table 7 5Empirical results of Pooled OLS, FE of the Jordanian commercial banks liquidity creation 
(2003-2015) 
 (LC) (LC) (LC) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS GLS FE 
LDep 0.2084 0.2084 -0.1078 
 -0.1365 -0.1365 -0.1576 
LLoan .4258*** .4258*** .2421*** 
 -0.0793 -0.0793 -0.0805 
LAsset -0.5559 -0.5559 11.0215 
 -1.6180 -1.6180 -8.2413 
LROA -2.5800 -2.5800 -0.1779 
 -2.1158 -2.1158 -1.9986 
LROE 0.1527 0.1527 -0.2271 
 -0.2524 -0.2524 -0.2395 
LCAP -0.3604 -0.3604 0.1442 
 -0.3544 -0.3544 -0.3641 
LNPL -.0201*** -.0201*** -0.0035 
 -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0074 
LIRB -0.0746 -0.0746 -0.3938 
 -1.5853 -1.5853 -1.3753 
LIRL 1.1535 1.1535 2.4794 
 -3.5421 -3.5421 -3.2745 
LMIR 0.5858 0.5858 -0.6839 
 -1.6032 -1.6032 -1.5095 
LGDP 0.4523 0.4523 1.0026 
 -0.7869 -0.7869 -0.7442 
LINF -0.1487 -0.1487 -0.1366 
 -0.2757 -0.2757 -0.2341 
LUNM -3.3424** -3.3424** -0.9880 
 -1.4264 -1.4264 -2.0061 
LRFC -2.2822 -2.2822 -2.3850 
 -2.3106 -2.3106 -1.9597 
Constant 36.6017 36.6017 -82.0588 
 -48.6087 -48.6087 -114.8152 
Observations 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.3575   
Adj R-squared    0.2779   
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Number of banks 13 13 13 
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Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the 
Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the 
liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, 
Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, IRB is the Interbank Interest Rate, IRL is the Loan Interest 
Rate, MIR is the Monetary policy interest rate, GDP is the GDP growth rate, UNM is the Unemployment rate, 
INF is the inflation rate, RFC is the Realized financial crisis, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance Scheme. Note: 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7 6Empirical results of Pooled OLS, FE of the Jordanian commercial banks LLP (2003-2015). 
 (LLP) (LLP) (LLP) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS GLSLS FE 
LDep -0.0060 -0.0060 0.0060 
 -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0096 
LLoan 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0039 
 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0049 
LAsset .1862* .1862* 0.4876 
 -0.0984 -0.0984 -0.4965 
LROA -.2647** -.2647** -.2471** 
 -0.1134 -0.1134 -0.1190 
LROE 0.0011 0.0011 0.0050 
 -0.0135 -0.0135 -0.0143 
LCAP 0.0254 0.0254 0.0359 
 -0.0193 -0.0193 -0.0220 
LNPL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 
LIRB -.2736*** -.2736*** -.2101** 
 -0.0844 -0.0844 -0.0824 
LIRL 0.0615 0.0615 0.0823 
 -0.1905 -0.1905 -0.1994 
LMIR .2042** .2042** 0.1489 
 -0.0860 -0.0860 -0.0915 
LGDP . -.0467617 . -.0467617 -0.0496 
 -0.0436 -0.0436 -0.0466 
LINF .0398** .0398** .0394*** 
 -0.0153 -0.0153 -0.0147 
LUNM 0.0774 0.0774 0.1278 
 -0.0773 -0.0773 -0.1211 
LRFC -0.0294 -0.0294 -0.0160 
 -0.1250 -0.1250 -0.1192 
Constant -2.4383 -2.4383 -6.8055 
 -2.7005 -2.7005 -6.9636 
Observations 124 124 124 
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R-squared 0.3341   
Adj R-squared    0.2486   
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Number of banks 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the 
Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the 
liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, 
Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, IRB is the Interbank Interest Rate, IRL is the Loan Interest 
Rate, MIR is the Monetary policy interest rate, GDP is the GDP growth rate, UNM is the Unemployment rate, 
INF is the inflation rate, RFC is the Realized financial crisis, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance Scheme. Note: 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7 7Empirical results of Pooled OLS, FE of the Jordanian commercial banks RWA (2003-2015). 
 (RWA) (RWA) (RWA) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS GLSLS FE 
LDep -0.1833 -0.2639 -.3235705** 
 -0.1949 -0.1750 -0.1562 
LLoan .4977*** .2151** 0.0650 
 -0.1136 -0.0924 -0.0811 
LAsset -4.9626** -3.6682 -35.0218*** 
 -2.2552 -3.7979 -13.0864 
LROA -0.4959 -2.5253 -3.7208 
 -3.4538 -2.7684 -2.4111 
LROE -0.2859 -0.0258 0.1084 
 -0.4391 -0.3528 -0.3042 
LCAP 0.2262 .90636* .9328** 
 -0.5612 -0.4811 -0.4728 
LNPL -.03264*** -0.0129 -0.0099 
 -0.0097 -0.0084 -0.0073 
LIRB -0.7349 0.1362 2.0048 
 -2.4893 -1.8014 -1.6275 
LIRL -0.9301 -3.1986 -5.4006 
 -9.8834 -7.1200 -5.9779 
LMIR -2.0590 -2.6824 -5.2055** 
 -3.9981 -2.8507 -2.5374 
LGDP 0.7967 0.5316 0.4961 
 -1.4925 -1.0596 -0.8841 
LINF -0.0230 0.0383 0.0255 
 -0.5135 -0.3692 -0.3125 
LUNM 0.8501 -0.0669 -2.5051 
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 -3.6958 -2.6311 -2.3136 
LRFC 0.1432 0.8414 0.5201 
 -4.3363 -3.1028 -2.6282 
Constant 113.8762 142.2711 501.6895***   
 -121.5409 -95.1537 -152.2763 
Observations 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.3543   
Adj R-squared    0.2592   
F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the 
Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the 
liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, 
Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, IRB is the Interbank Interest Rate, IRL is the Loan Interest 
Rate, MIR is the Monetary policy interest rate, GDP is the GDP growth rate, UNM is the Unemployment rate, 
INF is the inflation rate, RFC is the Realized financial crisis, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance Scheme. Note: 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7 8Empirical results of Pooled OLS, FE of the Jordanian commercial banks Z-score (2003-2015). 
 (Z-score) (Z-score) (Z-score) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS GLSLS RE 
LDep -.1814* -.0703    -.0703 
 (.0954) (.1139) (.1139) 
LLoan -.0225 -.0743 -.0743 
 (.0673) (.0664) (.0664) 
LAsset .6306 1.4419 1.4419 
 (1.3779) (2.2147) (2.2147) 
LROE -.3124*** -.2459** -.2459** 
 (.1035) (.1054) (.1054) 
LNPL -.0047 -.0007 -.0007 
 (.0061) (.0063) (.0063) 
LIRB -2.3452* -1.9194 -1.9194 
 (1.3405) (1.2148) (1.2148) 
LIRL 2.5483 2.4660 2.4660 
 (2.9815) (1.3171) (2.6942) 
LMIR 1.5203 1.1945 1.3171 
 (1.3203) (0.0936) (1.1945) 
LGDP .7594 .6379 .6379 
 (.6677) (.6026) (.6026) 
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LINF .19847 .1945 .1945 
 (.2351) (.2107) (.2107) 
LUNM 1.9986* 2.2118** 2.2118** 
 (1.1715) (1.1029) (1.1029) 
LRFC -1.0533 -1.0062 -1.0062 
 (1.9432) (1.7381) (1.7381) 
Constant -47.1137 -63.4813 -63.4813 
 (37.5145) (41.3831) (41.3831) 
Observations 130 130 130 
R-squared 0.2420   
Adj R-squared    0.1643   
F 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 
Number of banks 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the 
Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the 
liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, 
Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, IRB is the Interbank Interest Rate, IRL is the Loan Interest 
Rate, MIR is the Monetary policy interest rate, GDP is the GDP growth rate, UNM is the Unemployment rate, 
INF is the inflation rate, RFC is the Realized financial crisis, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance Scheme. Note: 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7 9Empirical results of Pooled OLS, RE of the Jordanian commercial banks’ liquidity funding 
(2003-2015). 
 (Funding Liquidity) (Funding Liquidity) (Funding Liquidity) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS GLS RE 
LLoan -.1491***   -.1008** -.1008** 
 (.0509) (.0438) (.0438) 
LAsset .4880    1.6575 1.6575 
 (1.0444) (2.7097) (2.7097) 
LROA 2.0854    .0975 .0975 
 (1.3969) (1.1338) (1.1338) 
LROE -.3275** -.2553** -.2553** 
 (.1666) (.1343) (.1343) 
LCAP -1.3204*** -.7682*** -.7682*** 
 (.2049) (.1885) (.1885) 
LNPL .0005 .0002 .0002 
 (.0048) * (.0041) (.0041) 
LIRB -1.7440 -1.9643*** -1.9643** 
 (1.0549) (.7776) (.7776) 
LIRL -3.4454* -1.8950 -1.8950 
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 (2.0276) (1.6613) (1.6613) 
LMIR 1.2916 1.0400 1.0400 
 (1.0648) (.8213) (.8213) 
LGDP -.5132 -.0209 -.0209 
 (.4865) (.3928) (.3928) 
LINF .1764 .1153 .1153 
 (.1833) (.1348) (.1348) 
LUNM -2.1945*** -1.2231 -1.2231 
 (.9423) (.8675) (.8675) 
LRFC 1.3107 .1842 .1842 
 (1.4649) (1.0859) (1.0859) 
Constant 154.6503 110.5548*** 110.5548 
 (27.4836) (42.4802) (42.4802) *** 
Observations 143 143 143 
R-squared 0.4685   
Adj R-squared    0.4150   
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the 
Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the 
liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, 
Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, IRB is the Interbank Interest Rate, IRL is the Loan Interest 
Rate, MIR is the Monetary policy interest rate, GDP is the GDP growth rate, UNM is the Unemployment rate, 
INF is the inflation rate, RFC is the Realized financial crisis, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance Scheme. Note: 




Table 7 10Empirical results of GLS, FE, and RE of the Jordanian commercial banks (liquidity creation, loan loss provision, risk weighted assets, and z-score) for 
the period 2003-2006. 
 LC LLP Z-score 
VARIABLES OLS GLS RE OLS GLS RE OLS GLS RE 
LDep 1.0005**    .3934   .3934    -.0143    -.0143    -.0143   -.0594       -.0594       -.0594       
 (.3611) (.4589) (.4589) (.0221) (.0221) (.0221) (.1035) (.1035) (.1035) 
LLoan 1.2349*** .5638    .5638    -.0250 -.0250 -.0250 -.1627 -.1627 -.1627 
 (.3054) (.3984) (.3984) (.0193) (.0193) (.0193) (.1039) (.1039) (.1039) 
LAsset 9.2836* 3.8092 3.8092 -.6013* -.6013* -.6013* -3.1601*    -3.1601*    -3.1601*    
 (5.2071) (9.1444) (9.1444) (.3331) (.3331) (.3331) (1.8441) (1.8441) (1.8441) 
LROA -5.7465*    -3.9550 -3.9550 .0305 .0305 .0305    
 (3.3924) (2.7664) (2.7664) (.2115) (.2115) (.2115)    
LROE .65906 .4775 .4775 -.0215    -.0215     -.0215     -.0764    -.0764    -.0764   
 (.3394) (.2992) (.2992) (.0212) (.0212) (.0212) (.0576) (.0576) (.0576) 
LCAP .61092 .1323 .1323 -.0141 -.0141 -.0141    
 (.8584) (.7400) (.7400) (.0516) (.0516) (.0516)    
LNPL .1899 .1070 .1070 -.0032 -.0032 -.0032 .0297   .0297   .0297    
 (.1900) (.18343) (.18343) (.01190)  (.01190)  (.01190)  (.0646)  (.0646)  (.0646)  
Constant -193.0002**     -65.8450 -65.8450 8.1909   8.1909  8.1909    36.0536   36.0536   36.0536   
 (66.007) (104.2056) (104.2056) (4.14026) * (4.14026) * (4.14026) * (20.9211) (20.9211) (20.9211) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.6465   0.4096   0.4572   
Adj R-squared    0.4815   0.1340   0.3064   
F 0.0126   0.2451   0.0370   
Prob > chi2  0.7574 0.7574  0.1668 0.1668  0.0097 0.0097 
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Number of banks 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the 
risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, Loan is the loan, 





Table 7 11Empirical results of GLS, FE, and RE of the Jordanian commercial banks (liquidity creation, loan loss provision, risk weighted assets, and z-score) for 
the period 2007-2009. 
 LC LLP RWA Z-score 
VARIABLES OLS GLS RE OLS GLS FE OLS GLS FE OLS GLS RE 
LDep 0.2754 0.2177 0.2177 -0.0103 -0.0103 .0823 **   -.4501** -.4501** -0.5061 -0.0199 -0.0265 -0.0265 
 -0.2090 -0.2205 -0.2205 -0.0167 -0.0167 -0.0337 -0.2154 -0.2154 -0.4158 -114253 -0.1235 -0.1235 
LLoan 0.2499 0.1517 0.1517 0.0050 0.0050 -0.0271 .4727**   .4727**   0.1122 0.0294 -0.0059 -0.0059 
 -0.1666 -0.1526 -0.1526 .0127681) .0127681) -0.0171 -0.1781 -0.1781 -0.2355 -0.0891 -0.0896 -0.0896 
LAsset -0.7423 -0.1830 -0.1830 0.3640 0.3640 1.9264 -12.1214***    -12.1214***    31.4667 -1.6149 -1.3223 -1.3223 
 -2.7034 -3.2381 -3.2381 -0.3918 -0.3918 -2.6136 -2.8770 -2.8770 -35.1219 -1.6978 -1.9756 -1.9756 
LROA -2.2277 -2.0044 -2.0044 -0.4324 -0.4324 -0.3815 -3.9372 -3.9372 -6.2448    
 -3.1179 -3.3827 -3.3827 -0.2723 -0.2723 -0.5497 -3.3191 -3.3191 -7.3269    
LROE 0.1282 0.1091 0.1091 0.0330 0.0330 .0946* -0.4822 -0.4822 -0.2600 -.3018 *   -0.1834 -0.1834 
 -0.4775 -0.4363 -0.4363 -0.0381 -0.0381 -0.0459 -0.5100 -0.5100 -0.6095 -0.1633 -0.1756 -0.1756 
LCAP -0.1803 0.0001 0.0001 0.0701 0.0701 .1678** -0.0387 -0.0387 0.8172    
 -0.6613 -0.6289 -0.6289 -0.0516 -0.0516 -0.0692 -0.7068 -0.7068 .9106676)    
LNPL -.0422***    -.0277**    -.0277**    -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -.0631***    -.0631***    -.0516**     -.0168** -.0178** -.0178** 
 -0.0110 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0117 -0.0117 -0.0181 -0.0071 -0.0076 -0.0076 
Constant 9.8244 10.3447 10.3447 -3.0101 -3.0101 -24.5666 202.9984***    202.9984***    -186.5980 13.5733 11.7018 11.7018 
 -29.2461 -32.7190 -32.7190 -3.3775 -3.3775 -23.4603 -30.5156 -30.5156 -321.6626 -17.6050 -19.7902 -19.7902 
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Observations 31 31 31 28 28 28 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.5330   0.3498   0.7759   0.2861   
Adj R-squared    0.3909   0.1222   0.7106   0.1488   
F 0.0075   0.2117   0.0000   0.0997   
Prob > chi2  0.1658 0.1658  0.1495 0.2038  0.0000 0.0745  0.2067 0.2067 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the 
risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, Loan is the loan, 
NPL is the None performing loans. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7 12Empirical results of GLS, FE, and RE of the Jordanian commercial banks (liquidity creation, loan loss provision, risk weighted assets, and z-score) for 
the period 2010-2015. 
 LC LLP RWA Z-score 
VARIABLES OLS GLS RE OLS GLS FE OLS GLS RE OLS GLS RE 
LDep 0.0095 0.0095 0.0095 0.0087 0.0086 0.0042 0.0845 0.0809 0.0809 -.3024* -0.2583 -0.2583 
 -0.1982 -0.1982 -0.1982 -0.0107 -0.0111 -0.0130 -0.2948 -0.2024 -0.2024 -0.1783 -0.1793 -0.1793 
LLoan .3998*** .3998*** .3998*** 0.0029 0.0003 -0.0082 .5155*** -0.0041 -0.0041 . .0312895 -0.0653 -0.0653 
 -0.1037 -0.1037 -0.1037 -0.0056 -0.0058 -0.0070 -0.1528 -0.1042 -0.1042 -0.1048 -0.1031 -0.1031 
LAsset -2.2590 -2.2590 -2.2590 0.2494 0.2374 -1.3479* -2.6420 -3.6662 -3.6662 2.1020 2.4421 2.4421 
 -1.9742 -1.9742 -1.9742 -0.1119 -0.1311 -0.7256 -2.8885 -4.5362 -4.5362 -2.0078 -3.5796 -3.5796 
LROA -3.5205 -3.5205 -3.5205 -0.2959 -0.3492 -0.3694 3.5013 -3.8042 -3.8042    
 -5.6255 -5.6255 -5.6255 -0.3038 -0.3124 -0.3586 -8.1480 -5.4190 -5.4190    
LROE 0.4479 0.4479 0.4479 -0.0142 -0.0076 -0.0067 -0.6770 0.4961 0.4961 -.5763** -.5492** -.5492** 
 -0.7696 -0.7696 -0.7696 -0.0415 -0.0429 -0.0484 -1.1138 -0.7446 -0.7446 -0.2307 -0.2601 -0.2601 
LCAP -0.6811 -0.6811 -0.6811 0.0152 0.0183 -0.0147 0.3377 1.2787** 1.2787**    
 -0.5778 -0.5778 -0.5778 -0.0313 -0.0325 -0.0442 -0.8377 -0.6024 -0.6024    
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LNPL -0.0125 -0.0125 -0.0125 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 -.0231* 0.0010 0.0010 -0.0035 0.0017 0.0017 
 -0.0086 -0.0086 -0.0086 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0124 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0088 -0.0080 -0.0080 
Constant 42.7662 42.7662 42.7662 -2.2853 -2.0916 13.8115* 61.4762 78.9640* 78.9640* -2.4658 -5.0977 -5.0977 
 -27.6643 -27.6643 -27.6643 -1.5232 -1.6713 -7.0767 -39.9898 -47.2200 -47.2200 -23.6546 -35.5336 -35.5336 
Observations 74 74 74 73 73 73 72 72 72 74 74 74 
R-squared 0.2674   0.2546   0.2219   0.1603   
Adj R-squared    0.1897   0.1743   0.1368   0.0986   
F 0.0034   0.0060   0.0197   0.0330   
Prob > chi2  0.0011 0.0011  0.0090 0.0175  0.3554 0.3554  0.1804 0.1804 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: LC is the Liquidity Creation, LLP is the Loan loss provision, RWA is the Risk-weighted asset, Z-scores is the Z-scores that measured the 
risk. The independent variables are: Dep is the liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured the profitability, Loan is the loan, 





Table 7 13Empirical Results of GLS, RE, and FE of the Jordanian commercial liquidity funding. 
 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2015 
VARIABLES OLS GLS RE OLS GLS RE OLS GLS RE 
          
Loan -.3322*** -.1698* -.1698* -.4619*** -.2472 -.2472 0245 .0713 .0713 
 (.1171) (.0882) (.0882) (.1555) (.1690) (.1690) (.0628) (.0602) (.0602) 
Asset 2.4704 -6.8010 -6.8010 .20697 1.4359 1.4359 -.0332 -.1883 -.1883 
 (4.3749) (1.0444) (1.0444) (1.6413) (2.3082) (2.3082) (1.2154) (2.1694) (2.1694) 
ROA -1.0615 -1.1233 -1.1233 .1038 -1.1362 -1.1362 -.9149 -8.0491* -8.0491* 
 (2.6256) (1.3342) (1.3342) (2.1375) (2.2177) (2.2177) (5.2607) (4.5369) (4.5369) 
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ROE -.0311 .0251 .0251 .0703 -.0368 -.0368 .3917 1.1994* 1.1994* 
 (.2706) (.1504) (.1504) (.3160) (.3255) (.3255) (.7422) (.6442) (.6442) 
CAP -.8316 -.6316** -.6316** -1.1010*** -1.1498 -1.1498*** -.8496* -.3432 -.3432 
 (.5370) (.3166) (.3166) (.3722) (.4105) (.4105) (.4515) (.4208) (.4208) 
NPL .0201 -.0034 -.0034 -.0084 -.0016 -.0016 -.0028 -.0049 -.0049 
 (.1225) (.1002) * (.1002) * (.0075) (.0078) (.0078) (.0052) (.0045) (.0045) 
Constant 77.3627** 151.425*** 151.425*** 108.0863*** 89.9315*** 89.9315*** 83.8535*** 77.9510*** 77.9510*** 
 (35.8412) (38.3463) (38.3463) (17.3922) (23.8700) (23.8700) (13.6695) (21.9078) (21.9078) 
Observations 34 34 34 33 33 33 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.6367   0.7120   0.2901   
Adj R-squared    0.5559   0.6456   0.2283   
F 0.0001   0.0000   0.0005   
Prob > chi2         0.0000 0.0000  0.0002 0.0002  0.0003 0.0003 
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Where the dependent variables are: Dep is the Liquidity funding risk. The independent variables are: CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE measured 
the profitability, Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 14A Empirical results for the impact of the deposit insurance scheme on the Jordanian banking 
liquidity creation using DID approach for the period (1995-2015). 
 D.LC D.LC 
VARIABLES  (Pooled) (FE) 
   
D.Dep 0.420*** 0.416*** 
 (0.121) (0.125) 
D.Loan 0.358*** 0.358*** 
 (0.0463) (0.0474) 
D.Asset -12.39* -13.79* 
 (6.823) (7.299) 
D.ROA 1.969*** 1.966*** 
 (0.619) (0.633) 
D.ROE -0.0888 -0.0884 
 (0.0690) (0.0706) 
D.CAP -0.541*** -0.538*** 
 (0.109) (0.112) 
D.NPL 0.0080 0.0079 
 (0.0068) (0.0069) 
D.JDIC -4.441** -4.373** 
 (2.053) (2.102) 
Constant 1.122** 1.183** 
 (0.549) (0.569) 
Observations 254 254 
R-squared 0.389 0.389 
Number of Bank 13 13 
Where the dependent variables is: LC is the Liquidity Creation that measured the risk. The independent 
variables are: Dep is the liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE 
measured the profitability, Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance 











Table 7 15B Empirical results of the impact of the deposit insurance scheme on the Jordanian banking 
liquidity creation using DID approach for the period (1995-2015). 
 (OLS) (FE) 
VARIABLES D.LC D.LC 
   
D.Dep 0.508*** 0.510*** 
 (0.0741) (0.0761) 
D.Loan 0.553*** 0.549*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0353) 
D.Ass -5.352 -9.054 
 (6.437) (7.476) 
D.ROA 1.844** 1.866** 
 (0.826) (0.842) 
D.ROE -0.215** -0.217** 
 (0.101) (0.103) 
D.CAP -0.440*** -0.441*** 
 (0.127) (0.131) 
D.NPL 0.00134 0.00138 
 (0.00326) (0.00331) 
Constant 0.380 0.554 
 (0.420) (0.458) 
Observations 130 130 
R-squared 0.719 0.733 
Number of Bank  13 
Where the dependent variables is: LC is the Liquidity Creation that measured the risk. The independent 
variables are: Dep is the liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE 
measured the profitability, Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, Scheme. Note: Standard errors 












Table 7 16 A The impact of the deposit insurance on the Jordanian Banking Liquidity Creation using 
DID approach for the pre and post-period of the scheme. 
 2000-2015  1995-1999  
 Pooled OLD FE Pooled OLD FE 
VARIABLES D.LC D.LC D.LC D.LC 
     
D.Dep 0.414*** 0.420*** 0.955*** 0.964*** 
 (0.129) (0.133) (0.176) (0.210) 
D.Loan 0.345*** 0.344*** 0.805*** 0.772*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0502) (0.116) (0.137) 
D.Ass -16.17* -17.62* -25.29*** -33.28*** 
 (9.089) (9.937) (8.124) (10.34) 
D.ROA 1.834*** 1.803*** 1.833 1.767 
 (0.654) (0.675) (2.224) (3.146) 
D.ROE -0.0811 -0.0817 -0.129 -0.103 
 (0.0736) (0.0756) (0.189) (0.248) 
D.CAP -0.538*** -0.526*** -0.540*** -0.693*** 
 (0.129) (0.134) (0.180) (0.239) 
Constant 1.462** 1.524** 1.350** 1.784** 
 (0.641) (0.673) (0.591) (0.716) 
Observations 193 193 47 47 
R-squared 0.400 0.404 0.749 0.758 
Number of Bank  13  13 
Where the dependent variables is: LC is the Liquidity Creation that measured the risk. The independent 
variables are: Dep is the liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE 
measured the profitability, Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance 











Table 7 17B: The impact of the deposit insurance on the Jordanian Banking Liquidity Creation using 
DID approach for the pre and post-period of the scheme. 
 2000-2015  1995-1999  
 Pooled OLD FE Pooled OLD FE 
VARIABLES D.LC D.LC D.LC D.LC 
     
D.Dep 0.508*** 0.510*** 0.508*** 0.510*** 
 (0.0741) (0.0761) (0.0741) (0.0761) 
D.Loan 0.553*** 0.549*** 0.553*** 0.549*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0353) (0.0346) (0.0353) 
D.Ass -5.352 -9.054 -5.352 -9.054 
 (6.437) (7.476) (6.437) (7.476) 
D.ROA 1.844** 1.866** 1.844** 1.866** 
 (0.826) (0.842) (0.826) (0.842) 
D.ROE -0.215** -0.217** -0.215** -0.217** 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.101) (0.103) 
D.CAP -0.440*** -0.441*** -0.440*** -0.441*** 
 (0.127) (0.131) (0.127) (0.131) 
D.JDIC 0.00134 0.00138 0.00134 0.00138 
 (0.00326) (0.00331) (0.00326) (0.00331) 
Constant 0.380 0.554 0.380 0.554 
 (0.420) (0.458) (0.420) (0.458) 
Observations   130 130 
R-squared 0.719 0.733 0.719 0.733 
Number of Bank  13  13 
Where the dependent variables is: LC is the Liquidity Creation that measured the risk. The independent 
variables are: Dep is the liquidity funding risk, CAP is the Capitalization, Asset is the Size, ROA and ROE 
measured the profitability, Loan is the loan, NPL is the None performing loans, JDIC is the Deposit Insurance 
Scheme. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.5 Results 
The analysis employed several econometric approaches to address the study questions and to 
ensure the robustness of the results. These methods include Pooled OLS, FE, RE, in addition 
to use different measure of risk. The selection between FE and GLS models is based on 
Hausman test results. The test confirms that FE model is more appropriate for the first three 
models (LC, LLP, and RWA) while GLS model is more appropriate for the last model (Z-
score). Due to a large number of results, as a rule of thumb, we report only the results that are 
significant and robust across at least two of the estimations methodologies. The ratio of total 
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equity to total assets (CAP) is significant and positively correlated with RWA (credit risk) with 
a coefficient of 0.93 suggesting that Jordanian banks with larger capital engage in more risky 
actions than other banks (Table 7.7). Size is positively correlated with risk-weighted assets 
with a coefficient of 35.02 indicating that the size of the bank increased its credit risk (Table 
7.7). The results are in line with the findings of (Boyd and Runkle, 1993), (Demsetz and 
Strahan, 1997), and (De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). There is a significant robust positive 
relationship between loan and liquidity creation as shown in Table 7.5. This result is consistent 
with the implications of short-term liquidity for bank risk-taking and bank stability, the 
theoretical predictions of (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) and (Wagner, 2007) suggest that high 
levels of asset liquidity can potentially increase bank risk. Deposits shield banks from "run" 
risk and banks with higher deposits have less funding liquidity risk, which in turn reduces 
market discipline and leads to greater risk-taking by banks and the findings of (Acharya and 
Naqvi’s, 2012) who note that increased deposit funding increased both liquidity creation and 
risk-weighted assets. NPL negatively affect liquidity creation, where one unit increase in the 
rate of NPL, reduces LC by -0.020 in the FE model in Table 7.5. The estimation results show 
that MIR has a significant positive relationship with LLP. One unit increase in MIR leads to 
0.20 increase in the LLP. The low-interest-rate in the Jordanian banking reduces the volume of 
bank deposits that feeds into lower risk levels. 
ASS, MIR, and INF are positively correlated with banks’ loan loss prevention, while 
ROA and IRB are the negative regressors. Loan is positively correlated with liquidity creation 
as shown in Table 7.5. This result suggests that the excessive lending behavior of Jordanian 
commercial banks increases the chances of credit and default risks. In line with (Acharya and 
Naqvi’s, 2012) who showed that increasing deposit funding increased both liquidity creation 
and risk-weighted assets. Both ROA and ROE have a negative relationship with loan loss 
provisions and z-score. In Table 7.6, for example, a one-unit increase in ROA decreases LLP 
with a coefficient value of 0.247. High capital adequacy ratios and high profits enhance banks’ 
capacity to increase provisions and mitigate potential losses out of any financial shocks. 
Interbank interest rates are shown to reduce bank risk as captured by LLP in Table 7.6. This 
finding is in line with (Khan et al., 2017). Unemployment and inflation feed into higher bank 
risks as shown in Tables 7.6 and 7.8. Macroeconomic imbalances adversely affect individuals’ 
credit profile and make them less likely to repay their obligations to the banks which directly 
increase banks' risk.  
Turning to results for the liquidity funding risk model shown in Table 7.9, the results 
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show that there is a significant negative relationship between loan, ROE, CAP, IRB and 
funding liquidity risk with coefficients of 0.10, 0.25, 0.76, and 1.96 respectively. These 
findings suggest that an increase in the capital buffer and profit decrease liquidity funding risk 
and are in line with previous results that confirm that well-capitalized banks with high-profit 
profiles are better protected against shocks (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005) the results in line with 
results of (Tan and Floros, 2013) in the context of the Chinese banking industry and suggested 
by the financing theory, high levels of debt and low value of equity to asset ratio results in high 
risk. 
Theoretically, the relationship between the liquidity of bank assets and banking stability 
modelled by (Wagner, 2007) who finds that during financial crises but not during normal times 
increased liquidity of bank assets reduces banking stability. In line with our results. Tables 7.10 
- 7.12 displays the results for the 3 sub-periods: before, during and after the global financial 
crises. The results show that before the 2008 crises, size negatively impacted the Jordanian 
banking sector risk-taking (LLP and z-score) with a coefficient of 0.60 and 3.16 respectively 
(Table 7.10). The results indicate that the larger Jordanian banks are safer and more stable in 
line with (Boyd and Runkle, 1993), (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997), and (De Haan and 
Poghosyan, 2012). During the global financial crises, NPL is shown to have a negative and 
significant impact on the Jordanian banking sector risk-taking (LC, RWA, and Z-score) 
behaviour with a coefficient of 0.02, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.  
Dep, ROE, and CAP are positively correlated with the Jordanian banking sector risk-
taking (LLP) with coefficients of 0.08, 0.09, and 0.16 respectively. The results are explained 
by the fact that Jordanian banks with high capital buffers engage in much riskier activities. 
These results also correspond with the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) levels in the Jordanian 
banking sector, ranging between 18.0 percent and 21.0 percent during the years 2007-2015. 
The CAR levels are generally higher by a comfortable margin than the limit set by the CBJ of 
12.0 percent and the limit specified by Basel Committee of 8.0 percent. The CAR increased to 
19.1 percent at the end of 2015. The results also show that after the global financial crises, the 
loan and CAP has positive significant impacts on the Jordanian banking sector risk levels. 
In regard to the liquidity funding risk model in Table 7.13, the results show that before 
the global financial crises, loan and CAP have a negative significant impact on the funding 
liquidity risk with coefficients of 0.16 and 0.63 respectively. While during the global financial 
crises, CAP maintains its negative relationship with the liquidity funding risk with a coefficient 
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of 1.14. The results suggest that increasing capital buffer and bank profits decrease the liquidity 
funding risk. ROA has a significant negative impact on the funding liquidity risk with a 
coefficient of 8.04, in the period that followed the global financial crisis. It is worth mentioning 
that the rate of return on assets (ROA) in Jordan’s banking system also witnessed a sharp 
decline in the 2006-2010 period that include and also followed the global financial crises. ROA 
rates reached 1.7 percent at the end of 2006 and declined to 1.1% at the end of 2009.  
Table 7.14 shows the DiD estimation results of the impact of the deposit insurance 
scheme on Jordanian commercial bank liquidity creation during the period 1995-2015. While 
Table 7.15 reports the estimation results during two sub-periods, before (1995-1999) and after 
(2000-2015) the system implementation. The result show that in general banks enrolled in the 
deposit insurance scheme have a significant decrease of a value 4.37 on the rates of liquidity 
creation. The sign remains negative in describing the relationship between deposit insurance 
and the impact of capital on liquidity creation during the 2 sub-periods. 
Theoretically, lower funding liquidity risk can induce bank managers to engage in more 
aggressive lending practices as shown by (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) who present this 
theoretical evidence. In line with this view, banks with greater access to deposit funding during 
the financial crisis were willing to lend more than those that relied more on short-term debt 
financing as shown by (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Similarly, (Wagner, 2007) show that 
higher liquidity can increase banking system instability. our results show that liquidity funding, 
loan, and ROA have significantly positive relationships with liquidity creation. The results 
suggest that in the presence of the deposit insurance scheme, banks with excessive deposits 
have less liquidity funding risk which in turn reduces the probability of bank runs. While those 
Jordanian banks’ that lend more are typically riskier. Ass and CAP improve liquidity creation 
with coefficients of 13.79 and 0.53, respectively, suggesting that Jordanian banks with higher 
capital buffers tend to take less risk relative to banks with lower capital buffers. The major 
finding is that the “financial fragility/crowding out” hypothesis explains better our findings in 
relation to the negative relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation variable. The 
analysis provides robust evidence support the negative relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation before and during the implementation of the deposit insurance scheme for 
the Jordanian banking system. In other words, greater liquidity creation leads to lower levels 
of capital. the explanation of this finding that the increased liquidity creation is associated with 
increased deposits that crowd out capital in Jordanian banks especially after the huge amount 
of refugee deposits during the Arab spring for the (Iraqi and Syrian refugees). The interest rate 
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that paid on the deposit fluctuates between 3 and 5 percent during the study period which is a 
safe investment for the individuals. This improvement of the depositor access leads to reduces 
the incentives for bank managers to search for external funding, including the capital. We can 
interpret this finding because of the improved access to the depositor base would reduce the 
incentives for Jordanian commercial banks managers to search for external funding, including 
the capital. Our results in line with (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) and F(ungáčová et al., 2010) 
who find a negative impact from the capital on liquidity creation. A negative impact of capital 
on liquidity creation would the results suggest that greater capital requirements may hamper 
liquidity creation noting that the Jordanian banks hold greater than the minimum of the capital 
requirement (reach 21% during the study period).  
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to study the impact of banks’ funding liquidity risk on the Jordanian 
commercial banks' risk-taking behavior using panel data of 13 commercial banks and covering 
the period 2003-2015. We use fixed and random effects estimation methodologies to 
empirically define the main determinants of the different risk measures of the Jordanian 
commercial banks. The analysis extends to determine also the major factors of the bank’s 
liquidity funding. DiD method is used to analyze the impact of implementing the deposit 
insurance scheme in 2000 on Jordanian banks' liquidity creation. This chapter attempts to 
address the following research questions, 1) does size affect liquidity funding? 2) does 
capitalization affect liquidity funding? 3) do crises periods affect liquidity funding? 4) does 
size affect liquidity creation? 5) does capitalization affect liquidity creation? and 6) do crises 
periods affect liquidity creation?  
In this study, we find evidence support (Acharya and Naqvi’s, 2012) theoretical 
prediction that decreases in banks’ funding liquidity risk as proxied by deposits leads to an 
increase in bank risk. We found a significant inverse relationship between banks’ funding 
liquidity risk and bank risk-taking.  In theory, a large flow of deposit funding encourages more 
aggressive lending at lower interest rates. In support of this, we find that an increase in deposit 
funding is consistently followed by an increase in banks’ risk-weighted assets and liquidity 
creation. Moreover, an increase in deposit funding increases overall bank risk. The key 
empirical findings concern the risk determinants of liquidity financing and indicate that 
Jordanian banks with greater resources participate in riskier behavior than other banks. 
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Increased deposit financing also increases both the creation of liquidity and risk-weighted 
assets. High capital adequacy ratios, bank size, and high profits are also found to enhance 
banks’ capacity to increase provisions and mitigate potential losses out of any financial shocks. 
The results show also that capital buffer and profit decrease liquidity funding risk which is 
broadly in line with previous results that confirm that well-capitalized banks with high-profit 
profiles are better protected against shocks, confirming (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005). 
Macroeconomic instability in terms of high unemployment and inflation rates are also found 
to feed into higher bank risks. The DiD results show that banks with excessive deposits tend to 
have less liquidity funding risk after implementing the deposit insurance scheme, which in turn 
reduces the probability of bank “run". overall, bank size and capital buffers help to minimize 
the Jordanian commercial banks’ risk-taking behaviour in response to decreased funding 
liquidity risk. 
Jordanian commercial banks are more conservative even during the financial crises as 
they are monitored and controlled by the CBJ. Since 2000, the implementation of deposit 
insurance has not changed the negative relationship between bank capital and the creation of 
liquidity. The analysis provides robust evidence to support the negative relationship between 
capital and liquidity creation before and during the implementation of the Jordanian banking 
deposit insurance scheme. There seems to be a clear tradeoff between imposing bank capital 
requirements to maintain the financial system stability, and the process of liquidity creation to 
enhance banks’ capital assets. This trade-off needs to be carefully considered when decision-
makers and regulators design new policies or levy new measures on the Jordanian commercial 
banks. Our results in line with (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) and (Fungáčová et al., 2010) who 
find a negative impact from the capital on liquidity creation. A negative impact of capital on 
liquidity creation would the results suggest that greater capital requirements may hamper 
liquidity creation. 
The ratio of total equity to total assets (CAP) is significant and positively correlated 
with RWA (credit risk). Size is also positively correlated with risk-weighted assets, the results 
are in line with the findings of (Boyd and Runkle, 1993), (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997), and 
(De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). A significant robust positive relationship between loan and 
liquidity creation which is consistent with the findings of (Acharya and Naqvi’s, 2012), NPL 
negatively affects liquidity creation. Loan is positively correlated with liquidity creation; thesis 
results suggest that the excessive lending behavior of Jordanian commercial banks increases 
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the chances of credit and default risks. In line with (Acharya and Naqvi’s, 2012). Both ROA 
and ROE have a negative relationship with loan loss provisions and z-score. The results show 
that there is a significant negative relationship between loan, ROE, CAP, IRB and funding 
liquidity risk, which suggests that an increase in the capital buffer and profit will decrease the 
liquidity funding risk and are in line with previous results that confirm that well-capitalized 
banks with high-profit profiles are better protected against shocks (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005). 
The results for the 3 sub-periods: before, during and after the global financial crises show that 
before the 2008 crises, size has a negative and significant impact on the Jordanian banking 
sector risk-taking (LLP and z-score). The results indicate that the larger Jordanian banks are 
safer and more stable in line with (Boyd and Runkle, 1993), (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997), and 
(De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012). During the global financial crises, NPL is shown to have a 
negative and significant impact on the Jordanian banking sector risk-taking (LC, RWA, and Z-
score) behavior. Dep, ROE, and CAP are positively correlated with the Jordanian banking 
sector risk-taking (LLP). The results are explained by the fact that Jordanian banks with high 
capital buffers engage in much riskier activities. These results also correspond with the capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) levels in the Jordanian banking sector which range between 18.0 percent 
and 21.0 percent during the years 2007-2015. 
With regard to the liquidity financing risk model, the results show that, prior to the 
global financial crisis, the credit and CAP have had a significant negative impact on the 
liquidity risk of financing. While CAP maintains its negative relationship with liquidity 
financing risk during the global financial crisis. The results suggest that increasing capital 















This chapter summarises and concludes this thesis. First a summary of the thesis is provided, 
followed by a discussion of the main findings of the three main chapters, the empirical findings 
of which fills the gap in the existing literature on the issues examined using Jordanian bank 
and other economic data. We then discuss the implications of this thesis with respect to how 
the Jordanian Central Bank (CBJ) and other policy makers improve and develop banking in 
Jordan. We proceed by briefly discussing the main limitations faced in completing this thesis 
and then provide directions for future research by focusing on two possible areas for research. 
The chapter concludes by providing a summary conclusion and highlight the main contribution 
made by the three chapters. 
Commercial banks in Jordan are vital for financing other sectors. The turmoil in the MENA 
region and the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2010 and the Global Financial Crisis 
exacerbated the challenges that banks in MENA area face, including Jordan.The importance 
of the study is to investigate the impact of the reform program, Arab Spring, Global Financial 
Crises, and the Basel I, II and III on the Jordanian commercial banks during the 2003 and 
2015. The research studied the 13 Jordanian commercial banks that listed in Amman Stock 
Exchange which they present 94% of the Jordanian banking system assets, the study covers 
the main driver banks in the Jordanian banking system in addition to the availability of the 
data that we need to the analysis purposes. The minimum CAR of the CBJ is 12% and the 
Jordanian commercial banks CAR reached 21% which give the importance to study the 
impact of the high CAR on the bank performance and the risk-taking behavior. One of the 
main reasons behind this investigation is the rare of the studies that examined the same topic 
in the Middle East in general and especially in Jordan. The study's findings are important as 
it give and highlight the impact of the new capital requirement regulations, liquidity risk, and 
risk-based capital regulation on the Jordanian commercial banks, which directly may help the 
CBJ regulators take the right and logical decision to improve and enhance the sector. It is 
helping the banks manager as well to take the right decision to minimize the banks risks. 
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Again, this study only focused on one aspect of banking sector indicators, which is a risk, and 
overlooked indicators related to productivity, efficiency, and profitability. Thus, there is a 
need for a comprehensive empirical assessment of the impact of the recent CBJ reforms on 
performance, risk, and efficiency indicators. This research is the first of its kind to cover an 
extended time span from 2003 until 2015 while considering the effects of some major 
incidences namely the 2008 global financial crises, Basel II and III accords announcements 
and regional political shocks such as the Arab Spring in the Middle East area and especially 
Jordan which makes a direct contribution to the existing literature by filling this gap in the 
Middle East area. 
This thesis contains seven chapters, chapter one presents the introduction, chapter two 
provides a survey of the literature, and chapter three provides background on the development 
of Jordanian banking sector since 1990. The main empirical chapters that are the core of this 
thesis are chapter four, five, six and seven, the findings of which fill the gaps in the existing 
literature using Jordanian bank and other economic data. We used a sample of 13 commercial 
banks operating in Jordan’s banking sector over the period 2003-2015. 
8.2 Summary of the main findings 
The main objective of the first empirical chapter, chapter 4 was to assess the effects of 
competition, risk, and market interest rate on Jordanian bank profitability. The methods of 
Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), and Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) approaches to aid our research strategy. The issues examined throughout this thesis is 
motivated by recent studies. Our study builds on the work of (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992 
and Bikkera and Vervliet (2018), by extending the investigation to Jordanian commercial banks 
by incorporating more variables and in assessing the impact of competition, liquidity risk, and 
interest rate on bank profitability and risk-taking behavior. The study also makes use of more 
factors to show its effects on Jordanian bank profitability. We start our analysis by 
implementing the model of (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) which is based on a test statistic H, to 
assess the state of competition in the Jordanian banking sector. Both the FE and RE methods 
account for biasness in omitted variables that arise from ignoring the time-invariant 
characteristics correlated with the dependent variables and which cannot be accounted for. The 
GMM method is a dynamic modelling technique that permits the inclusion of lagged dependent 
variable as one of the right-hand side variables while accounting for the endogenous nature of 
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some of the variables by replacing them with their lagged and lagged differenced values. The 
findings of this chapter show the improvement of Jordanian commercial banks profitability and 
efficiency which is evidence that an increasing number of banks improved their 
competitiveness which ultimately impact bank performance, while also minimizing 
concentration (wherein the concentration ratio decreased from75 per cent to 53.9 per cent in 
2015), decreasing the interest rate which, in turn, encouraged lending that affected investment 
activities positively. The findings also indicate a positive impact of competition on bank 
profitability, thus supporting the results of (Petria et al., 2015) who found a positive influence 
of competition on bank profitability. Liquidity risk was also found to have a significant positive 
impact on profitability which support the results of (Bourke, 1989) who found evidence of a 
positive relationship between liquidity risk and bank profitability. The results suggest that 
short-term interest rate has no significant impact on profitability and risk measures, thus 
supporting the findings of (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009) and (Bikker and Hu, 2002). 
The main goal of the second empirical chapters, chapter 5, was to examine the 
relationship between bank efficiency, capital, and risk of Jordanian commercial. This was 
important to understand the impact of capital requirements on the Jordanian bank efficiency 
and performance. We build on the contribution of (Tan and Floros, 2013) by examine the 
magnitude and direction of the dynamic relationships between bank efficiency/productivity, 
capital, risk. The two chapters use the pooled OLS, FE and RE methods previously discussed 
in addition to the Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS) method for chapter 5 which we use to 
estimate a system of equations that employ different risk indicators. This method has been used 
by (Tan and Floros, 2013) and (Rime, 2001). 3SLS is a remedy for the problem of endogeneity 
between bank efficiency, risk, and capital.  Using 3SLS is that it provides consistent estimates 
of the parameters and is also a full information modelling technique that estimates all the 
parameters simultaneously and incorporates the cross-equation correlations and produces 
parameter estimates that are asymptotically more efficient than Two-Stage Least Square 
(2SLS). To calculate bank efficiency (Eff/O), I use the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) 
which uses distance functions to measure changes in productivity. I measure technical 
efficiencies using the non-parametric method, Data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique 
which has been used by Paul & (Kourouche, 2008) and (Alkhathlan and Abdul Malik, 2010a) 
among others. The empirical evidence suggests that risk harms capital and efficiency which 
supports the findings of (Demsetz et al, 1997), (Tan and Floros, 2013) and (Salas and Saurina, 




The main goal of the third empirical chapters, chapter 6, we examined the relationship 
between bank efficiency, competition on the cost of credit using data for 13 Jordanian 
commercial banks and 118 firms during the period 2003-2015. In the measurement of 
efficiency, we use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. Unlike what was expected, 
the efficiency of the banking sector has no impact on firms’ cost of credit, other determinants 
such as firm size, bank competition, and GDP are found to be the main moderatos of the 
borrowing costs. Our results are in line with (Fungáčová et al., 2014). The results show the 
favourable impact of the program and liberalization on the bank efficiency which improve the 
household and business to accesses credit. The results show no differences in findings 
regarding the impact of variables on the cost of credit for both large and small banks. The only 
difference found with the Tangibility as the variable shows a positive significant impact on the 
cost of credit in the large-sized firms while it is insignificant for small-sized firms.  The positive 
relation explained as the Tangibility defined as the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
A greater share of tangible fixed assets that could serve as collateral can contribute to easier 
access to credit and may indicate better opportunities for obtaining external financing
The main objective of the fourth empirical chapter, chapter 7, was to examine the 
impact of banks’ funding liquidity risk on Jordanian commercial banks' risk-taking behaviour. 
This was important in order to understand the factors affecting Jordanian banking sector 
liquidity risk and capital. The issues examined throughout this chapter is motivated by recent 
studies. And we build on the contribution of (Khan et al., 2017) by investigating the 
relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk-taking and extend their study by looking 
at the impact of imposed Jordanian deposit insurance scheme. For this empirical exercise, I use 
the FE and RE estimation methodologies to empirically define the main determinants of the 
different risk measures of Jordanian commercial banks. The analysis undertaken is extended to 
determine the major factors of the banks' liquidity funding. I also use the Difference in 
Difference (DID) method to analyse the impact of the deposit insurance scheme implemented 
in Jordan in 2000 to gauge Jordanian banks' liquidity creation. In this respect, I compare 
changes in liquidity creation before and after the implementation of deposit insurance. The DID 
approach is usually used to estimate the effect of a specific intervention (deposit insurance 
scheme) by comparing the changes in outcomes over time between a group that is enrolled in 
a program and a group that is not. The empirical results show that Jordanian banks with larger 
capital engage in more risky actions than other banks. The results show that capital buffer and 
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profit decrease liquidity funding risk which is broadly in line with previous results that confirm 
that well-capitalized banks with high-profit profiles are better protected against shocks which 
is broadly consistent with the findings of (Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005). The results also show 
that before the global financial crises, loan and CAP have a negative significant impact on the 
funding liquidity risk. While during the global financial crises, CAP maintains its negative 
relationship with the liquidity funding risk, the study results show that bank size and capital 
buffers help to minimize the Jordanian commercial banks’ risk-taking behaviour in response 
to decreased funding liquidity risk which is consistent with the findings of (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009) and (Fungáčová et al., 2010) who find a negative impact from the capital on 
liquidity creation. 
The findings of this study show liquidity risk to be one of the most significant risks that 
Jordanian commercial banks must mitigate against most of these banks rely on central bank 
guidelines to manage and set their liquidity and funding liquidity risk limits. The breadth of 
commercial banks’ activities in Jordan as regards financing most of the economic sectors in 
the country through their role as financial intermediaries marks the importance of shielding 
them from liquidity risks. The thesis analyzed the impact of some factors such as profitability, 
capital, credit, size, competition. efficiency, risk, and other variables on the Jordanian 
banking performance and stability. 
 
8.3 Research Contribution 
The research contributes to the existing body of knowledge through providing a fair 
assessment of the impact of the reform program, the deregulation, and the new capital 
requirements on the Jordanian banking system performance, as to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge; very few studies have yet been concerned with the impact of new capital 
requirements framework in the MENA region in general and in Jordan specifically. This 
research will cover all Jordan commercial banks to investigating the impact of competition, 
risk, and interest rate on Jordanian commercial banks profitability, in addition to the 
relationship between Jordanian bank efficiency, capital and risk, and the relationship between 
funding liquidity risk and Jordanian bank risk-taking, capital, and size for the period between 
2003and 2015. In additions, this research will enrich the existing literature of the techniques 
that could applied in other banks environments. The shape of this study could be helpful for 
the researchers in field of risk management studies and banking performance.  
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The outcome of the analysis shows that how the political volatility of the region and its 
impact on banks operations, commercial banks are using different metrics to set their 
exposures although the macroeconomic, regulatory and products are relatively the same, 
pointing to the level of risk appetite on which these banks operate and their dependency on 
the central bank in setting metrics for risks. Shedding light on the vulnerability of the banking 
system in Jordan to the political instability in the region, which impacts both macroeconomic 
and financial conditions. This is reflected in banks’ risk appetites as most banks indicated 
that they are avoiding high-risk exposures to reduce their overall risk. 
Therefore, this study is one of the first studies to present the impact of the capital 
requirements and risk-based capital within the population of commercial banks in Jordan and 
tests whether the reform program and deregulation is effective in commercial banks through 
employing a set of sub-hypotheses related to the main types of risks, such as liquidity and 
credit, risks. It also looks at liquidity funding plans that banks adopt based on their 
supervisory authorities’ instructions. Furthermore, this thesis assesses the impact of various 
variables related to banking operations and the regulatory framework in Jordan, including the 
impact of macroeconomic conditions on Jordanian commercial banks’ profitability, 
efficiency, and liquidity. The study deducts useful conclusions and recommendations that 
would help the banking industry to enhance banks performance and efficiency and help banks 
to develop a comprehensive and applicable framework tailored to the Jordanian banking 
system by identifying the main factors that impact profitability, efficiency, and liquidity risk.  
The results indicate that internal factors have a major impact on the profitability, 
efficiency, and liquidity risk as the strategic plan of commercial banks impact the structure of 
banks’ balance sheet and their operations, and thereby their liquidity positions and risk 
exposures. Therefore, having a consistent strategic plan that is aligned with the bank goals 
regarding maximizing profits and risk appetite, while mitigating against risk exposures, is 
imperative to control changes in these factors. For example, the results indicated that 
profitability had a positive impact on liquidity risk, which in the case of Jordanian banks should 
be warranted by the limited resources that banks have, their limited access to wholesale 
funding, and their reliance on conventional banking as their primary means of generating 
revenues. On the other hand, the importance of having efficient management who are able to 
set strategic plans and limits on risk exposures and risk appetite taking the regulatory and 
macroeconomic circumstances in Jordan into consideration.  
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To the best of my knowledge, the study found no previous research on Jordanian 
banking covers the main objectives of this study. Overall, the empirical work presented in these 
chapters fills an important gap in the empirical literature by investigating the impact of 
competition, risk and interest rate on Jordanian commercial banks profitability, in addition to 
the relationship between Jordanian bank efficiency, capital and risk, and the relationship 
between funding liquidity risk and Jordanian bank risk-taking, capital, and size for the period 
between 2003and 2015 which should help to inform policy makers on how to move forward, 
with respect to policy measures, to improve the environment in which Jordanian banks operate. 
8.4 Policy Implications and Recommendations 
The results of this study provide some implications for policy-makers, banks shareholders, 
academics, as well as, regulatory institutions such as the central bank of Jordan. Central banks 
in countries with a similar banking sector may find the results useful for drafting regulations 
and policies related to liquidity risk management in commercial banks. This would help to 
safeguard the banking sector by encouraging banks to develop guidelines for bank performance 
(profitability, efficiency and liquidity risk) that promote transparency in risk management. 
Regulators could also use this study to set guidelines built on the recommendations of the Basel 
committee. If shared with other research, the general findings in this study will have remarkable 
implications in improving the bank's performance and chart up risk’s identifications for 
financial institutions. 
The main conclusions of the research clearly show that internal factors have the biggest 
impact on bank profitability, efficiency, and liquidity risk. As the Jordanian commercial banks 
are concerned with meeting the liquidity requirements set by the central bank. This is an 
indicator of the comprehensive framework for liquidity management at commercial banks 
given the limited resources. This highlights the importance of the regulatory body to help banks 
construct a framework for liquidity management that takes a holistic approach to dealing with 
transparency in risk management, proper delegation of authorities, adequate reporting, and 
funding sources. Such frameworks should be a part of the strategic plans and targets set by 
banks. It is hard to set out one best strategy for liquidity management – but multi strategies can 
be adopted to achieve banks goals in profit and growth and enhance commercial banks’ abilities 
in managing their liquidity positions and risks. It is worth to point out the growth in banks’ 
balance sheet is crucial, it needs an appropriate framework to support this growth and minimize 
the risks. Therefore, banks’ risk-taking behaviour strategies should be organised with other risk 
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plans implemented first followed by banks goals to support and ensuring banks sustainable 
growth. Accordingly, the main recommendations from the thesis can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
Clear framework for liquidity risk management: The Jordanian commercial banks 
should ensure the consistency of their liquidity management frameworks with the strategic 
objectives of operational divisions, considering the asset and liability structures, capital 
positions and liquidity on different stages. The liquidity risk framework is extremely important 
from the viewpoint of ensuring the soundness and suitability of banking system, and the bank 
management is responsible for taking the initiative in the chart up a clear liquidity risk 
management framework and reviewing occasionally whether the framework is appropriate to 
the bank risk profile (such as liquidity, interest rate and credit risk), and the nature of its 
business.  
Enhancing coordination between banks and supervisory authorities: Supervisory 
authorities, represented by the central bank in Jordan, have taken a keen interest in supervising 
financial institutions’ liquidity positions as well as liquidity risk levels, especially after the 
Global Financial Crisis, which urged the Basel committee to issue the Basel III guidelines that 
are mainly concerned with liquidity management. These changes have increased the regulatory 
burden on the central bank and increased banks’ reliance on its guidelines with regards to 
liquidity, as shown by the study results. Accordingly, banks could still be lacking a 
comprehensive framework related to liquidity risk management. Therefore, increased 
coordination between banks and central banks is needed through establish systems for 
assessing and measure risks. The study results indicated that the new regulations and the 
liberalization processes are effective in most Jordanian commercial banks, as supported by the 
results of the sub-hypotheses. Still, some actions should be taken to insulate banks from 
liquidity risks and improve profitability and efficiency, taking into consideration the political 
instability in the region and its impact on the macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, the 
supervisory authorities, represented by the central bank, should take into consideration the 
results of this study given the emphasis of Basel III on liquidity management.  
Besides, this thesis have some important policy implications for the Amman stock 
exchange (ASE), Jordanian banking regulatory authorities, the CBJ regulators and bank 
managers, as it provides rigorous empirical investigations of profit, efficiency, and risk 
exposure determinants of the Jordanian banking sector. Our findings should steer policymakers 
towards designing appropriate and fair regulations to enhance bank performance while at the 
206 
 
same time ensuring the stability of the Jordanian financial system. The findings of chapter five 
and six should encourage bank managers and regulators to enforce tighter restrictions and to 
apply effective risk management practices to ensure financial stability and mitigate potential 
losses of any internal or external shocks. The CBJ reform phases and the introduction of the 
deposit insurance scheme both carried favorable spillovers on the competitiveness, 
profitability, and stability of the banking sector, however extra efforts are still required to 
enhance the competitiveness of the banking sector and the development of the Amman stock 
market.  
 
Chapter four investigates the impact of competition, liquidity risk, and market interest 
rate environment on Jordanian banks’ profitability results, suggesting that the structure of the 
Jordanian commercial banking industry was characterized by monopolistic competition. This 
result may reflect the domination of the Jordanian commercial banking sector by 3 large banks, 
which together account for over 75 percent of total banking assets.  The large banks tend to 
avoid outright competition against each other. The challenge for Jordanian banking sector 
authorities is to ensure that the ongoing reforms result in greater competition and welfare gains 
for the economy. Therefore, motivating the competitive environment in the market will 
eventually lead to more efficiency. The results show that there is still a need to enhance market 
competition, the positive change in the competitiveness state of the Jordanian banking sector 
corresponds to the entry of six new banks meaning that minimizing the entry of new banks 
restrictions to the Jordanian banking sector will improve the competition and reduce the 
concentration. Careful management is required for the larger number of deposits and the 
acquired capital by Jordanian banks due to the inward migration of Iraqi and Syrian refugees 
to Jordan. more restrictions on the liquidity and capital ratio needed as they protect Jordanian 
banks against future shocks. As a result, Jordanian banks should start to use a wide range of 
products and services to improve banks’ profitability and become less reliant on interest income 
as a result of the low-interest-rate environment. The government should, therefore, desist from 
controlling prices and allow the functioning of market forces. On the other hand, in the highly 
concentrated markets, uncertainty avoidance or risk aversion rather than efficiency become the 
objectives of some banks. Market power (lack of competition) can thus lead to reduced 
efficiency. The policy implication for this result suggests that mergers between banks could 
strengthen the market power. With a high degree of concentration, it is possible that the “quiet 
life” hypothesis will come into play in Jordan. That is, as firms enjoy greater market power and 
concentration, inefficiency follows not because of non-competitive pricing but more so because 
207 
 
of a relaxed environment with no incentives to minimize costs. Thus, if the market 
concentration is leading to lower efficiency, the government policy of encouraging the bank 
mergers between banks needs to be approached with caution. it supports the favorable 
spillovers of the reform policies on the overall profitability and efficiency of the Jordanian 
banking sector. However, chapter four empirical results confirm the low competitive nature of 
the banking sector and stress the need for enhancing market competition. The results also 
suggest that higher total banks’ assets may not necessarily lead to higher profits and that careful 
management by bank managers is required due to the unexpected booming in the number of 
deposits and capital by Jordanian banks due to the inward migration of Iraqi and Syrian 
refugees to Jordan. The unplanned escalation in bank capital may encourage bank managers' 
risk-taking behaviour and enhance the chances of bank default. 
In Chapter five and six, we analyze the relationship between bank 
efficiency/productivity, capital, risk, and cost of credit. DEA results suggest there is improving 
bank efficiency in Jordanian commercial banks. The factors that may influence efficiency have 
been identified in this study and could aid banks and policymakers in devising suitable 
strategies. Inconsistent with the above results, First, large banks are found to be more efficient 
than small banks. Therefore, small banks should be encouraged to become larger. Second, 
banks’ profitability is positively related to efficiency. Third, market power plays an important 
role in inefficiency. Therefore, motivating the competitive environment in the market will 
eventually lead to more efficiency. Fourth, the significance of capital adequacy ratio in 
explaining efficiency implies that banks with higher capital adequacy ratio are less efficient 
since they are risk-averse and prefer safer and lower-earning portfolios. Finally, and more 
importantly, the liberalization is positively related to efficiency, suggesting that a further 
liberalization in the market will eventually lead to more efficiency in the Jordanian banking 
sector. The results show that improving the competitiveness of the banking sector is one 
dimension that requires the attention of bank regulators as it was found to be a significant factor 
in improving capital and efficiency measures and reducing risks in the Jordanian banking 
sector, in addition to contributing significantly to better access to credit by lowering financing 
obstacles for firms.  
Chapter seven studies the impact of banks’ funding liquidity risk on the Jordanian 
commercial banks' risk-taking behavior. It shows that bank size and capital buffers help to 
minimize the Jordanian commercial banks’ risk-taking behaviour in response to decreased 
funding liquidity risk. Also, the introduced deposit insurance scheme has reduced the need for 
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liquidity funding risk for banks with excessive deposits. Policymakers and bank managers need 
to carefully address the tradeoff between imposing bank capital requirements to maintain the 
financial system stability, and the process of liquidity creation to enhance banks’ capital assets. 
This trade-off needs to be carefully considered when designing new policies or levy new 
measures on the Jordanian commercial banks. Jordanian commercial banks are more 
conservative even during the financial crises as they are monitored and controlled by the CBJ. 
Implementing deposit insurance since 2000 has not changed the negative relationship between 
bank capital and liquidity creation. There seems to be a clear tradeoff between imposing bank 
capital requirements to maintain the financial system stability, and the process of liquidity 
creation to enhance banks’ capital assets. This trade-off needs to be carefully considered when 
decision-makers and regulators design new policies or levy new measures on the Jordanian 
commercial banks. The results support the view that the Jordanian banks should improve the 
quality of their assets and reduce their riskiness. The findings of this study show that capital 
buffers and size generally help to curb banks’ risk-taking behavior in response to decreased 
funding liquidity risk. The results may help regulators redesign the banking regulatory 
framework such as (stress analysis) to better discipline and control the perverse incentives of 
bank managers to take too much risk when bank deposits change. 
8.5 Research Limitations 
Although this thesis conducted a study of commercial banking in Jordan, consisting of three 
core chapters, in an in-depth manner, the completion of the thesis was not without its specific 
limitations. This research has the following limitations: 
1. Limited population: The Jordanian economy is a small open economy with a banking 
sector comprised of 21 commercial banks and many of Islamic banks. Therefore, this 
is a limited population to study.  
2. Data limitations: There are 21 commercial banks in Jordan. Thirteen are domestic banks 
and the rest are foreign banks branches. In this part of the study, the analysis only 
included the 13 domestic commercial banks as data for the rest of the population could 
not be obtained through the used database or through manual data entry. Moreover, the 
small-time span of the data is considered another limitation that led to having a 
relatively small dataset. 
3. Lack of prior research studies: According to the best of the researcher's knowledge, 
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very few studies have investigated the impact of internal factors profitability, 
efficiency, and risk at Jordanian commercial banks. And very few studies have yet 
studied the impact of new capital requirement and risk-taking behavior. 
4.  Longitudinal effect: Compared to the long history of literature on bank management in 
both a global as well as domestic context, this research was carried out over a fairly 
short period of time.  
The major limitation was its focus on a limited number of commercial banks in Jordan 
covering the period 2003-2015, which means that time does not consider the effects of the 
historical financial crisis during the 1980s. Regarding some relevant control variables such as 
risk-weighted assets and NPL, we were unable to locate sufficient data for these variables 
especially before 2006 to incorporate them in our models. However, despite the limited data, 
the three Chapters that form the core of the thesis has produced a significant empirical study 
that contributes towards filling the gap in the literature on the behavior of Jordanian banks, 
which should be of some help to bank managers, the CBJ, foreign investors, bank regulators 
and Jordanian policy makers interested in obtaining better understanding of modern day 
developments, including the impact of policy changes, and the changing market environment 
on Jordanian commercial banks.  
8.6 Directions for future research 
Within the confines of this thesis, there are two areas of potential extensions to the issues 
studied that have emerged during our study of Jordanian banking. In our earlier discussion in 
Chapter 3 on the developments in Jordanian banking, we noted that the CBJ implemented a 
series of measures to improve the overall performance of the banking sector, including 
measures based on best practices in corporate governance. Therefore, it would be of interest 
to investigate the extent to which corporate governance initiatives' performance has affected 
the performance of Jordanian banks over the period in which corporate governance measures 
began to take effect. According to the corporate governance literature, successful corporate 
governance structures can improve not only public accountability, but it can also create value, 
enhance operational efficiency, while also minimizing risk exposure. Empirically, this line of 
inquiry could be approached by the application of two common approaches – the parametric 
stochastic frontier approach and the non-parametric data envelop analysis, using the theory 
of agency and a set of governance related data. This line of research would also be of some 
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interest to regulators and policy makers and other MENA countries where corporate 
governance reforms are on the increase.  
A second important issue for further research which follows from our findings reported 
in Chapter 6 concerns the risk preference of Jordanian commercial banks. In regard to this, it 
would be of interest to ascertain which categories of risk preferences best categorise Jordanian 
commercial banks – conservative, moderate or aggressive, especially given the general 
consensus in Jordan which holds that Jordanian commercial banks are conservative in their 
banking practices. Thus, it would be of interest to confirm whether such views hold empirically 
by examining banking efficiency with risk factors taking the risk preferences of Jordanian 
banks into account. Statistically, this could be approached by, in the first instance, a profit 
model using common profit-based variables to study the risk preferences of Jordanian banks. 
Second, a credit model which could be used to determine whether low risk cost affects the risk 
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Appendix A: The Commercial Banks Name 
Appendix 1: The Commercial Banks Name 
Bank Name 
ARAB BANK 
THE HOUSING BANK FOR TRADE AND FINANCE 
JORDAN KUWAIT BANK 
JORDAN AHLI BANK 
BANK OF JORDAN 
CAIRO AMMAN BANK 
ARAB BANKING CORPORATION /(JORDAN) 
BANK AL ETIHAD 
CAPITAL BANK OF JORDAN 
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JORDAN COMMERCIAL BANK 
SOCIETE GENERALE DE BANQUE - JORDANIE 




Appendix 2: The Firms Size and Sector. 
Firm Name Sector Size (Total Assets) Firm Name Sector Size (Total Assets) 
JORDAN CHEMICAL 
INDUSTRIES 
Industrial  6556000 
JORDAN TRADE FAC 
services 38273000 
JORDAN COM  
Industrial  1482983000 
JORDAN VEGETABLE OIL  
Industrial  6282000 
JORDAN DAIRY 
Industrial  11602000 JORDAN WOOD 
INDUSTRIES / JWICO 
Industrial  13786000 
JORDANIAN 
ELECTRIC  
Industrial  898442000 
JORDAN WORSTED MILLS  
Services 76423000 
JORDAN HOTELS  
Services 34924000 
JORDAN INDUSTRIAL  
Industrial  19292000 
JORDAN INTER TIO L  






JORDAN CEM  




Industrial  35853000 











Industrial  62713000 
INTERNATIONAL POULTRY 
PLC  






Industrial  13187000 
JORDAN STEEL PLC  
Industrial  67812000 PHILADELPHIA 
PHARMACEEUTICALS 





AL EQBAL INVEST  






MIDDLE EAST INSURANC  
Services 78022000 
ARAB EAST FOR 
INVEST  
Services 73266000 
INTERNATIONAL CHLORINE  
Industrial  19043000 
ARAB 
INTERNATIONAL  
Industrial  75158000 INTERNATIONAL 
PORTFOLIO  
Services  11701000 
ARAB PHOENIX 
HOLDING  
Industrial  92822000 INTERNATIONAL STEEL 
INDUSTREAL  
Industrial  6251000 
ASSAS FOR 
CONCRETE 
PRODUCTS CO. LTD 






ELZAY READY WEAR  








Industrial  18236000 
PREMIER BUSINESS AND 
PROJECTS CO.LTD 
Industrial  6815000 
INDUSTRIAL 
COMMERC  
Industrial  25912000 




Industrial  10802000 















Industrial  48283000 
CONSULTANT AND INV  
Services 15679000 
AFAQ FOR ENERGY 
CO. P.L.C 

















Industrial 52068000 JORDAN PRESS 
FOUNDATION/AL-RA'I 
services 11170000 
AL BIL  
Industrial  44184000 JORDAN SULPHO-
CHEMICALS 
Industrial 11058000 
AL QUDS READY MIX  





Industrial  8786000 




Industrial  34153000 
ALAHLIA FOR PROJECT  
Industrial  91009000 
ARAB INTER TIO L  
Industrial  118644000 
INTERNATIONAL CERAMIC 
Industrial  8947000 




RUM ALADDIN INDUSTRIES 
Industrial 13250000 
JORDAN COM  
Industrial  1482983000 TRUST INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
services 544000 
RUM GROUP  
Services 21730000 





UNITED ARAB  






TRANSPORT & TRADING 
services 50752000 
UNION TOBACCO & 
CIGARETTE 
INDUSTRIES 






UNION INVESTMENT  
Services 150518000 AKARY FOR INDUSTRIES 





Industrial  65395000 





AL TAJAMOUAT FOR  
Industrial  9073000 
AD DULAYL 
INDUSTRIAL  




AL ISRA FOR 
EDUCATIO  
Services  45797000 UNIVERSAL MODERN 
INDUSTRIES 
Industrial 11146000 
AL FARIS TIO L IN  
Industrial  30118000 
ALJANOUB FILTERS  
Industrial  3825000 
AL TAJAMOUAT  
Industrial  150128000 
AMA AGRIC  
Industrial  6226000 
ALIA- THE ROYAL 
JORDANIAN 
AIRLINES PLC. 







INVESTMENTS AND  
Services 30103000 
ARAB EAST FOR REAL  















Industrial  10088000 








Services 22824000 AL-QARIA FOOD & 
VEGETABLE OIL 




Industrial  7253000 
DARWISH KHALILI  
Industrial  52780000 
INTERNATIONAL 
BROKER  
Services 22798000 MIDDLE EAST PHARMA. & 
CHMICAL IND. & MEDICAL 
APPLIANCES 
Industrial 19062000 
INTERNATIONAL CO  
Industrial  22798000 MIDDLE EAST COMPLEX 
FOR ENG., ELECTRONICS & 
HEAVY 
Industrial 423031000 
 
 
 
